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Abstract 
Divergence is defined in this thesis as an inconsistency between the human operator’s assumption of the 
system state and the actual state of the system, which is substantial enough to have consequential effects 
on the outcome of the situation. The purpose of this thesis is to explore the concept of divergence and 
develop a framework that can be used to identify the consequential causes of divergence in cases 
involving human-system interaction.  
Many recent aircraft accidents involve divergence between the crew state assumption and the actual 
system state. As aircraft systems and automation become more complex, it’s possible that the 
consequential effects of divergence, illustrated by these accidents, could become more prevalent due to 
the correspondingly more complex understanding that may be required by the crew to effectively operate 
the aircraft.  
Divergence was explored as a concept by (1) understanding the previous literature related to divergence 
such as work on human error, human information processing, situation awareness, and mode awareness 
(2) developing a framework that can be used to understand possible causes of divergence, (3) illustrating 
use of the framework with accident case studies, and (4) discussing the implications of the findings of the 
case study analysis of divergence. 
Human information processing of divergence was developed using the established human information 
processing literature including Wickens (1992), Endsley (1995), and Reason (1990). The framework 
highlighted the inputs to the human and represented human processing of this information in relation to 
formation of a state assumption. The process model was used to identify potential causes of divergence, 
which were hypothesized as human information processing failures affecting the human state assumption, 
and to evaluate the effects of those failures on downstream processes and the human state assumption. 
Eleven accident case studies involving automation mode confusion were conducted to evaluate 
divergence using the process model of divergence. Eight of the case studies involved auto-throttle mode 
confusion and the three remaining cases involved divergence in other automation systems that resulted in 
controlled flight into terrain. The industry implications of the findings of the case studies were then 
discussed.   
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Chapter 1           
             
             
              
Introduction and Motivation 
1.1 Introduction and Motivation 
Divergence is defined in this thesis as an inconsistency between the human operator’s assumption of the 
system state and the actual state of the system, which is substantial enough to have consequential effects 
on the outcome of the situation. The Performance-Based Operations Aviation Rulemaking Committee 
(PARC) and Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) highlighted issues in human-automation 
interaction in their safety report released in 2013 (Performance Based Aviation Rulemaking Committee & 
Commercial Aviation Safety Team, 2013). Relevant findings illustrated evidence of continued deficiency 
of crew understanding of aircraft and automation state as well as the impact of design decisions 
introducing complexity into the system, further contributing to pilot confusion and errors. This thesis 
explores the concept of divergence and develops a framework to identify consequential causes of 
divergence in cases involving human-machine interaction in efforts to ultimately understand causal trends 
and inform mitigations for divergence. Many recent aircraft accidents have involved divergence between 
the crew assumption of system state and the actual system state. As aircraft systems and automation 
become more complex, it is possible that the consequential effects of divergence, likely illustrated by 
these accidents, could become more prevalent (Woods, 1996).1  
                                                      
1 AC/AMC 25.1302 discusses complexity as follows: “Complexity of the system design from the flight 
crew’s perspective is an important factor that may also affect means of compliance in this process. 
Complexity has multiple dimensions. The number of information elements the flight crew has to use (the 
number of pieces of information on a display, for instance) may be an indication of complexity. The level 
of system integration may be a measure of complexity of the system from the flight crew’s perspective. 
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This chapter discusses the previous work relating to divergence including literature regarding human 
error, human information processing, situation awareness, and mode awareness. Following the literature 
review, this chapter illustrates where divergence would fit within the current literature and proposes a 
problem statement. Later, the concept of divergence is formally defined and the objectives of the work are 
presented. Finally, a summary of the thesis organization is provided.  
 “Pilots mitigate safety and operational risks on a frequent bases, and the aviation system is designed to 
rely on that mitigation” (Performance Based Aviation Rulemaking Committee & Commercial Aviation 
Safety Team, 2013). This reliance on the human for robust reaction to abnormal events indicates the 
importance of ensuring effective human-system interaction. While automation has contributed to 
improvements in safety, operational efficiency, and precise flight path management, this technology 
development has introduced vulnerability into the system at the boundary between the user and the 
system (Performance Based Aviation Rulemaking Committee & Commercial Aviation Safety Team, 
2013). As automation use increases, it becomes more important to address these issues effectively. Figure 
1-1 shows the increase in the number of flights with varying generations of aircraft. The trend is toward 
further use of fly-by-wire systems with higher automation levels, such as envelope protection2. The 
PARC and CAST report also mentions that as the scope of operations, combined with complexity of 
airspace, procedures, and automated tools on the flight deck has evolved, there is a corresponding 
increase in the set of required skills and knowledge that pilots need for flight path energy management in 
today’s complex aircraft and airspace. Divergence could occur when this knowledge requirement may 
either have too high of an expectation for human comprehension, or when the skills pilots use, such as 
supervisory control and observation, become ineffective. In order to provide a basis for the discussion in 
this thesis, the following description of divergence is provided.  
                                                                                                                                                                              
Design of controls can also be complex. An example would be a knob with multiple control modes.” 
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2013) 
2 Envelope protection refers to automation systems that are designed to take control of the aircraft 
automatically to avoid flight outside of the flight envelope.  
  
25 
 
Figure 1-1. Yearly number of flights trend based on generation of aircraft (Airbus Industrie, 2014) 
Figure 1-2 illustrates a basic schematic of how the actual system state and human system state are related. 
As can be seen in the figure, the human state assumption is formed using the human’s information 
processing system transforming the data from actual state into a human state assumption. Thus, at any 
point in time, the human has a mental representation and assumption of the actual state of the system. 
This human state assumption and the actual system state can be compared to evaluate divergence.  
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Figure 1-2. Basis for human state assumption  
Figure 1-3 illustrates one example of possible divergence in human state assumption. At time t = t0, both 
the system state and human assumption of state are consistent. Between time t = t0 and t = t1, both the 
system state and human state transition to State II and remain consistent. However, divergence occurs at 
time t = t2, when the actual state transitions back to State I, however the crew believes the system remains 
in State II. As can be seen by the human state assumption transition from State II to State I at time t = t3, it 
is also possible for re-convergence to occur. 
 
Figure 1-3. Representation of human state assumption and divergence profile through time 
This thesis explores how the human state assumption can be formed and the impact of possible 
divergence on consequences of a situation. While the concept of divergence itself can be used to assess a 
number of various human-systems issues, this thesis explores divergence in automation systems. 
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1.2 Previous Work 
The concept of divergence appears in many different realms of the previous literature. The topics shown 
in Figure 1-4 are discussed in this section as they have specific relation to divergence. Divergence is 
considered to be a subset of human error. Since divergence is determined using the human state 
assumption, human information processing could be used to understand how the human state assumption 
is formed. Divergence falls within the concept of situation awareness (SA), discussing specifically the 
awareness of state. Since mode confusion has been established as a common problem in aviation, 
divergence in state of automation was chosen to illustrate the concept of divergence. Ultimately, this 
literature review sets the stage for where divergence fits within the current human error and human 
information processing literature and discusses its applicability to mode awareness issues. The previous 
literature for these topics is extensive, and this section presents select literature related to the concept of 
divergence.    
 
Figure 1-4. Discussed literature related to divergence 
1.2.1 Human Error Literature 
Human error has been attributed to many high profile accidents in recent history and is not limited to 
aviation. Some of the current literature views human error and knowledge originating from the same 
mental processes (Reason, 1990; Ernst, 1905). The same processes that provide humans with a “rapid 
retrieval system, capable of locating relevant items within a virtually unlimited knowledge base” also 
make humans susceptible to unintentional actions, information overload, and confirmation bias, which 
could contribute to the occurrence of divergence (Reason, 1990). Since the risk associated with 
divergence is the result of an error in performance, it is relevant to discuss how the concept of human 
error has been discussed in the past.  
Assuming that the human holds a prior intention to achieve a certain goal, errors can be discussed with 
respect to whether the action was what was intended or not (Norman, 1981, 1983; Reason, 1990). 
Mistakes refer to cases where the intention itself was not appropriate to achieve the goal. Slips and lapses 
refer to cases where the intention was correct but the action was not what was intended. The difference in 
these error taxonomies reflect the concept of cognitive levels where mistakes as planning failures may 
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more often be related to divergence, but slips could be less straightforward. Mistakes normally arise from 
higher-level processes than slips and lapses as execution failures. The details on types of slips and 
mistakes is further discussed in Section 3.8. 
The slips-mistakes dichotomy focused on assessing more inconsequential action slips that occurred 
through daily life, however Rasmussen and Jensen developed a skill-rule-knowledge based framework 
that incorporated planning errors and accounted for more serious errors that could occur when the human 
holds a supervisory role which is commonly seen in cases of divergence in the cockpit (Rasmussen and 
Jensen, 1974). Skill-based level of performance refers to task performance that is governed by stored 
patterns of pre-programmed instructions and is more automatic in nature.  The rule-based level of 
performance refers to tasks, which may be familiar, in which solutions are governed by stored rules. The 
knowledge based level uses conscious analytical processes and stored processes to plan actions to resolve 
novel situations. Errors in each of these levels manifest differently. Slips and lapses would fall into skill-
based errors, however mistakes can be regarded as rule-based mistakes or knowledge-based mistakes 
depending on what level of cognition is required for the task (Rasmussen, 1985). These distinctions in 
level of cognition allude to possible other factors affecting cognition, which could contribute to errors in 
action. 
Reason proposed the “Swiss Cheese Model” of error causation to link errors to mishaps (Reason 1990). 
These failures can be classified as active failures, which have been discussed thus far as errors in action, 
and latent failures, which are contributory factors, which may lie dormant for a period of time. Shappell 
and Wiegmann expanded on Reason’s Swiss cheese model to create the Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System (HFACS), defining types of failures and categorized them into Unsafe Acts, 
Preconditions for Unsafe Actions, Unsafe Supervision, Organizational Influences (Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 2000). While unsafe actions are active failures, divergence is concerned about the underlying 
causes of those unsafe actions. The preconditions to unsafe acts provide insight into what factors may 
contribute to divergence. These preconditions could include adverse mental states such as task saturation, 
physical limitations, as well as crew resource management problems. The causes of these pre-conditions 
could be linked to unsafe supervision such as poor training practices or lack of guidance from an airline 
for example. Ultimately this unsafe supervision could be linked to organizational influences such as 
funding or resource limitations. This framework identifies aspects of how unsafe acts originate and where 
those underlying preconditions can also originate.  
Reason attempted to capture all error with his concept of the “Fallible Machine” model by modeling not 
only correct performance but also predictable varieties of fallibility (Reason, 1990). Reason’s model of a 
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fallible machine incorporates the erroneous, or fallible, behavior of humans (Reason, 1990). The structure 
of the framework includes a Knowledge Base (KB) and a Working Memory (WM) that is further divided 
into a Focal Working Memory (FWM) and a Peripheral Working Memory (PWM). According to this 
model, the PWM is an area of vast capacity that receives information directly from the outside world and 
the knowledge base. This information is filtered into the FWM, which is an area of limited capacity.  
A novel aspect of this model is the description of retrieval mechanisms applied to compare perceived 
information to the knowledge base content and to select between alternative situations. These include 
Similarity Matching (SM), Frequency Gambling (FG) and the process of Direct Search (DS). SM refers to 
a search within the KB for matches to the information perceived from the external world. This search 
could identify a number of frames that satisfies matching conditions. Thus, it may be necessary to apply 
FG where the multiple frames are filtered for the frame that is most familiar or most frequently 
encountered in the past. The literature continues on to suggest that it may be possible for the SM step to 
be skipped and to call the FG directly. In some cases, it may be possible that the SM and FG processes 
may not be able to deliver a “definite” appropriate plan of action. At this point the model describes the 
method of DS. In DS, the frequent interaction between KB and memory can be used to develop an 
unfamiliar situation that could explain cues from the environment. This may include searching the 
environment for further cues or reasoning through the situation to develop a plan of action.  
Reason suggests that the prime generators of errors in human behavior are the retrieval mechanisms of 
SM and FG. Norman (1981) and Reason (1979) suggest that retrieval mechanisms function using an 
activation-trigger schema, implying that activators can trigger certain schema to search the KB. Two 
types of activators include specific activators, which use a mental model that is composed of explanations 
of intended actions and plans, and general activators, which provide contextual and affective background 
information regardless of intentions. Norman and Reason suggest that errors mostly appear when schemas 
are appropriately chosen and activated, but are misapplied. This representation of the retrieval 
mechanisms as an activation-trigger schema system illustrates how the short term memory can handle 
familiar knowledge with speed and without heavy workloads, but also how error can be introduced into 
the system as an artifact which could provide insight on origins of divergence. While Reason’s fallible 
machine may be able to encompass the errors in action seen in the human, the generality of the model 
doesn’t detail the individual processes that account behaviors within the feedback loop. Thus, it is 
relevant to assess models that discuss individual processes and behaviors within the feedback loop 
captured by previous work on the human information processing system. 
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1.2.2 Human Information Processing Literature 
Human information processing refers to how incoming information is processed through the brain to 
affect aspects such as decision-making and execution. In order to understand divergence, it’s necessary to 
understand how a human processes information and makes a state assumption. There have been a number 
of proposals in the literature concerning the manner in which the human information processing system 
functions and the interaction between components of the processing system.  
A three-stage model of information processing captures perception of a stimulus, cognition of the 
information perceived, and action based on cognition ultimately resulting in a response to the input 
stimulus.  (Sperry, 1952; Thelen & Sperling, 1994). Wickens used the fundamentals of the three stage 
model and developed a representation that is commonly used as a basis for information processing models 
(Wickens & Hollands, 2000).  The Wickens model of information processing is shown in Figure 1-5 
(Wickens & Hollands, 2000). It encompasses the aspects such as sensory processing, perception, 
cognition, response selection and response execution. Wickens illustrates a feedback loop to the 
environment, and also incorporates the distinct effects of attention, long-term memory and working 
memory.  
 
Figure 1-5. Wickens information processing model (Wickens & Hollands, 2000) 
Sensory Processing Store and Buffering - Sensory memory refers to the phenomenon of stimuli 
persisting for a short period after they have been removed from the environment (Standing, Conezio, & 
Haber, 1970). This is an important aspect of information processing, and relevant to divergence as it 
affects input into the perceptual stage. 
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Perception – Perception of the environment is the process by which input of sensory information and 
outputs filtered sensory information to the processes downstream (Henderson & Hollingworth, 1999). 
Physiologically, perception occurs through stimulation of the sensory organs and interpretation of those 
neural signals in the brain (Wolfe et al., 2008). This process can be affected by attention and can occur 
directly or through an intermediary such as displays or instruments; thus, integrity of perception is also 
dependent on these intermediary systems (Endsley, 1999). The ways that displays are designed can also 
influence perception of the information (Nikolic, Orr, & Sarter, 2004). Since perception is the gateway 
into the human, this stage is very important to understanding where the human state assumption 
originates. 
Working Memory/Cognition – Once the perceptual stage has extracted information from the 
environment, cognition takes over to ultimately determine the appropriate response to the signal by 
attaching meaning to that information and forming an understanding of the environment (Schnotz & 
Kürschner, 2008). Cognition processes could include information retrieval from memory in order to 
conduct comparisons between signals and frames in memory. Another aspect of cognition is the ability to 
form an expectation of future states (Herrmann, Buschke, & Gall, 1987).  
Working memory or short term memory refers to a store of limited capacity that is used to temporarily 
represent and retain information for problem-solving and comprehension (Brown, 1958; Peterson & 
Peterson, 1959).  
Long Term Memory - Long term memory (LTM) refers to the store of information that can be recalled 
for processing in the working memory (Cowan, 2008). Long term stores are recalled often to comprehend 
system information, determine what action is appropriate, and actually execute the action (Proctor & Van 
Zandt, 2008). Short-term memory integrates this information and the incoming information from 
perception and aids with cognition. Sensory stores influence the perception of information. Each of these 
memory stores is critical to information processing, so limitations associated with all three types of 
memory could introduce errors into the human information process.    
The term mental model generally describes an abstraction researchers use to explain how knowledge and 
information are represented in the mind (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994). One theory hypothesizes that 
the mental model(s) provides a conceptual framework for explaining and predicting future system states 
(Rouse & Morris, 1985). Examples of mental models in long-term memory are a model of how an aircraft 
automation system is expected to function, or the dynamics of typical weather patterns encountered. As 
evidenced, these long term mental models are built from previous experience and training to provide a 
basis of understanding of the current situation and expected future state of the situation (Cowan, 2008; 
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Norman, 1983). Norman suggested the concept of “gulfs” of execution and evaluation to describe 
discrepancies between internal goals and information specifying the state of the world (Norman, 1986). 
While LTM mental models can contribute a gulf in execution, divergence can be related to the concept of 
the gulf of evaluation which describes “the degree to which the system/artifact provide representations 
that can be directly perceived and interpreted in terms of the expectations and intentions of the user” 
(Norman, 1986). If the degree of similarity in representation is low, it could induce cases of divergence. 
Literature discussing influences to the mental model is extensive. It has been found that creating correct 
mental models by explicit training on underlying causal structures of the system is effective in improving 
performance on novel tasks (Halasz & Moran, 1983). In addition to explicit training of causal structures, 
Schnolz and Kurschner discovered that the form of visualization, such as design influences in a display, 
can affect the structure of mental models ultimately affecting performance on tasks relying purely on the 
mental model (Schnotz & Kürschner, 2008). In addition to different types of training, degree of 
experience was also shown to influence mental models. Bellenkes et al. showed that more experienced 
pilots held a better mental model of cross-coupling and predictive behavior between and within axes of 
the aircraft when flying a simulated pattern (Bellenkes, Wickens, & Kramer, 1997). Although training of 
actual system structure may not always be practical, the concept of visibility could be used to design a 
system where the user can immediately determine the state of the system and possibilities for action 
(Norman, 1988). The literature indicates that the mental model of a system can be dependent both on 
aspects of the human, such as training, experience, and perception, as well as design of the system.  
Expectation is dependent on mental models and has been shown to have an effect on human information 
processing (Deliza & Macfie, 1996; Summerfield & Egner, 2009). Expectation allows tasks to be 
performed faster and more efficiently and has been found to be a contributor to expert behavior 
(Bellenkes et al., 1997; Kasarskis, Stehwien, Hickox, Aretz, & Wickens, 2001). However, it can also 
introduce problems if the expectation or mental models behind the expectation are incorrect. This can 
cause expectation bias and affect perception of incoming information.  
Expectation bias can refer to the manipulation of perceived elements to values consistent with the 
human’s expectation (Bhattacherjee, 2001). This is distinct confirmation bias, which describes the 
cognitive phenomenon of humans seeking confirming evidence in perception supporting their 
expectations and discounting evidence that disproves their expectation (Nickerson, 1998). For the purpose 
of this thesis, expectation bias is used to describe effects of both confirmation bias and the manipulation 
of perceived elements to values consistent with expectation. This can be explained using Reason’s 
concept of retrieval mechanisms. While nominal retrieval may conduct similarity matching first and then 
follow up with frequency gambling to pick a single option, it is possible that FG could occur without SM; 
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this would be an example of how expectation bias could manifest within Reason’s construct. If a state is 
chosen with only regard to the frequency it occurs or its familiarity, this effectively bypasses the 
observation and could introduce errors if this occurrence is inappropriate for the situation. 
Overall, cognition incorporates processing of information and expectation in order to form an 
understanding of the situation relevant to a given task at hand. This understanding can include a 
representation of a human state assumption with which many of the other processes likely interact. The 
decision making process can be dependent on cognition and if divergence exists, would be directly 
affected by it. Planning errors based on information from cognition could manifest here.   
Response Selection - There are a number of theories relating to decision-making, or response selection. 
A few examples include the concept of using logic and reasoning, which hypothesizes that when 
conditions are known, decisions are made logically to determine a result using deduction, induction, or 
abduction (Harman, 1984). Klein suggests that decisions are not made logically, but are dependent on 
heuristics representing more naturalistic behavior based on bounded rationality (Klein, 2008; Simon, 
1972; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000). J. Reason suggests that decision making occurs via direct identification, 
elimination, partial identification, or guessing, which could also exhibit stopping behavior based on 
heuristics (Reason, 1990). As decision-making is considered a downstream product of the human state 
assumption, it is discussed as a focus of this thesis. However, it is important to discuss due to the action 
feedback loop. Once a response is chosen, it feeds into response execution. 
Response Execution – Once a decision has been made, if an overt action is required, it is selected, 
programed, and executed in this action stage (Prinz & Hommel, 2003). Physiologically, the response is 
translated into a set of neuromuscular commands that control specific limbs or effectors involved in 
executing the response. Theories of execution are expansive in the literature and include aspects of 
automatic and conscious control (Fitts, 1964; Rasmussen, 1983). These also incorporate the mechanisms 
of motor processors (Kieras & Meyer, 1994). However, if upstream processes are corrupt, execution of a 
corrupt decision may lead to error. This is important to remember as output of the execution process 
defines performance and correspondingly performance errors.  
Attention Resources – Attention can be seen as a limitation input on all processes involved with 
information processing. These limitations could influence the integrity of the output of the process and 
contribute to a poor human state assumption and divergence. James defines attention as “the taking 
possession of the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what may seem several simultaneously 
possible objects or trains of thoughts…It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively 
with others” (James, 1890). There has been much work in different aspects of attention such as focused 
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attention, where it is driven actively in search of information (Hollander, 2000; N. Wood & Cowan, 
1995). Attention can also be directed involuntarily, such as toward salient cues for example (Prinzmetal, 
Ha, & Khani, 2010; Yantis, 2005). Attention has been considered a limiting factor in all stages of human 
information processing, however there are two main theories regarding the source of this limitation and its 
effect on selective or divided attention: bottleneck models and resource models (Hogendoorn, Carlson, 
VanRullen, & Verstraten, 2010; Kahneman, 1973; Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004; Lavie, 1995; 
Treisman, 1969; Wickens, 2002; N. Wood & Cowan, 1995). Bottleneck models hypothesize that 
limitations due to attention are caused by limitations in the information processing sequence where the 
amount of information to which humans can attend to is limited (Broadbent, 1958; Cherry, 1953; N. 
Wood & Cowan, 1995). Resource models, on the other hand, hypothesize that limitations due to attention 
are caused by attentional limitations that arise due to limited capacities available for mental activity 
(Proctor & Van Zandt, 2008). Unitary-resource models consider attention to be a single limited capacity 
resource that can be applied to a variety of cognitive processes (Kahneman, 1973). Conversely, multiple 
resource models suggest that there is not a single pool of resources, but several distinct subsystems of 
attention that each have their own limited pool of resources (Navon & Gopher, 1979; Wickens, 2002). 
Despite evidence supporting both of these theories, research indicates that problems in dual-task 
interference are much more complex then currently understood (Navon & Miller, 1987). 
Wickens’ model built on the three-stage model of perception, cognition, and action; however, Endsley 
expanded on Wickens’ model by incorporating more detail into aspects of situation awareness. 
1.2.3 Situation Awareness Literature 
Endsley’s work focused on how situation awareness fits into human cognition, and she formally defines 
three stages of situation awareness. She theorizes that situation awareness occurs through perception of 
the environment, comprehension of those observations, and projection of the current situation into the 
future. This concept has been well supported in the field (Endsley & Garland, 2000; Endsley, 1996, 1999; 
Wickens, Mccarley, & Thomas, 2003). Figure 1-6 depicts a model of dynamic decision-making 
incorporating situation awareness into human information processing. Endsley adds to Wickens’ model 
by explicating the situation awareness elements and introduces how these elements affect each process in 
the system. Because divergence describes state awareness, a subset of situation awareness, it’s important 
to understand how situation awareness is modeled.   
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Figure 1-6. Endsley’s model of dynamic decision making (Endsley, 1995) 
Errors in situation awareness are defined based on which level in the SA taxonomy it originates in (D. 
Jones & Endsley, 1996). Level 1 errors occur if the human fails “to perceive information or misperceives 
information.” Level 2 errors occur if there is “improper integration or comprehension of information.” 
And Level 3 errors occur if there is “incorrect projection of future actions of the system.” During a study 
conducted using Aviation Safety Reporting System Data, Level 1 errors accounted for 76.3% of SA errors 
in the events analyzed, followed by Level 2 errors (20.3%) and Level 3 (3.4%) errors. This information 
illustrates the criticality of Level 1 SA and distinguishes between cognition related to understanding and 
cognition related to projection.  
Situation awareness has been used extensively to evaluate awareness of the mode of automation. The 
incorporation of automation has increased in reliability, but also introduced complacency into the cockpit 
(D. Jones & Endsley, 1996), some factors which may contribute to the monitoring (Level 1 SA) failures 
that have been seen. The following section discusses literature regarding mode confusion and flight path 
monitoring, which are both possible contributors to divergence. 
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1.2.4 Mode Awareness Literature 
Mode awareness in aviation systems describes the pilot awareness of aircraft configuration and auto-
flight system modes (Sarter & Woods, 1995). If awareness is lost, problems such as automation surprise 
and mode confusion can occur. In addition to issues with understanding of automation, problems in 
monitoring have been discussed in the literature as a potential cause for mode confusion. The literature 
presented here relates to both the issues relevant to mode confusion as well as efforts to assess the 
potential breakdown of pilot monitoring (PM) in the flight deck.  
1.2.4.1 Automation Surprise and Mode Confusion 
The result of divergence in automation state has been captured in much of the literature on aircraft 
automation mode confusion, and is a continuing concern for aviation safety. Automation surprise occurs 
when actual behavior of a system departs from that predicted by its operator’s mental model (Rushby, 
2002). This surprise can affect human response possibly capitalizing human attention following the event 
(Dehais, Peysakhovich, Scannella, Fongue, & Gateau, 2015; Itti & Baldi, 2009). This attention focus on 
the automation could also detract from other basic flight control tasks of the crew, possibly evolving to 
have consequential effects (Dehais et al., 2015). In order to prevent the consequential effects of 
automation surprise, the causes of surprise were evaluated. McDaniel et al.  proposes that surprise can 
emanate from a lack of sufficient information or knowledge and the basic dynamics of complex adaptive 
systems (McDaniel, Jordan, & Fleeman, 2003). Mode confusion is a specific type of automation surprise 
that occurs when the system is in a different mode than that assumed by its operator.  
PARC and CAST highlighted issues in human-automation interaction in their safety report released in 
2013 (Performance Based Aviation Rulemaking Committee & Commercial Aviation Safety Team, 2013). 
The findings of the PARC and CAST report reinforced previous research on mode confusion and gaps in 
understanding leading to automation surprise. For example, Sarter, Wickens, and Mumaw explored the 
concept of automation surprise and probed crew mental models subjectively during a simulator study with 
a B747-400 (Sarter et al., 2003). The results of this study, as well as a study by the U.K. Civil Aviation 
Authority (CAA) on flight crew reliance on automation, indicated that pilots had substantial gaps in their 
understanding of the automation (S. Wood, 2004). This is consistent with findings of Silva and 
Nicholson’s analysis of operational events involving unreliable airspeed, a nonnormal situation that could 
be difficult to detect by the crew and can occur in various aircraft systems that use airspeed data (Silva & 
Nicholson, 2012). The analysis used Rasmussen’s decision ladder to show that breakdowns in earlier 
stages in human information processing (detection and understanding), led to more consequential 
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outcomes such as fatal accidents compared to breakdowns that occurred later in human information 
processing (decision making and execution). In addition to gaps in understanding, it has been suggested 
that breakdowns in perception can also influence mode awareness (Degani, 1996; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 
1979; McCrobie & Sherry, 1996; Sarter & Woods, 1995; Sarter, 2008).  
Dekker suggests that the origins of mode confusion are tied to the interaction between components of the 
system (Dekker, 2008). In addition, the system safety Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes 
(STAMP) concept discusses the existence of inconsistencies between the model of the process used by 
the controller and the actual process state (Leveson, Daouk, Dulac, & Marais, 2003; Leveson, 2011). 
Since perception and understanding have been shown to be highly influenced by design of displays and 
systems, and human characteristics such as attention allocation, training, and fatigue, it is important to 
assess mode awareness from a systems perspective, as opposed to purely a human perspective (Endsley & 
Kaber, 1999; Hegarty, 2011; Mccauley, 2001). 
Because mode confusion can be influenced by feedback of the system, human observation of feedback, as 
well as understanding of the system, these factors are discussed in detail throughout the thesis. Pilot 
monitoring of flight parameters is discussed in the next section.  
1.2.4.2 Identified Weakness in Flight Path Monitoring 
Both the system and the human can be discussed when assessing flight path monitoring because 
perception by the human can be directly tied to the feedback the system provides to the human. (M R 
Endsley & Kaber, 1999; Hegarty, 2011; Mccauley, 2001). Between 2005 and 2014, there were 1706 
deaths attributed to inflight loss of control (LOC) and 804 deaths attributed to controlled flight into terrain 
(CFIT) (The Boeing Company, 2014). Both of these classes of accidents can relate to problems in flight 
path monitoring (Flight Safety Foundation, 2014). In response, there have been many initiatives focused 
on enhancing the effectiveness of pilot flight path monitoring (Civil Aviation Authority, 2013; Flight 
Safety Foundation, 2014; Performance Based Aviation Rulemaking Committee & Commercial Aviation 
Safety Team, 2013).   
The U.K. CAA identified a number of factors involving flight crew monitoring lapses (Civil Aviation 
Authority, 2013). These are represented in Figure 1-7. The factors involve aspects of the external 
environment, aircraft, organization, and human performance shaping. The CAA summary accounts for 
many factors outside the human that also affect monitoring lapses such as system reliability, schedules, 
and design. The human factors include a number of physiological, psychological, and personal influences. 
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More detail on the physiological and psychological factors is provided later in Chapter 2 when discussing 
human information processing and model of divergence.  
 
Figure 1-7. Factors affecting monitoring lapses (Civil Aviation Authority, 2013) 
The Flight Safety Foundation (FSF), PARC and CAST proposed various recommendations to address 
lapses in monitoring of the aircraft (Flight Safety Foundation, 2014; Performance Based Aviation 
Rulemaking Committee & Commercial Aviation Safety Team, 2013). Some of the specific 
recommendations in the FSF report included following standard operating procedures, aggressively 
managing distractions, remaining vigilant, and intervening if flight guidance modes or aircraft actions do 
not agree with expected actions. This last recommendation directly relates to recovering from divergence, 
which is discussed in detail throughout this thesis.  
1.2.5 Summary of Literature and Research Contribution 
1.2.5.1 Summary of Literature  
A number of well-established aspects of human information processing exist in the literature. The general 
structure of the perception, cognition, action and action feedback to the environment is consistent between 
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many of the information processing models (Endsley, 1995; Norman, 1988; Wickens & Hollands, 2000). 
In addition, it is also generally accepted that this system operates with limited resources. Wickens may 
consider attentional resources to be limited while Reason may argue that working memory is the 
limitation (Bellenkes et al., 1997; Reason, 1990; Wickens, 2002). In addition, models also mention how 
the cognitive system is driven by mental models in long-term memory. These dynamic models show 
prediction capability and builds on projection or expectation for the human.  
Because some problems in mode awareness has been suggest to originate in human understanding, it 
suggests that development of a model that focuses situation awareness to awareness of state and provides 
more detail of how this awareness is formed would be beneficial in assessing how these problems could 
be alleviated.   
Divergence can use these common elements established in the literature to develop an understanding of 
how the human state assumption is formed. Focusing on a state awareness as a specific type of situation 
awareness, a detailed understanding of the origins of the state assumption and the alignment with actual 
state could provide the ability to not only evaluate aspects of individual cases, but also identify patterns in 
groups of cases.  
1.2.5.2 Research Contribution 
While the previous systems mode confusion literature identifies inconsistencies in pilot understanding of 
system as a problem, this research puts forth divergence as an inconsistency between the human state 
assumption and the actual system state, and proposes a framework with which divergence may be better 
understood. 
This thesis presents the concept of divergence (1) as a model that builds on the systems approach of 
Dekker and Leveson, (2) that incorporates the information processing theories of Wickens, awareness of 
state by Endsley, and LTM information retrieval modeling of Reason to develop a model of formation of 
the human state assumption (3) and can be applied to issues of mode confusion in the cockpit. This 
human information processing model of divergence can illustrate not only how divergence can occur but 
provide insight into why divergence occurred. Ultimately, this understanding of potential causes of 
divergence could provide supporting or dissenting evidence of current recommendations for addressing 
the negative consequences of poor human-automation performance.  
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1.3 Development of Concept of Divergence 
The accident of Asiana 214 in 2013, shown in Figure 1-8, highlights the possible consequences of 
divergence. In this example, the crew interviews indicated that their assumption during the approach was 
that the auto-throttle system would capture approach speed, but in actuality the auto-throttle had defaulted 
to a dormant mode that maintained throttle position, which had been set to idle power (National 
Transportation Safety Board, 2013). In this case, there was an apparent divergence between the state of 
the auto-throttle in actuality (HOLD mode3) and the crew’s state assumption (likely SPD mode4). In this 
accident, while in HOLD mode and throttles at idle, the speed of the aircraft decayed below the pre-set 
approach airspeed. The analysis of divergence may explain the delayed crew response to this low speed 
situation. The crew eventually noticed the low airspeed, however was not able to recover in time to avoid 
impacting the sea wall short of the runway threshold.  
 
Figure 1-8. Asiana 214 accident in San Francisco, CA in 2013 
While it is possible divergence could occur frequently in-flight without resulting in significant safety 
hazards, accidents such as Asiana 214 reveal the potentially dangerous implications of divergence. This 
thesis suggests that divergence can play a role in aircraft accidents. If this is true, the understanding of the 
                                                      
3 In HOLD mode in the B777, the auto-throttle servos are inhibited and the pilot can set the throttles 
manually. In HOLD mode, the auto-throttle does not reposition throttle levers (National Transportation 
and Safety Board, 2013).   
4 In SPD mode in the B777, the auto-throttle maintains the selected speed displayed on the PFD, set by 
either the MCP or flight management computer (National Transportation and Safety Board, 2013).  
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mechanisms behind divergence could inform more effective mitigations that can prevent these potentially 
dangerous situations.    
This thesis focuses on divergence in modern commercial aviation where the aircraft includes a complex 
integration of many sub-systems. It is assumed that pilots use both observation of continuous parameters, 
such as airspeed and altitude, as well as discrete parameters, such as autopilot (A/P) settings, to build a 
mental model of the system and control the aircraft. Assuming that control of the aircraft includes 
controlling continuous parameters as well as discrete parameters, flying can be described as a hybrid 
control task (Branicky, Borkar, & Mitter, 1998; Lygeros, Tomlin, & Sastry, 1997). The relevant 
parameters to the crew could change based on aircraft configuration as well as flight situation. When the 
actual system state transitions through different events, the human state assumption must also transition in 
order to maintain consistency with the actual system state. These dynamic characteristics of the system 
could provide more susceptibility to inconsistency between the system and the human in particularly due 
to these transitions.   
The example described in Figure 1-3 illustrates an example of one classification of divergence where the 
actual state transitions and crew’s state assumption is not updated to reflect the transition. Types of 
divergence are defined below. 
• Type D-1: The actual state transitions and crew’s state assumption does not update to reflect the 
transition. 
o Type D-1a: Actual state transitions without input by the crew. 
o Type D-1b: Actual state transitions due to input by the crew. 
• Type D-2: The actual state does not transition, however crew’s state assumption transitions 
• Type D-3: The actual state transitions, and crew’s state assumption updates to reflect a different 
transition. 
The different types of divergence can be described by discussing a divergence trigger, which refers to the 
state transition (of the system or human) that initiates divergence. Because the trigger could have been the 
result of an input by the crew or the system, it is relevant to differentiate the trigger itself from the 
divergence origin. Divergence origin refers to the origin of the trigger (human or system).5 
                                                      
5 For example, in Asiana 214, the crew’s abnormal use of FLCH along with a manual retardation of the 
throttles (origin) caused the automation to revert to HOLD mode (trigger). 
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Divergence can be further sequenced into two levels. The more significant level of divergence is referred 
to as unknown divergence where the crew is unaware that divergence has occurred. When in unknown 
divergence, the human can be expected to exhibit behavior based on an incorrect state assumption. 
Depending on the criticality of the situation, significant consequences could occur if this behavior based 
on incorrect assumptions results in discrepancies in flight path or energy management for example.  The 
other level of divergence is referred to as known divergence and occurs when the crew becomes aware 
that their state assumption is not correct. This thesis assumes that once divergence is identified, the human 
works to resolve their confusion of the state of the system.  
In some cases, the situation can recover from divergence and re-converge. This re-convergence process 
could involve known divergence as a precursor to re-convergence where the human knows that something 
is wrong, but not exactly what is wrong. The sequence of the entire divergence and re-convergence 
process is shown in Figure 1-9. If the situation begins with consistency between actual state and human 
state assumption, when divergence triggers, it is assumed that the human moves into unknown 
divergence.  
The human could potentially move directly into known divergence if immediate awareness of divergence 
is attained, or the human could remain in unknown divergence for some time. Once the human recognizes 
an anomaly in the system of interest, she would move into known divergence where she troubleshoots the 
system to resolve the confusion. Once the confusion is resolved, it is assumed that the human re-
converges with the system when their state assumption becomes consistent with the actual system state. It 
is possible that the re-convergence process first reaches known divergence before fully converging, 
though these stages could occur in a near simultaneous timeframe, or certain situations could yield re-
convergence without the human actually recognizing divergence.   
 
Figure 1-9. Sequence of divergence process 
The transition from known divergence to re-convergence could occur in the following ways.  
• Type C-1: Aircraft state transitions to meet the human state assumption. 
• Type C-2: Human state transitions to meet actual system state. 
• Type C-3: Both the aircraft state and human state assumption transition to a new state. 
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Known divergence does not necessarily involve a state transition, thus in this case trigger for known 
divergence is defined as the process that apparently recovers to result in known divergence. Similarly to 
divergence, a re-convergence trigger refers to the state transition (of the system of human) that results in 
re-convergence and the re-convergence origin refers to the origin of the re-convergence trigger.6  
The types of divergence and re-convergence can be used to assess trends in the cases analyzed. Since the 
mental models inform the human state assumption, errors in mental models could cause errors in the 
human state assumption as previously discussed, however it may be possible to converge without a full 
recovery of the mental model. An example of this could be if the human had poor understanding of the 
automation (i.e. contributing to errors in the expectation process), but decides to disconnect the 
automation and bring the automation to a state consistent with one they know to be true. This would result 
in re-convergence type C-3 because the end result is consistency in between actual state and human state 
assumption. However, this would not indicate a recovery of the mental model because, likely, the 
underlying poor understanding remained after the disconnection of the automation. This distinction 
between re-convergence and recovery of the mental model is important to remember when discussing 
mitigations for divergence.   
1.4 Research Goals 
This research suggests that divergence could be a contributing factor in a number of aviation accidents, 
particularly those involving automation mode confusion. With a proper understanding of the mechanisms 
behind divergence, we can be in a better position to understand causality and effectively mitigate these 
types of accidents. The overall goal of this research is to understand how divergence can manifest in 
aviation accidents, in order to inform mitigations to alleviate divergence before it occurs and/or promote 
re-convergence before the situation becomes unrecoverable. 
In order to achieve this goal, the following sub-goals were defined:  
• Develop a systematic method to identify sources of divergence in human information processing 
• Use the method to analyze divergence in case studies 
• Discuss potential implications of divergence 
                                                      
6 For example, the human (origin) decides to disengage the autopilot (trigger) that results in re-
convergence. 
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1.5 Thesis Organization 
The remainder of this thesis evaluates the concept of divergence in aircraft operations. Chapter 2 
introduces the proposed human information processing model of divergence. This model provides a 
hypothesis of how the human information process can influence the human state assumption and impact 
the occurrence of divergence. Chapter 3 explores the impact of failures in processes in the model and the 
effect of these failures on the occurrence of divergence. Chapter 4 uses the model discussed in Chapters 2 
and 3 to evaluate case studies of accidents and incidents involving divergence. Chapter 5 discusses the 
implications of divergence and how it may inform mitigations to alleviate consequential effects of 
divergence. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the conclusions of this research, the contributions that have 
been made, and suggestions for future work in this area.     
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Chapter 2           
             
             
              
Development of Human Information Processing Model of 
Divergence 
The human information process of divergence was developed to understand causes of divergence by 
evaluating how the human state assumption is formed. Using this representation, causes of divergence can 
be represented in terms of process failures that lead to incorrect state assumptions. This representation can 
ultimately inform mitigations for divergence, some of which are discussed later in this thesis.  
This chapter introduces a representation of human information processing that can be used to explain 
cases of divergence. Each aspect of the proposed representation is discussed including the indication 
system that presents feedback to the user regarding the state of the system. Within the human, processes 
related to the formation of a state assumption are introduced including the observation, association, state 
selection, expectation, and ambiguity resolution processes.  
2.1 Description of Human Information Processing Model 
Occurrence of divergence is normally associated with discrete events, such as a change in the actual state 
or the human state assumption. Within this thesis, an event is defined as a change in actual state, human 
state assumption, expectation, observables, or observation. An event trigger is defined as the transition 
(human or system) that initiates the event. Correspondingly, a divergence trigger refers to the event that 
initiates divergence, a known divergence trigger refers to the event that causes the human to transition 
into known divergence, and a re-convergence trigger refers to the event that signals re-convergence.  
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Figure 2-1. Human information processing model of divergence 
Information flow through the human information processing system can be described using Figure 2-1. 
The human state assumption is considered to be formed from a series of processes which incorporate the 
set of observations made of the actual system state and aspects of human experience.  
If an event occurs due to a trigger such as a change in actual state, this change manifests in the actual 
system that outputs the actual system state. As seen on the left side of Figure 2-1, the actual system state 
feeds through an indication system where observables with which the human can make an observation are 
developed. Observables are perceived in the observation process, and the set of observations is input to 
the association process where they can be associated with particular states. The states that are consistent 
with the observation can fed into the state selection process for comparison with the human’s expectation 
of state. The output of the state selection process is the human state assumption, which can be used to 
make decisions and execute those decisions. If no state assumption can be made, the information can then 
proceed to the ambiguity resolution process to resolve any confusion in state. It is important to remember 
that there can be uncertainty sources in each of the individual processes, and various assumptions are built 
into the model. These assumptions are mentioned in the discussion and also summarized in Appendix C. 
The human information processing model of divergence was consistent with current work in the field of 
human information processing and adapted to incorporate specific attributes for determining human state 
assumption. The major process components in Wickens’ and Endsley’s models are included in the human 
information processing model of divergence.  Table 2-1 shows a comparison of the processes in each of 
the models and the corresponding process in human information processing of divergence in which those 
functions are included. The previous work presented and the model proposed have aspects of perception, 
comprehension, projection, decision-making, and execution. A difference between divergence and the 
previous work, however, is that the human information processing model of divergence was developed 
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specifically to discuss the awareness of state of a system, a subcomponent of situation awareness. It also 
introduces a comparator between the human and the environment to evaluate divergence. 
Table 2-1. Comparison of common processes between the prior literature and the proposed human 
information process of divergence 
Human Information Process of 
Divergence  
Information Processing Model 
(Wickens, 1992) 
Situation Awareness 
(Endsley, 1995) 
Observation Process Sensory Processing and Store Perception Perception 
Association Process   Working Memory - Cognition Comprehension 
State Selection Process Working Memory - Cognition Comprehension 
Expectation Process Working Memory - Cognition Projection 
Ambiguity Resolution Process  Response Selection Decision Making 
Nominal Decision Making 
Process Response Selection Decision Making 
Execution Processes Response Execution Performance of Actions 
System Understanding Long Term Memory Long Term Memory 
Associative Understanding Long Term Memory Long Term Memory 
Attention Attention Attention 
 
2.1.1 Indication System 
Prior to discussing the aspects of human information processing, it’s important to discuss aspects of the 
environment that relate to system state and can input into human information processing. As mentioned in 
the example above, the actual system state is output by the actual system. Any change in the actual system 
state would constitute a triggering event. These could be in the form of mode transitions of automation 
systems, for example.  
The inputs and outputs of the indication system are shown in Figure 2-2. As can be seen in Figure 2-2, the 
state is then input into an indication system. This system determines how the outside world, as part of the 
actual state and environment, is indicated to the human. These indications can be direct sensory aspects of 
the real world or they could be manufactured through a display. Within this thesis, observables are 
defined as indications that provide useful information to the human regarding the state of interest and the 
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situation. In addition to observables relating directly to the state of interest, this process also can include 
information about the situation to the human. Situation observables refer to contextual variables that can 
be relevant to the situation such as phase of flight, position, aircraft configuration, or air traffic control 
(ATC) clearances. A change in observables can also trigger an event, as it provides different cues to the 
human regarding the state of the system. 
 
Figure 2-2. Depiction of inputs and outputs of the indication system  
There are many characteristics of the indication system. While physical properties such as heat and smell 
from a fire provide information regarding state, many of these physical variables can be transformed and 
displayed to the human through displays and automation (Henderson & Hollingworth, 1999). Design of 
displays and automation as well as implementation of that design can also be important aspects within the 
indication system. These aspects can influence what observables are available, how they are provided, 
when they are available, and where observables are located. Design, for example, can impact 
observability and readability of an observable as well as influence the human’s understanding of the 
system (Endsley, 1999). The observables output by the indication system can also provide varying 
degrees of discrimination between different states. Due to direct input into human information processing, 
integrity of the indication system can directly impact the integrity of human information processing. The 
individual processes are described in detail below, beginning with the observation process as the gateway 
between the system and the human. 
2.1.2 Observation Process 
The observation process is the process by which observables can be perceived and how new information 
enters the human information processing system and is a critical basis for the human state assumption.  
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Figure 2-3. Depiction of inputs and outputs of the observation process 
For the purpose of this thesis, the observation process, shown in Figure 2-3, is considered to have stages 
of attention allocation, physical perception, and processing of that perceptual information. Attention can 
act as a filter for what information is actually perceived by the human (Bundesen, 1990; Wickens et al., 
2003).7 This can be a strong component of the observation process and can directly influence input into 
the other stages of observation. Once attention is allocated, perception can occur. This is a physical 
process that can use multiple senses. The information that is perceived then goes through a processing 
stage prior to becoming an observation where meaningful tags can be assigned to the observables 
(Hollander, 2000).8 This specific description of stages of observation is specific to visual attention, 
however it is possible for olfactory signals to be perceived, for example, without attention being allocated, 
so the process itself can be adapted for the different signals that are input into the human information 
system.  
A change in observation can also trigger an event since the state of the processing system could change 
based on this added information, possibly resulting in known divergence or re-convergence. On the other 
hand, it is possible that had a mode transition occurred without observation from the crew, the mode 
transition could be the trigger for divergence. There are a number of reasons why observables are missed 
by the human, one example could be limits to attention. 
                                                      
7 There are a number of theories to how attention is allocated from single resource theory to multiple 
resource theory. This thesis does not use a specific theory; it only uses attention allocation as an influence 
into the observation process. Further work can be conducted to adapt this model to incorporate specific 
attention allocation or perceptual processing theories.  
8 An example of perceptual processing: perception itself may observe the numbers and patterns on an 
airspeed indicator, however the processing stage morphs that information into a reading on the airspeed 
indicator. 
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Attention allocation, a human variable referring to where attention is focused at a given time, is likely a 
major contributor to whether an observable is actually perceived (Bundesen, 1990; Hollander, 2000; 
Johnston & Dark, 1986; Summerfield & Egner, 2009). Whether attention is focused on an indication can 
influence the probability of it being correctly observed. Attention also can play a part in how other human 
variables influence the observation, such as when the human searches for information. Attention could be 
allocated to relevant observables if the human is performing a search for information using learned scan 
strategies, possibly increasing the probability of correct observation (Summerfield & Egner, 2009; Yu, 
Wang, Li, & Braithwaite, 2014). In addition, involuntary attention allocation could occur for specifically 
salient signals (Prinzmetal et al., 2010; Prinzmetal, Long, & Leonhardt, 2008; Prinzmetal, 
Zvinyatskovskiy, Gutierrez, & Dilem, 2009; Yantis, 2005). This illustrates some influences outside of the 
human, such as design of the system and feedback, on the probability of correct observation. Other human 
variables can decrease the probability that attention will be focused on the relevant observables. Fatigue 
could change or slow the scan of information, contributing to a lower probability of all observables being 
correctly observed (Boksem, Meijman, & Lorist, 2005; Caldwell, 2012; Faber, Maurits, & Lorist, 2012; 
May & Kline, 1987). While fatigue could affect all observables, workload can influence attention 
allocation to specific observables if attentional resources are being used in a non-related task. Levels of 
very high or very low workload may decrease the probability of correct observation of relevant 
observables (Lohse & Sherwood, 2011; Teigen, 1994). Distraction can operate hand in hand with 
workload if the human’s attention is not focused on the task relevant to the state of interest (Broom, 
Capek, Carachi, Akeroyd, & Hilditch, 2011; Casner & Schooler, 2015; Dismukes, Young, & Sumwalt, 
1998; Dittrich & Stahl, 2012). In addition to human variables, such as fatigue, workload, and distraction 
affecting the observation, scan strategies can be influenced by the human’s expectation of the state of the 
system.  
In some cases, the observation can be influenced by expectation bias possibly affecting the scan strategy 
of the human or influencing the integrity of values of observables (Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 
2001; M. Jones & Sugden, 2001; Kassin, Dror, & Kukucka, 2013; Summerfield & Egner, 2009). This 
could result in bypass of observables, which the human believes is known based on expectation or 
observables whose values provide conflicting information than is expected. Expectation bias can also 
influence perceptual processing by contaminating values/trends of observables based on what the human 
expects to see.   
Perceptual processing can also be influenced by human variables such as fatigue or high workload. As the 
human approaches the limits of her human information bandwidth, fatigue or high workload could slow 
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processing or introduce errors into the observables, possibly decreasing the probability of a correct 
observation of an observable.  
Overall, this model discusses attention as a resource limitation in the information processing system. This 
is consistent with Wickens’ interpretation of attentional limitations (Wickens & Hollands, 2000). Reason 
also discusses the limited resources in working memory (Reason, 1990). Reason’s fallible machine also 
discusses filtering between the peripheral working memory into the focal working memory. This concept 
is captured in the model as attention in the perceptual processing stage prior to the transition to the 
association process. The aspects of attention discussed introduce the possibility of error occurring in the 
observation process. Further discussion of these possible “failures” in the observation process is provided 
in the following chapter. Once the set of observations has been made, it can proceed into the association 
process and the human becomes one step closer to a human state assumption. 
2.1.3 Association Process 
Because of the possibly extensive array of observations from the environment and possible states in long 
term memory, it is considered that there could be an association process, which relates the set of 
observations to a set of feasible states. The association process captures one aspect of retrieval of 
information from long term memory (Anderson, 1974; Khader, Burke, Bien, Ranganath, & Roesler, 2005; 
Shiffrin & Atkinson, 1969). Based on Reason’s model, the association process performs the function of 
similarity matching of observations to states in long term memory (Reason, 1990).  
The inputs and outputs of the association process are depicted in Figure 2-4. This association process, as 
modeled, inputs the set of observations and correlates those with possible states (built from the human’s 
associative understanding). Associative understanding can be formed from prior experience and training 
and is used to signify the human’s understanding of what observables are indicative of each possible state. 
This associative understanding can be compared to what is actually observed in order to output a list of 
states that are consistent with the set of observations.  
 
Figure 2-4. Depiction of inputs and outputs of the association process 
It may be possible for some observables to provide more distinct information than others. Definitive 
observables are defined in this thesis as observables which, if correctly observed, provide unambiguous 
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indication of the state of the system. Indefinitive observables, on the other hand, could be indicative of 
multiple possible states. This distinction can become relevant when discussing the observables available 
to the crew and whether observables were definitive in determining state of the system. Some situations 
can also lead to ambiguous sets of observables, where only indefinitive observables may get input into the 
association process.  
The human’s associative understanding can house the possible states of the system that the human is 
aware of and the indications associated with each of those possible states. While the knowledge 
representation of the human’s associative understanding is not in the scope of this thesis, there is research 
that theorizes how knowledge is organized in long term memory (Baader, 1999; Darwiche, 2008; Davis, 
Shrobe, & Szolovits, 1993; Rasmussen, 1985; Schnotz & Kürschner, 2008). Semantic maps may be one 
representation that may be particularly relevant to the task of the association process. As a static process 
of comparing the set of observations to the associative understanding of what states the set of 
observations can be attributed to. One theory of semantic mapping of a static system suggests that 
understanding and relationships are organized by characteristics (Lambiotte, Dansereau, Cross, & 
Reynolds, 1989). This link may be appropriate for representing associative understanding. The indications 
would be considered as a characteristic of the state. Then these characteristics can be compared to the set 
of observations in order to determine states that are consistent with the set of observations.9 The construct 
of associative understanding can also be represented using a simple deterministic example using Figure 
2-5. The matrix illustrates the possible range of observations that would be indicative of each state for 
each observable. If the observations were tested to fit within the range of observables indicative of each 
state, this would result in a set of states where the observations were consistent with the associative 
understanding.  
                                                      
9 It may be possible that associative understanding is filtered to possible states only relevant to the state(s) 
of interest and feasibility given the observed situation. The actual dynamics of the association process are 
outside the scope of this thesis, but a rich area for further work 
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Figure 2-5. Generic form of example associative understanding matrix 
The actual selection of possible states may be modeled in a number of different ways. While deterministic 
comparison of the observations to associative understanding may be a simple method to determine the 
possible states, this process could also be modeled as a Hidden Markov Process based on probabilities. 
Because the process is based on prior information (associative understanding) as well as observations, it 
can be thought of as Bayesian (Itti & Baldi, 2009). Once the association process completes, it outputs a 
set of states that are consistent with the observations. This is fed into the state selection process for 
comparison with the human expectation.  
2.1.4 State Selection Process 
The state selection process is the final process involved in determining the human state assumption. Its 
purpose is to integrate the information from the association process, expectation process, and possibly 
ambiguity resolution process in order to determine a human state assumption.10 This process acts as an 
executive processor determining which state is assumed by the human using the similarity matching result 
from the association process and the frequency gambling result from the expectation process (Reason, 
1990). It can also detect ambiguity if no result can be gained from either the association or the expectation 
process resulting in an ambiguous state assumption. 
Thus, the state selection process can be modeled using expectation to reduce output of the association 
process to a single state assumption. In the case that a clear unambiguous state assumption cannot be 
                                                      
10 Since the ambiguity resolution process can be called to reconcile confusion if a single human state 
assumption cannot be determined. This definition is important to understand in the context of the state 
selection process, however the ambiguity process itself is discussed in detail in a future section. 
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formed, the process can signal the appropriate processes to resolve the lack of state assumption. Figure 
2-6 illustrates the inputs and outputs of the state selection process.  
 
Figure 2-6. Depiction of inputs and outputs of state selection process 
Human expectation has been discussed in the literature as a powerful influence on the situation awareness 
of the human (Deliza & Macfie, 1996). In order to integrate association process information with 
expectation process information, this thesis models their interaction using a decision tree, shown in Figure 
2-7.11 In particular, Reason’s concept of frequency gambling was used here (Reason, 1990). Since 
similarity matching would have taken place in association, if the output of that process included multiple 
states, Reason states that frequency gambling would be used to pick between multiple states. If 
expectation were built on frequency of a particular state, this expectation would have priority in the state 
selection process. It was for this reason that a decision tree was chosen to illustrate that priority if one or 
more states were output from the association process.  
 
Figure 2-7. Decision tree of logic of state selection process 
                                                      
11 This thesis treats state selection simply as a deterministic process, however it may be possible in future 
work to incorporate uncertainty into the process for more realistic dynamics of this process. The decision 
tree has not been validated for failures in logic. 
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The state selection process inputs the states consistent with observation from the association process. The 
human state assumption can be clear or ambiguous based on how many possible states exist and whether 
the expectation is consistent with any of those states.  
If there are zero states output from the state association process, this can cue the human to a situation that 
is ambiguous to the human, as the set of observations wouldn’t fit within any states in associative 
understanding.  
If there are multiple states output from the association process, this can constitute an under-constrained 
system. At this point, expectation was modeled to reduce the multiple possible states to a clear state 
assumption, if expectation was available. If expectation was not available, multiple states would signal an 
ambiguous state assumption as a clear state assumption cannot be ascertained. However, based on 
Reason’s frequency gambling concept, if expectation is consistent with any of the states consistent with 
the observation, the expected state is considered to be selected as the clear human state assumption. 
This brings up the possibility of the expectation not being consistent with any of the states consistent with 
the observations. This could cue the human to a discrepancy between her expectation and what she is 
observing. This could occur if a single state or multiple states are output from state association and can 
result in an ambiguous state assumption as the human works to figure out whether the observation or the 
expectation reflects the actual state of the system. 
If an ambiguous state assumption exists, it is assumed that the human recognizes that divergence occurs 
and the situation moves into known divergence. This known divergence can prompt the ambiguity 
process to attempt to resolve the ambiguity and ultimately attain re-convergence.        
Figure 2-6 shows a possible guess input from the ambiguity resolution process into the state selection 
process. The details of this guess are discussed in the ambiguity resolution process section, however what 
is relevant for this section is if the result of the state selection process is a guess of the state of the system. 
Within this model, if a guess exists, the decision tree logic in the state selection process is bypassed and 
the human state assumption is replaced with the guess in this model. This guess is assumed to be 
conscious and the human is aware of the divergence. 
Since the output of the state selection process is the human state assumption, this information is now 
available for downstream processes. The expectation process also can use the human state assumption to 
reinforce or refute the current expectation of state.  
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2.1.5 Expectation Process 
Lambiotte et al suggests that knowledge of dynamic systems may be linked through influences, temporal 
next steps “Next”, or causation “Leads to” (Lambiotte et al., 1989). When assessing the human’s 
operational knowledge of state, the expectation process functions as a model the human uses to project 
current state into a future expectation of state. Figure 2-8 shows the inputs and outputs of the expectation 
of state process. This can be an important component of human information processing and is likely built 
from previous experience and understanding of the system. This initial expectation can be reinforced, 
refuted, or replaced based on the human state assumption, ambiguity of that assumption, or a possible 
action that was taken. (Bhattacherjee, 2001; Deliza & Macfie, 1996).  
The dynamics of how expectations are formed, reinforced, or refuted are complex. Because the 
expectation process uses prior information of expectation and updates that expectation based on new 
information, it is possible that expectation could be modeled using Bayesian methods which estimates 
parameters of an underlying distribution based on an observed distribution (López Puga, Krzywinski, & 
Altman, 2015). It may also be possible to model expectation as frequency based, consistent with Reason’s 
fallible machine. (Reason, 1990). This thesis does not discuss the specifics of how expectation is formed 
from system understanding. While the dynamics can be complex, for the purpose of this thesis, these 
dynamics are discussed in relevance to any action taken by the human in addition to ambiguity of the state 
assumption.  
 
Figure 2-8. Depiction of inputs and outputs of expectation of state process 
First, it is assumed that if the human takes an action, her expectation of state is updated to reflect the 
anticipated result of that action, triggering an event, regardless of whether the action was reflected in the 
environment or not, such as what could result with a slip.12 If no action is taken that affects the state of 
interest where the expectation of state is updated to reflect the anticipated consequences of the action, the 
                                                      
12 For example, it is assumed that when a pilot depresses the autopilot disengage button, her expectation is 
updated to reflect the outcome of that action, in this case that the A/P is disengaged, regardless whether 
the disconnect was actually registered by the system. 
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expectation process evaluates whether the human state assumption is inconsistent with the current 
expectation. This inconsistency can indicate to the human that there may be errors in the expectation she 
previously held and confidence in her expectation could decrease. For this thesis, it is assumed that if an 
ambiguous state assumption exists, confidence in the state expectation is degraded, and for the next event 
cycle, the human has no expectation of state.13   
Finally, if the human has confidence in her state assumption, this state assumption can become the 
expectation of state for the next cycle of human information processing. If the state assumption equals 
expectation of state, the expectation of state can be reinforced. The cases without an ambiguous state 
assumption can appear in cases of re-convergence as well as unknown divergence, while cases with 
significant ambiguity can only appear in known divergence where the human is working to resolve the 
divergence. As was mentioned in the previous sections, expectation of state is output from the process and 
can feed back into the observation process and state selection process for the next event cycle.  
In addition to feeding into expectation, if an ambiguous state assumption exists, information also inputs to 
the ambiguity resolution process, described below.  
2.1.6 Ambiguity Resolution Process 
The ambiguity resolution process occurs when an unambiguous state assumption cannot be output by the 
state selection process and the human results in known divergence. Figure 2-9 shows the inputs and 
outputs of the ambiguity resolution process. In addition to ambiguity, the ambiguity resolution process 
can be influenced by system understanding and attentional limitations. System understanding can provide 
a basis for a decision to be made, and attentional limitations can also have an effect on what resources can 
be directed towards the ambiguity resolution process possibly affecting the strategy of resolution and 
decision.  
                                                      
13 As mentioned, the relationship between ambiguity of a signal, reliance of a signal, and confidence in 
the expectation is a complex process. The relationship assumed in this thesis illustrates how the 
expectation interacts with the entire cognitive system, but further research can be conducted to evaluate 
the detailed dynamics of this process.  
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Figure 2-9. Inputs and outputs of ambiguity resolution process 
Contrary to automatic or trained patterns of behavior found in convergent or unknown divergent 
processing, ambiguity resolution could be more cognitively difficult (Prinzmetal et al., 2009). 
Considering ambiguity resolution inputs may be atypical, processing could require substantial time or 
cognitive resources to fully identify the ambiguity (Klapproth, 2008; Wittmann & Paulus, 2008). Thus, 
the ambiguity resolution process could revert to heuristics in the face of limitations, such as high 
workload or resource limitations, to make a decision (Klein, 2008; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000). While 
heuristics may be effective at solving a problem, it can also introduce error if an incorrect decision is 
made. This poor decision could propagate through the execution processes and affect expectation and the 
actual state. Depending on the dynamics, this could possibly reintroduce unknown divergence back into 
the system. It may also be possible for the human to accept that they cannot (or will not) fully resolve the 
ambiguity and force the system into a known state forcing re-convergence. This would result in Type C-3 
re-convergence where the human may take action in attempt to force re-convergence to a clear, known 
state, as opposed to taking the time to conduct further observation to determine the actual state of the 
system.    
There is the possibility that the human could revert to guessing the state of the system, as was mentioned 
in Section 2.1.4. This could occur in the presence of high workload or resource limitations as mentioned 
in the previous paragraph. Once a guess is made in the ambiguity process, it can be transferred back to the 
state selection process for direct transition into the human state assumption.14 There is also the possibility 
the human chooses to resolve the ambiguity by scanning for more information; in this case, the decision 
can be fed downstream for execution, ultimately feeding back to the observation process as a search for 
more information (Reason, 1990). In addition to guessing or scanning, the human could also decide to 
                                                      
14 This transfer of the guess through the state selection process into the human state assumption is an 
artifact of the modeling. It could be modeled differently, such as directly feeding into the human state 
assumption, however then the assumption would need a process to discern two separate signals. This is 
why the state selection process and its logic was used to incorporate the guess and output to the human 
state assumption. 
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take action to resolve the ambiguity. In this case, the decision can also be fed downstream for execution, 
but in this case the action feeds back into the system (Endsley, 1995; Wickens & Hollands, 2000). Within 
the model of divergence, this action expectation also feeds back into the expectation process.  
The exact method of ambiguity resolution is not within the scope of this thesis, but is relevant to the 
output of the process. We use the output of this process to determine further information flow through 
human information processing, as described above. The ambiguity resolution process can be considered 
as a problem solving process, however it is not the sole decision making process in human information 
processing.  
While decision making processes and execution processes hold critical function in completing the 
feedback loop in human cognition, because this thesis focuses on the formation of the human state 
assumption, decision processes (outside of ambiguity resolution) and execution processes are not 
described in detail. However, the output and feedback of the execution process are relevant inputs into 
some other human information processes such as expectation and observation, in addition to the 
possibility of manipulating the actual state of the system.  
The result of the execution process could be an action to physically manipulate the system, communicate, 
or scan for information by manipulating attention allocation. While this output is driven by the decision, it 
is possible for slips to occur at this phase making the output different from the decision’s intention 
(Norman, 1981). However, regardless of any errors, the output of the execution process can be fed back 
into the system via action and/or communication, and can manipulate human variables such as attention 
allocation for executing an action or performing a scan, possibly triggering another event through change 
in actual state, expectation, or observation. These outputs can then be fed back to the respective areas in 
human information processing and environment. If physical action is taken, this execution can feed back 
directly into (a) the system possibly changing observables, (b) human variables controlling attention, and 
(c) the expectation process. If the human communicates, this execution can feed back into the 
environment providing another observable to the system. Finally, if scanning occurs, the execution 
process output can manipulate attention to conduct the scan. As can be seen, the effects of execution are 
widespread in the model. Also, in the context of this model, completion of execution can signify the 
completion of an event cycle.  
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2.2 Summary  
This chapter introduces a human information processing model of divergence that was developed to 
evaluate causes of divergence by evaluating inputs to the human state assumption. This model introduces 
a representation of information processes that can form a human state assumption using a set of 
observations from the environment and previous experience of the human. This representation can also 
illustrate how divergence and re-convergence can originate as well as how known divergence can be 
resolved in the decision making process. This model highlights relationships between processes at a high 
level. The representation attempts to capture key human information processes influencing the human 
state assumption and divergence; however, it does not depict all of the inputs and outputs of each process. 
A representation of all of the inputs and outputs to each process can be found in Appendix B. Using this 
human information processing model, the next chapter assesses the impact of failures in individual 
processes, how these can result in unknown divergence, and how these failures can possibly be contained 
in other processes.  
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Chapter 3           
             
             
              
Impacts of Process Failures on Divergence 
The previous chapter described the basic processes involved with human cognition related to divergence. 
It may be possible for discrepancies to exist in the inputs and outputs of these processes. If a process 
produces incorrect or contaminated output, the process can be considered as failed. It is possible that 
failures could be contained in downstream processes, which, in some cases, could be inconsequential for 
the human state assumption and result in re-convergence despite a failed process.15 Containment of 
process failures discussed in this thesis refers to occurrences where a failure is trapped in a downstream 
process resulting in either re-convergence or known divergence. Containment of failures when the human 
is in known divergence is discussed later in this chapter and would in this case refer to trapping of the 
failure that results in re-convergence only. Containment does not imply mitigation of the process failure 
or divergence, only that failures could be trapped within human processes to avoid a case of unknown 
divergence.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, human error refers to inappropriate action for a given situation. This thesis 
suggests that some aspects of human error can be explained by divergence and the human taking action 
based on a false state assumption. The end of this chapter places divergence within the current 
frameworks used to describe human error. Assuming that divergence can be caused by failures in one or 
more of the individual processes described in the previous chapter, the causes of divergence can be 
evaluated by assessing the impacts of different types of failures on each of the individual processes. Some 
of these failures may lead to unknown divergence, while others may not. This chapter assesses the 
potential failures of processes and discusses the impact as well as the possibility of containing the failure 
in downstream human information processes using the human information processing model discussed in 
                                                      
15 An example of inconsequential failure can be seen in a case when the human observes only that the 
airspeed value is on target and concludes correctly that the auto-throttle is in SPD mode. Despite a missed 
observation of the FMA, for example, this observation process failure does not result in divergence.  
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the previous chapter and reproduced in Figure 3-1. The delineations between environment and human are 
removed from this figure for simplicity. With the understanding of the impacts of the failures, mitigations 
can be designed to address them.  
 
Figure 3-1. Human information processing model of divergence 
In order to display propagation of human information process failures, the notation shown in Table 3-1 is 
used. Upstream and downstream processes are defined relative to the process being discussed. Upstream 
processes refer to processes that input (directly or indirectly) into the process of consideration. 
Downstream processes refer to processes that output (directly or indirectly) from the process being 
discussed. If a failure is apparent in the process it is highlighted in bright red and a star. Since failures can 
propagate downstream, the process box is highlighted light red if it is affected by a failure upstream, but 
shows no indication of a failure originating in that process. Finally, if there is a failure upstream, but it is 
contained in a downstream process, a bar is shown on the right side of the process that contains the 
failure; a red bar indicates result of known divergence and green bar indicates possible result of re-
convergence. In addition to the color of individual process boxes, the human state assumption is also 
colored based on whether the system indicates re-convergence or divergence. The box is highlighted red 
if the result is known or unknown divergence, green if the result is re-convergence, and blue if the result 
could be either re-convergence or divergence.16  
  
                                                      
16 The result is ambiguous in the context of the discussion of containment of failures because the outcome 
is dependent on the details of the problem itself. Depending on the states and expectations it could be that 
in some cases the process can result in known divergence, while in other cases it can result in re-
convergence.  
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Table 3-1. Notation used in human information processing model 
Symbol Meaning 
 
Failure in process 
 
 
Process affected by failures 
upstream 
 
Process where a failure may or 
may not exist 
 
Process in which an upstream 
failure is contained and results in 
re-convergence 
 
Process in which an upstream 
failure is contained and could 
result in known divergence 
 
 
 
Process which is not active 
during the event 
 
This block is highlighted red if 
the human state assumption is 
corrupted by failures in 
processes 
 
This block is highlighted green if 
the human state assumption is 
not corrupted by failures in 
processes 
 
This block is highlighted blue if 
the human state assumption 
could result in re-convergence or 
divergence 
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3.1 Failures in the Expectation Process 
Figure 3-2 depicts the potential propagation of expectation process failures. As can be seen by the output 
arrows from the expectation process, failures in the expectation process can influence both the 
observation process and the state selection process. Failures in previous experience and training could 
lead to an incorrect mental model of the system with which expectations are formed. It is also possible for 
the actual system to transition into an abnormal state, triggering an event. In these cases, the human’s 
expectation may be nominal, but the actual system state may be off nominal. Finally, current divergence 
can also propagate into the expectation process reinforcing an incorrect expectation.  
Expectation failures could impact both the observation process and the state selection process and can be 
difficult to trap because of this characteristic. The feedback to the observation process would likely occur 
in the form of expectation bias, possibly manipulating the scan strategy or corrupting the values of 
observations. As can be seen, this failure would propagate into the state association process and the state 
selection process. Nominally, the observation failure could be trapped in the state selection process if the 
expectation were correct, however the state selection process is also affected by the incorrect expectation. 
This characteristic would lead to the inability to contain an expectation failure that corrupts both the 
observation and state selection processes downstream, which can ultimately result in unknown 
divergence.  
 
Figure 3-2. Possible propagation of expectation process failure 
3.1.1 Containment of Expectation Process Failures 
While the negative impact of the expectation process failure on both the observation process and state 
selection process would lead to unknown divergence, it is possible that if one of those biases can be 
overcome that the expectation process failure could be effectively contained. The state selection process 
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is dependent on the integrity of both expectation and association (and observation processes upstream). 
Thus, both inputs to the state selection would be corrupt with an expectation process failure. This 
characteristic indicates it may not be an effective process to overcome the influence of an expectation 
failure. The observation process, on the other hand, includes an input from the indication system as well 
as the expectation process. If the indication system remains unaffected by a failure, it could provide 
information to the observation process that could overcome the expectation bias. Figure 3-3 illustrates the 
human information processing model if the observation process recovers triggering an event that results in 
known divergence. This recovery would feed downstream into the association process and likely provide 
uncorrupt information to the state association process. Thus, a discrepancy between the states consistent 
with the set of observations and the expected state would trigger a transition from unknown to known 
divergence and the expectation process failure could be contained in the state selection process. 
 
Figure 3-3. Containment of expectation process failure in the state selection process 
3.2 Failures in the Indication System 
As mentioned, the indication system provides another input (alternative to expectation) into the 
observation process. It is possible however, for the indication system to provide false input to the human, 
contaminating input into human information processing. Examples of failures of the indication system 
include the burning out of a landing gear light bulb, a false indication of an error message, or false 
readings on an instrument. The above examples could originate from component failures, environmental 
factors, or possibly from design of the system. 
Figure 3-4 illustrates the possible propagation of an indication system failure through the human 
information processing system of the human. If the landing gear light bulb burned out for example, this 
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information, indicating that the landing gear was not deployed when it actually was deployed, would enter 
human information processing through the observation process.17 Once it reaches the association process, 
this observation of no landing gear light annunciation should be associated with the landing gear not 
being deployed. If the expectation is also incorrect, then this failure would propagate through the state 
selection process causing unknown divergence. If this indication failure, for example, occurred following 
takeoff, it may be possible to overspeed the landing gear if the crew did not realize it remained deployed, 
illustrating the possible consequences of an indication system failure.  
 
Figure 3-4. Potential propagation of an indication system failure 
Section 2.1.3 discussed how observables can be categorized into two groups, definitive and indefinitive, 
depending on the extent of defining information they provide for the state. The critical aspect in terms of 
containment of indication failures is not the availability of a specific type of observable, but the 
availability of any one or more observables unaffected by the failure.  
3.2.1 Containment of Failures in the Indication System  
When one or more observables exist that are unaffected by the failure in the indication system, this 
provides the capability to error check the indication. This error checking can occur in the association 
process when the set of observations is compared with the human’s system understanding. Figure 3-5 
illustrates the possible containment of the failure in the association process. If the set of observations 
includes at least one failed observable and at least one correct observable, when compared with an intact 
associative understanding, a discrepancy should become apparent. It is possible for no states to be 
                                                      
17 In this example, assume the landing gear annunciation system consists of one light that illuminates 
when the landing gear is down and locked and extinguishes when the landing gear is not down and 
locked.  
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consistent with the opposing set of observations. If no states are consistent with the set of observations, 
the unknown divergence would be trapped in the association process, known divergence can trigger, and 
the human can move into the ambiguity resolution process.  
 
Figure 3-5. Containment of an indication system failure in the association process 
If one or more states are consistent with full set of observations, they cannot be trapped in the association 
process and the next possible place for containment is in the state selection process. This can be seen in 
Figure 3-6 and would occur if expectation of state is correct.18 If a correct expectation of state exists, the 
decision tree logic can identify that the states consistent with the observation conflict with the 
expectation, triggering an event resulting in known divergence and incorporates ambiguity resolution 
process. Initial containment of an indication system failure in the association or state selection process can 
result in known divergence. When in known divergence, the human can work to resolve her ambiguity.  
                                                      
18 The logic of the state selection process suggests that it is also possible to trigger a transition from 
unknown to known divergence if expectation is incorrect and still not consistent with any of the states 
output from the association process. For the purpose of addressing divergence however, this thesis places 
emphasis of having a correct expectation. 
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Figure 3-6.  Containment of an indication system failure in the state selection process 
The case of containment shown in Figure 3-7 is a more trivial case. The indication system failure can be 
trapped in the observation process if the human makes a correct observation of any correct observable and 
bypasses the input of the failed observable. This forces only correct information to propagate into the 
association process and further downstream, and the indication system failure is contained in the 
observation process. The above containment discussion is dependent on at least one correct observable 
being available; containment characteristics change if there are no correct observables available to the 
human. 
 
Figure 3-7. Containment of an indication system failure in the observation process 
As mentioned, there is the possibility that indication system failures contaminate all observables and no 
correct observables are available with which to trap the failure. For this case, the failure can propagate 
through both the observation and association processes downstream. Referring back to Figure 3-6, the 
model suggests that the only possible containment of this failure would be in the state selection process. 
The decision tree logic would likely trigger a transition from unknown to known divergence, since the 
expectation would be inconsistent with the states consistent with the set of observations. As is suggested 
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by the fewer opportunities for containment, an indication system failure that leaves no observables intact 
could be more susceptible to unknown divergence. 
3.3 Failures in the Observation Process 
The previous section discussed possible failures in the indication system. These failures could propagate 
into the observation process, however the topic of this section discusses failures that originate in the 
observation process. Even if observations are made, a failure in the observation process can result in some 
observables being missed or corrupted. Missed observations can be characterized as errors of omission, 
while corrupt observations characterize errors of commission, since values of observations are perceived 
incorrectly due to physical or environmental reasons, or expectation bias (Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 
1991; Tversky, Kahneman, & Slovic, 1974). Many aspects can influence how this observation can be 
made. 
The effectiveness and accuracy of the downstream processes can be influenced by the observation 
process. While aspects of information search and proper scanning can increase the chances for correct 
observations by appropriately allocating attention, there are a number of human and design aspects that 
could interfere with correct observation. Salience of a signal can influence attention allocation and 
influence the probability of an observation being made (Nikolic et al., 2004; Wickens et al., 2003; Yantis, 
2005). High salience signals can promote correct observation of the salient signal due to attention capture, 
however if salience of a signal is low compared to the background noise, such as clutter in the visual 
mode or engine noise in the aural mode for example, it could possibly decrease the probability of correct 
observation. This aspect specifically can be a result of design of the indication system, however it can 
also develop as a failure in the observation process since, in the point of view of this model, the result is 
that the human has missed an observation.  
Human variables can also influence failures in the observation process, possibly effecting attention 
allocation and perceptual processing. Fatigue can affect scan and can decrease probability of correct 
observation (May & Kline, 1987; Rowland et al., 2005). Workload and distraction can also affect 
probability of correct observations. Situations with very high or very low workload could be detrimental 
to making a correct observation (Grier et al., 2003; Teigen, 1994). Distraction from the state of interest 
can also be detrimental to the chance of making a correct observation likely due to attentional resources 
being assigned to areas not relevant to the state of interest (Bellenkes et al., 1997; Bundesen, 1990; 
Hollander, 2000; Yantis, 2005).  
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Finally, expectation bias can also influence where attention is allocated. If the human is confident in their 
expectation, they may not scan all observables carefully, possibly relying on expectation to form a state 
assumption. It is also possible that expectation bias could introduce corruption into perceptual processing 
of the observations potentially corrupting the value of observables (M. Jones & Sugden, 2001; Klayman, 
1995; Lehner, Adelman, Cheikes, & Brown, 2008; Nickerson, 1998). In this case, the confirmation bias 
aspect of expectation bias is relevant. The confirmation bias, as discussed, can result in the observation 
process being biased towards selectively processing information that confirms the human’s expectation.  
These influences are not an exhaustive list of aspects influencing failures in the observation process, 
however these examples were discussed to illustrate how different aspects could potentially influence the 
observation process positively or negatively. The potential propagation of an observation process failure 
can be seen in Figure 3-8. In these cases, we are concerned with the output of the observation process and 
how failures could potentially propagate through human information processing affecting association and 
state selection. This failure can eventually reach the human state assumption, possibly resulting in 
unknown divergence.  The next section discusses opportunities to contain an observation process failure.  
 
Figure 3-8. Potential propagation of observation process failure 
3.3.1 Containment of Failures in the Observation Process 
If an event occurs due to change in actual state or change in observables, missed observations or corrupt 
observations can occur due to failures in the observation process. These could potentially be trapped in 
the downstream processes. If these observation process failures occur without any failures in the 
association process, it may be possible to contain if least one definitive observable is observed correctly. 
Figure 3-9 illustrates the possible containment in the association process if a correct association using that 
single definitive observable could be made. In this case, the failure of other individual observables would 
not impact any processes further downstream than the association process as it is contained there resulting 
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in re-convergence. These types of failures likely commonly occur and can be used as a strategy to 
perform faster processing of information (Reason, 1990).   
 
Figure 3-9. Option 1: Containment of observation process failure in the association process 
It is possible that failures in misperception, for example, can also be caught if the association process 
outputs no states that are consistent with the observation.19 This containment in the association process is 
shown in Figure 3-10. The result of this containment is an event caused by a change in the human state 
assumption to an ambiguous state assumption, and would trigger a transition from unknown to known 
divergence ambiguity resolution. If a failure is not contained in the association process, there is a 
possibility it could be contained in the state selection process. 
 
Figure 3-10. Option 2: Containment of observation process failure in the association process 
                                                      
19 The possibility of containment in the association process due to no states being consistent with the 
output can be a trivial case depending on the failure or combination of failures. In this case, it is possible 
that the observation process failure is different enough from what would have been observed that no states 
could be associated. This is a powerful avenue for containment and can possibly avoid the effects of 
expectation bias. 
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In the case that one or more states are output from the association process, and includes incorrect states 
due to failure in the observation process, it may be possible to contain the observation process failure in 
the state selection process. This containment is shown in Figure 3-11. This again can occur if expectation 
is correct. The discrepancy between the states consistent with the flawed observation and the expectation 
of state would likely appear at this stage, forming an ambiguous state assumption and triggering known 
divergence.20  
 
Figure 3-11. Containment of observation process failure in state selection process 
3.4 Failures in the Association Process 
Failures can originate in the association process due to problems in associative understanding or 
ambiguity in the set of observations. Each of these failures is discussed below.  
3.4.1 Problems in Associative Understanding  
Breakdowns in associative understanding are one form of failure of the association process. Figure 3-12 
shows the possible propagation of problems in associative understanding. Since the associative 
understanding is directly used in the association process, problems can propagate directly into the 
comparison conducted in the association process. The failures discussed below can possibly be attributed 
to training or experience problems. If a failure in associative understanding occurs, it can occur in a 
number of different ways.   
                                                      
20 It is also possible to trigger a transition from unknown to known divergence if expectation is incorrect 
and still not consistent with any of the states output from the association process. For the purpose of 
addressing divergence however, this thesis places emphasis of having a correct expectation. 
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Figure 3-12. Possible propagation of associative understanding and association process failure 
The following are examples of failures in associative understanding that would affect the association 
process. 
• Missing knowledge of a state can be caused by lack of exposure to or experience with the state.  
• If a state occurs outside of its nominal situation, it’s possible that the human may not call that 
state for comparison.21  
• Missing association of individual indications of a state could also be attributed to lack of 
experience associating the indication with the particular state.  
• Incorrect understanding of indications for a particular state occurs when the human understands a 
certain observable is important for determining the state, however the value/trend of that 
observable is incorrect. This can be caused by possible training deficiency or other experience 
effects.22 
As can be seen failures in associative understanding could occur in a number of different ways in the 
association process. These failures could be compounded if there are situations of high ambiguity that 
also influence the association process.  
                                                      
21 Example: RETARD FLR is a mode on the MCP that is only typically associated with the final approach 
phase of the flight, so the human may not consider this as a possible state if the situation was in cruise. 
22 Example of incorrect knowledge of indications: This could occur if the human believed that the SPD 
indication on the MCP was associated with the Retard Mode (when in actuality, SPD would be associated 
with Speed Mode). 
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3.4.2 Ambiguity in the Set of Observations 
Ambiguity in the set of observations refers to cases where individual observations made are exclusively 
of indefinitive observables. This can disable the association process from identifying a single state that is 
consistent with the set of observations contributing to the failures. This potential propagation of 
ambiguity of observables is shown in Figure 3-13. These can then propagate downstream. 
  
 
Figure 3-13. Possible propagation of association process failure due to high ambiguity through human 
information processing 
Ambiguity in a set of observables can be a result of the situation, or a result of the design of the system 
(Sherry, Feary, Polson, & Palmer, 2001).23 Ambiguity of set of observations and problems with 
associative understanding can be contained in similar manners that are discussed in the next section. 
3.4.3 Containment of Association Process Failures 
The state selection process has the potential to trap association process failures caused by both problems 
in associative understanding and ambiguity in the set of observables.24 Potential containment of both 
                                                      
23 An example of ambiguity due to situation could be the crew initiating a descent with a vertical speed 
mode, but the automation transitioning into an IDLE mode. In this case, the nominally definitive 
observables can become indefinitive if they no longer providing distinguishing information regarding 
state.  An example of ambiguity due to system design could be two different modes in the autopilot, 
which provide no distinguishing information between the two. 
24 Technically, for cases of problems in associative understanding, it is possible to trigger a transition 
from unknown to known divergence in the association process if the understanding problems are so 
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sources of association process failures in the state selection process is shown in Figure 3-14 and Figure 
3-15. For problems in associative understanding, if the output of states is incorrect, the failure has the 
potential to be trapped in the decision tree logic of the state selection process. If expectation of state is 
correct, these incorrect states would not be consistent with the expectation, likely triggering known 
divergence. In addition to problems in associative understanding, ambiguity can also be trapped in the 
state selection process in a similar way if expectation is correct.  
 
Figure 3-14. Containment of association process failure due to problems in associative understandings in state 
selection process 
As mentioned, ambiguity in the set of observations can result in an under-constrained system, where 
association process outputs multiple states that are consistent with the observation. The possible 
containment of the association process failure is shown in Figure 3-15. This failure can be contained in 
the state selection process if the expectation is correct. The result would be re-convergence if the actual 
state is in the list of states consistent with the observation, while known divergence would result if the 
expectation is not included in the list of states consistent with the observation. Containment of association 
process failures, if not trapped in the state selection process, would not technically be possible in the 
context of the model, since the state selection process is modeled as the last line of defense between the 
association process and the human state assumption. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
severe that no states are consistent with the set of observations. However, this is a rather extreme case and 
less relevant when discussing ways to contain these failures.  
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Figure 3-15. Containment of association process failure due to high ambiguity in the state selection process 
3.5 Failures in the State Selection Process 
A consequence of modeling the state selection process with decision tree logic is that this process 
becomes purely dependent on upstream input. Considering that failures could not originate here, the state 
selection process is only discussed as a process that can be influenced by upstream failures or a process 
by which failures could be contained. It should be noted that in this is a simplistic modeling of the state 
selection process and is purely deterministic. However, in future work this process could be developed to 
be more realistic regarding uncertainty in human cognition and test whether internal failures within the 
logic could occur.  
3.6 Failures in Processes when in Known Divergence 
Known divergence can be signified by an ambiguous state assumption. This ambiguity can influence both 
the expectation process as well as the ambiguity resolution process. Both processes are described below in 
the context of containment of process failures. 
3.6.1 Impact on the Expectation Process 
When the human knows a divergent condition exists, it can be reasonable to assume that confidence in 
their expectation decreases. For the purpose of this thesis, an assumption was made to negate the 
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influence of expectation in the process if the human does not have confidence in the expectation, shown 
schematically in the model in Figure 3-16.25   
 
Figure 3-16. Simplified process model of divergence when confidence in expectation is low 
Without the expectation process in the model, the only remaining input to the state selection process is 
through the association process so it becomes impossible for failures to be trapped in the state selection 
process. On the other hand, in known divergence, humans can look for further information and no longer 
have a strong expectation bias so efficacy of observation process can increase.  Thus, the improved 
performance of the observation process has the potential to outweigh the loss of possible avenues for 
containment of failures. The expectation process is not the only process affected by the ambiguity of 
human state assumption; the ambiguity resolution process is discussed next.  
3.6.2 Failure in the Ambiguity Resolution Process 
The ambiguity resolution process, discussed in Section 2.1.6, could have a number of possible outputs. 
One of these outputs feeds directly back into the state selection process if the resolution is to guess the 
state of the system. In this case, divergence can result if this state is guessed incorrectly since the decision 
tree in the state selection process is bypassed if a guess is made. For this failure, it is not likely to be 
contained until the next cycle of human information processing. If the human is aware that she made a 
guess at the state however, the significant ambiguity of the human state assumption could input into the 
expectation process and expectation could be negated from the next cycle through the process model as 
was discussed in the previous section. With these changes in human information processing, it may be 
                                                      
25 As mentioned earlier, this is a crude representation of influence of low confidence on the expectation 
process, however this assumption will be used generally to illustrate use of the model. Further work can 
be conducted to further define the relationship between confidence and the expectation process.  
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possible for a poor decision coming from the ambiguity resolution process to be assessed and resolved in 
a later event.  
3.7 Failures in Multiple Processes  
The discussion in this chapter until now has focused on single process failures, however in the operational 
environment, it can be possible for failures in different processes to occur simultaneously. The effects of 
multiple failures can be very different than single failures. The multiple failures can diminish the 
containment potential depending on the processes affected. However there are some combinations of 
failures that do have containment potential based on the model. These combinations of failures involve 
any combination of indication, observation, and association processes. The possible containment of this 
combination of failures is shown in Figure 3-17. Failures affecting all three processes can each be 
contained in the state selection process if expectation is correct.  
 
Figure 3-17. Containment of multiple failures involving the indication, observation, associative understanding 
and association processes only 
Since all permutations of failures with containment potential rely on a correct expectation, more 
consequential issues can arise as the problems become uncontainable when failures in the expectation 
process are paired with other processes. This means that the following permutations can have the potential 
to result in unknown divergence.  
• Dual Failures 
o Indication System and Expectation Process 
o Observation Process and Expectation Process 
o Association Process and Expectation Process 
• Triple Failures 
o Indication System, Observation Process, and Expectation Process 
  
79 
o Indication System, Association Process, and Expectation Process 
o Observation Process, Association Process, and Expectation Process 
• Quadruple Failures 
o Indication System, Observation Process, Association Process, and Expectation Process 
An example of a lack of possible containment of the quadruple failure is shown in Figure 3-18. For all of 
these combinations of failures, state selection process can get contaminated along with the other 
processes. This leaves no uncontaminated avenue available to contain divergence. This provides 
susceptibility for consequential results if these failures occur simultaneously during critical flight regimes, 
for example. 
 
Figure 3-18. Example of lack of containment possibility involving the expectation process 
3.8 Model of Divergence in Existing Error Frameworks 
Since some impacts of divergence include human error, it’s relevant to discuss how divergence may fit 
into existing error frameworks. For this section, the HFACS error classification and Norman’s error 
classification of slips and mistakes discussed in Section 1.2.1 are used to discuss how divergence may 
explain the same types of errors.  The active errors in the Unsafe Acts causal category in HFACS can be 
split into decision errors, perceptual errors, and skill based errors. These correspond with mistakes and 
slips in Norman’s framework where mistakes can be further split into rule based mistakes and knowledge 
based mistakes based on the task (Norman, 1988; Rasmussen, 1985; Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000). Since 
skill-rule-knowledge based errors are based on the task itself, these are not differentiated in this 
discussion.   
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Table 3-2 depicts the types of HFACS and Norman’s errors and possible corresponding failures in the 
model of divergence, which could lead to those errors.  
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Table 3-2. Comparison of existing error frameworks and model of divergence 
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Decision error in the HFACS framework refers to “intentional behavior that proceeds as intended, yet the 
plan proves inadequate or inappropriate for the situation” (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2003). This type of 
mistake can originate from an inconsistent human state assumption, where the decision may be 
appropriate for the assumption the human holds, but is inappropriate for the actual state. In the model of 
divergence, this type of mistake could result from a failure in the indication system or any of the 
processes influencing the human state assumption such as observation, association, and expectation. In 
addition, if any of the decision making processes yield an inappropriate decision, this could also lead to a 
decision error. Perceptual errors can occur “when one’s perception of the world differs from reality”. This 
type of error can also originate from an inconsistent human state assumption. It specifies that the corrupt 
failure process originates from the perceptual path to the state selection process. In this case, failures in 
the indication system could contribute to an observation failure, failures in the observation process itself, 
or ambiguity in the observables can be mis-associated or underspecified forcing reliance on an 
expectation. In this case, because a perceptual error is defined, it may be assumed that failures may 
propagate into the decision process but may not originate there.  
Finally, within the context of slips there are three categories that have been defined (Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 2000). These categories include errors in intention formation, activation of schema, and 
triggering of schema.  
Errors in intention formation further categorize into mode errors, where the situation may be classified 
improperly, and description errors, where the intent may not be fully specified. Mode errors could 
originate from divergence and the failures of processes, which can lead to divergence, while description 
errors can originate due to attentional limitations or problems related to long term memory stores feeding 
execution.  
Errors in activation of schema can be further classified into capture slips, interference, or step skipping. 
Capture slips and interference refer to an unintended activation where capture may occur due to habitual 
behavior and interference could occur due to confusion with similar situations. Capture slips may have 
correct intention, but fail in the execution process, however interference can manifest in the model of 
divergence as a failure in the association process. Step skipping refers to omission of an action and is 
classified as a loss of activation, likely corresponding to a failure in the execution process.  
Errors in triggering of schema can be further classified into timing errors, confusion of intention with 
action, and spoonerisms. If a schema is triggered at the wrong time, it may be considered a slip, and if it is 
not triggered at all, it can be considered a lapse. Both of these timing errors would be captured in the 
model of divergence as failures in the execution process. Spoonerisms would also be considered as 
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possibly originating in the execution process. Confusion between intention and action, however, appears 
to involve the expectation process in addition to the execution process. An example of this may be an 
intent to press the auto-pilot disconnect button, but confusion arising because expectation may have 
updated to reflect the button press even if it had not actually been executed.  
Overall, the model of divergence can be used to explain mistakes (decision errors and perceptual errors) 
and certain types of slips/lapses (skill based errors) including mode errors, interference, and confusion 
between intent and action. Slips would not be explained by divergence as they would not be caused by an 
inconsistent state assumption. This section shows how divergence spans beyond the typical error 
frameworks and illustrates how errors in current frameworks may be explained by failures in different 
processes in the model of divergence.   
3.9 Summary 
Failures in human information processing can have different impacts on the outcome of a situation 
relating to divergence. These failures range from inconsequential single failures, such as missing 
observations of indefinitive indications of state, to multiple failures whose occurrence could prevent the 
possibility of containment anywhere in human information processing. If these failures are not contained 
prior to reaching a state assumption, it can propagate into decision-making and execution processes 
leading to errors in human performance. This chapter discussed how failures of individual processes can 
affect the human state assumption. Problems with understanding of the system can cause failures in the 
expectation, and association failures. Problems with the indication system and observation process can 
also affect the human state assumption, possibly resulting in mistakes if not contained.  
Major process failures relate to failures and combinations of failures that result in unknown divergence. 
These have no avenue for containment. Aside from a wrong guess output from the ambiguity resolution 
process, unknown divergence can also appear for multiple process failures that include an expectation 
process failure. This chapter discussed influences possibly contributing to failures in human information 
processes, impact of failures, and possible containment of these process failures. The following chapter 
uses this information to explore a number of accident case studies.  
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Chapter 4           
             
             
                   
Case Studies 
The human information processing model of divergence is used in this chapter to evaluate divergence in a 
set of accident and incident cases. Due to the expansive list of complex automation systems in a modern 
commercial aircraft, the analysis was scoped to aircraft systems that were complex enough to see the 
possible occurrence of divergence but with a limited state space such that the system could be easily 
understood by the reader. This chapter begins with a description of the scope of the analysis and 
introduces the method used in analyzing data from the accident and incident reports relating to aspects of 
divergence. The basic results of occurrence of divergence and re-convergence are initially discussed, 
followed by an evaluation of the dynamics of the divergence timeline. Finally, this chapter closes with a 
discussion of the factors contributing to divergence and inhibiting re-convergence.  
4.1 Cases Analyzed  
In order analyze divergence, a set of similar accidents, which clearly indicated potential for illustrating 
divergence, was needed. Since the human state assumption within the framework of divergence was tied 
to human performance, accidents tagged as involving “human error” were investigated initially using the 
FAA Lessons Learned accident database. The accidents within this set included various systems of 
interest, thus in order to identify trends, further specification was desired. Since industry initiatives have 
highlighted mode confusion as a potential threat to safety, the scope of analysis was initially focused on 
accidents involving auto-flight systems. Another goal in defining scope was to use a system with a simple 
state space to facilitate understanding of divergence and included a well established actual state of the 
system. The auto-throttle system within the auto-flight system fit these criteria including a limited set of 
possible modes and straightforward assessment of actual mode using Flight Data Recorder (FDR) data. 
Thus, the main analysis  focused on cases involving auto-throttle mode confusion. 
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Auto-throttle and auto-thrust systems both control engines. Despite differences in how auto-throttle and 
auto-thrust systems function, for the purpose of this thesis these differences were considered negligible 
and both auto-throttle and auto-thrust systems are referred to auto-throttle systems in this document for 
simplicity. 
Auto-throttle systems are a subcomponent of auto-flight systems and control thrust settings of the 
engines. Control of the engines, however, can occur in multiple different ways based on the mode of the 
auto-throttle. Examples of auto-throttle modes for the Airbus A320 include Speed (SPD), MACH, Thrust 
(THR), and Retard (RET) (Airbus Industrie, 1989). Each of these modes uses engine thrust to control 
different targets. When in SPD or MACH mode, for example, the auto-throttle manipulates the engine 
thrust to maintain a specific speed or Mach number target respectively. While in THR mode on the other 
hand, the auto-throttle controls the engine thrust to maintain a specific thrust level. Similarly, in RET 
mode, the auto-throttles reduce thrust to flight idle. The different modes of the auto-throttle can be 
operated independently of the auto-pilot system or can be coupled to auto-pilot modes. When coupled, the 
auto-throttle modes can be dependent on the auto-pilot’s vertical path control. For example if flying a 
coupled approach in the A320, when the vertical autopilot mode FLARE is activated, the RET mode on 
the auto-throttle is automatically selected to accompany the auto-pilot mode transition as the automation 
assumes the aircraft is in the landing flare (Airbus Industrie, 1989). This capability to couple the auto-
pilot and auto-throttle systems illustrates the potential complexity of the system. Also, the fact that it can 
be possible for auto-throttle modes to transition without direct crew input could indicate more 
susceptibility for cases of auto-throttle divergence if the crew is not in the loop when a transition occurs. 
Due to these characteristics of the auto-throttle system, divergence in auto-throttle mode was chosen as 
the focus of the analysis. 
In order to identify case studies, the FAA Lessons Learned Database was used (Federal Aviation 
Administration, n.d.). All of the cases within the subcategory “human error” were reviewed and included 
if they were related to auto-throttle mode confusion and evidence of divergence was present. Accidents 
tagged as “related events” to the accidents involving human error were also reviewed and included if they 
related to auto-throttle mode confusion. Within the accidents under the subcategory “human error” in the 
FAA Lessons Learned database, Indian 605, Air France 72, and China 140 were identified directly from 
the database to involve divergence in auto-throttle state. These are highlighted in blue in Table 4-1. Other 
accidents were added to this set using the “related events” specified in the database in addition to the 
investigative reports for those three initiating cases. These are highlighted in orange in Table 4-1. The 
Turkish 1951 accident and Thomsonfly incident were included because it was tagged as a “related event” 
to Indian 605. The Tarom 381 incident was included as a related to the Air France 72 accident. Asiana 
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214 occurred while this research was being conducted and was included based on its relevance to auto-
throttle mode confusion.26  
In order to investigate other classes of accidents where divergence appears to be a key factor, three further 
accidents were chosen from the human error list in the Lessons Learned database that did not relate to 
auto-throttle mode confusion. Since Eastern 401, American 965, and Air Inter 148 were high profile 
examples of human error, these three accidents were chosen to assess how divergence could be used to 
understand these accidents. All three of these accidents resulted in controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), a 
continuing concern for aviation safety (Loomis & Porter, 1982; Shappell & Wiegmann, 2003).  
As mentioned above, Table 4-1 lists the eleven accidents and incidents studied.27 These case studies 
included the eight accidents involving auto-throttle mode, in addition to three accidents involving other 
automation systems that resulted in CFIT.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                      
26 The American 903 incident was included due to a case of auto-throttle mode confusion where “a factor 
contributing to the accident was the flight-crew's failure to properly use the auto-throttle" that contributed 
to an inflight stall. This incident resulted in an inflight aerodynamic stall and exceedance of the rudder 
load limits.  American 903 was tagged for analysis due to its auto-throttle influence. It was tagged as a 
case similar to AA 587 in which the crew also exceeded rudder load limits. The main accident, AA 587 in 
this case, did not involve auto-throttle mode confusion and thus, was not included in this analysis.  
 
27 Some percentage of the following section has been adapted or reconstructed from a previous 
publication by the author (Silva & Hansman, 2015) that introduced the work.  
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Table 4-1. List of cases analyzed (Source: Directly (blue) or Indirectly (orange) from FAA Lesson’s Learned 
Database) 
 Flight A/C Model 
Accident 
Year Description Result 
A
ut
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Asiana 21428 B777 2013 
Auto-throttle reverted to a dormant (HOLD) 
mode during approach and did not capture 
approach speed 
Aerodynamic Stall and 
Impact 
Turkish 195129 B737 2009 
Auto-throttle went to RETARD FLARE 
mode during approach due to previous radar 
altimeter failure 
Aerodynamic Stall and 
Impact 
Thomsonfly 
(Incident)30 B737 2007 
Auto-throttle disengaged during approach 
and did not capture approach speed 
Successful Recovery 
from Aerodynamic Stall 
American 903 
(Incident)31 A300 1997 
Auto-throttle disengaged during descent and 
did not capture speed upon level-off 
Successful Recovery 
from Aerodynamic Stall 
Indian 60532 A320 1990 Auto-throttle in IDLE OP Descent mode and did not capture approach airspeed 
Aerodynamic Stall and 
Impact 
H
ig
h 
En
er
gy
 
C
as
es
 
Tarom 381 
(Incident)33 A310 1994 
Auto-throttle increased power during 
transient flap overspeed 
Successful Recovery 
from Aerodynamic Stall 
China Airlines 
14034 A300 1994 
Auto-throttle increased power due to 
inadvertent crew activation of TOGA button 
Aerodynamic Stall and 
Impact 
Air France 7235 B747 1993 Auto-throttle increased power due to end of descent point logic in FMS.  Runway Excursion  
C
FI
T 
Air Inter 14836 A320 1992 Vertical descent speed set to 3,300 fpm rather than 3.3 degrees FPA 
Controlled Flight into 
Terrain 
American 96537 B757 1995 
Incorrect waypoint input steered aircraft off-
course, coupled with descent into the 
terminal area resulted in impact with a 
mountain ridge 
Controlled Flight into 
Terrain 
Eastern 40138 L1011 1972 
Auto-pilot altitude hold disconnected and 
aircraft began slow descent. Crew was 
distracted troubleshooting a landing gear 
failure 
Controlled Flight into 
Terrain 
 
                                                      
28  (National Transportation Safety Board, 2013) 
29  (Dutch Safety Board, 2010) 
30  (Department for Transport/Air Accidents Investigation Branch, 2009) 
31  (National Transportation Safety Board, 1998)  
32  (Ministry of Civil Aviation, 1990) 
33  (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses, 2000) 
34  (Aircraft Accident Investigation Commission - Ministry of Transport, 1996) 
35  (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses, 1999) 
36  (Ministry of Transport, 1993) 
37  (Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Columbia, 1995) 
38  (National Transportation Safety Board, 1973) 
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It should be noted that the scope and cases discussed, were chosen to illustrate that divergence could add 
value as a perspective for evaluating these cases. As accidents can originate from a complex interaction of 
a number of different factors, this thesis does not claim that divergence is the exclusive contributor to 
these accidents and incidents, but a possible contributor.    
Three accidents, of the eleven, are discussed in detail in this chapter. These accidents, Turkish 1951, Air 
Inter 148, and Eastern 401, are presented to illustrate the assessment of divergence, while the detailed 
discussion of all accidents can be found in Appendix D.  
4.2 Method 
In order to evaluate cases of divergence in accident and incident reports, evidence of divergence was 
inferred from a number of sources. Different types of data in investigative reports provided different 
insights into divergence. FDR data for example provided information regarding actual state of the system. 
This data was supplemented with analysis performed by the investigative team. Cockpit flight recorder 
(CVR) data, on the other hand, provided insight into the human’s assumption of the state of the system. 
Crew interviews also supplemented CVR data if the crew survived to provide a statement. Other aspects 
of the human state assumption were inferred from crew actions and behavior. Because these were based 
on standard operating procedures, appropriate action was possible to infer for different situations. Using 
these sources of data, the following method was used to evaluate divergence in several accident cases. 
Step 1. Determined whether there was evidence indicating unknown divergence, known divergence, 
and re-convergence.  
For the auto-throttle cases, the state of interest analyzed was the mode of the auto-throttle. For the CFIT 
cases, multiple options were considered and the individual state of interest for each CFIT cases is 
presented in each discussion.  
In order to assess divergence, information regarding the actual state of the system and the human 
assumption of state was needed.  
Actual state information was generally straightforward to infer from the accident or incident reports. 
Typically, the FDR data included time of mode transition. In auto-throttle cases, the FDR included 
parameters of auto-throttle engagement and mode of engagement. In some cases the FDR was not 
recoverable or destroyed by impact, or the data in the FDR would be overwritten if too much time had 
passed from incident and notification of the incident to authorities. In these cases where FDR data was not 
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available, reports sometimes included Quick Access Recorder (QAR) data that also would have provided 
mode information.39 While the list of parameters recorded on the QAR could be less extensive than those 
recorded by the FDR, it typically includes mode information and flight path vector information. If 
automation mode information was not available, e.g. in the incident involving American Airlines (AA) 
903, the uncertainty in time of mode transition is explicitly noted in the discussion. In these cases, 
behavior of the engines could have provided insight into the state of the auto-throttle system. For 
example, in cases of level off, if the auto-throttle was engaged in SPD mode, it is expected that the auto-
throttle would have manipulated the engines to maintain SPD upon level off. If the engine manipulation 
was not apparent in the engine parameters recorded, it was inferred that the auto-throttle was not engaged 
in SPD mode.  
Human state assumption information was more implicit in the investigation reports. In order to make an 
assessment of the human state assumption, human behavior and verbalization during the case was used. 
The evidence of behavior was gathered from the FDR/QAR if the action was reflected in the aircraft 
system. For example, if the auto-pilot was disconnected, the time of disconnect was taken from the FDR. 
The source of the disconnect (aircraft or human) was inferred based on verbalization of the crew. 
Verbalization was taken from the cockpit voice recorder if it was available. If the cockpit voice recorder 
data was not available, behavior was used to make the inference of human state assumption alone. In 
some cases, the crew survived to provide a statement. The information gathered from these interviews 
provided further insight into the human state assumption. Typically, in these interviews, the crew 
explained their expectations at each point in the accident timeline.40 Thus, the information can be useful 
in determining divergence. For example the crew in AA903 stated in the interview that they knew the 
auto-throttle disconnected sometime during the descent, but didn’t recognize it until level off and the 
speed was below their target airspeed. Thus, the human state assumption until that airspeed was reached 
can be inferred as the last known expectation by the crew, which in AA903 was likely when they began 
                                                      
39 QAR was a recording device installed to record engine performance. Operationally, this information 
can be used by mechanics to troubleshoot engine problems. However, since the device records other 
aircraft information, it is a useful tool for accident investigators to validate FDR data or replace it if the 
FDR is not available.  
40 Typical cues in the report could include verbiage such as “the crew was not aware of _____,” or “the 
crew did not realize that ____.” In CVR or interview transcripts, verbiage such as “I didn’t know that 
____,” or “I was confused ___”  
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the descent (they reported that the auto-throttle behaved as expected reducing thrust to idle for the 
descent).    
Unknown divergence was inferred if there was evidence that the crew’s state assumption was inconsistent 
with the actual system state. Re-convergence was inferred if there was evidence that the crew’s state 
assumption was consistent with the actual system state. Known Divergence was inferred if there was 
evidence that the crew recognized errors in their state assumption. This could be in the form of 
verbalization such as “what’s going on?” indicating confusion. This information was also gained from 
crew interviews if available.  
Step 2: Recorded times of critical events 
Critical events in this thesis were considered as the events related to loss of control, recovery, point of 
unrecoverability (if available) and impact. A record was needed of time of imminent loss of control and 
the time of impact for assessment of dynamics of divergence. Time of imminent loss of control was 
defined for these specific cases as the time of stall warning, overspeed warning, aerodynamic stall, 
aircraft overspeed, annunciation of Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Systems (EGPWS) or impact 
with the ground, whichever occurred first.41 Initiation of recovery was recorded as the time of crew input 
of the appropriate recovery action for the situation. Completion of recovery was recorded as the time 
following recovery when flight parameters returned to a stabilized configuration consistent with nominal 
controlled flight. Point of unrecoverability was occasionally provided in the accident report, and if it was 
available, it was included in this analysis. Finally, time of impact was defined as first contact with the 
ground outside of the runway environment.  These critical events were used to understand the overall 
timeline of divergence and effects thereof.  
Step 3. Identified events of interest 
Events of interest constituted events that were relevant to the divergence timeline. They may or may not 
have included critical events identified above. From the report, it was determined when divergence most 
likely occurred. From that point on, an event would constitute a change in actual state of the system, 
human state assumption, observables, or observation. All events of interest were listed. The description of 
the event and time of the event were also recorded. 
                                                      
41 While this definition was sufficient for the autothrottle and CFIT cases analyzed, the definition of 
imminent loss of control can be adapted to include other parameters such as extreme attitude for other 
cases where that may have constituted a loss of control.  
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Step 4. For each event, possible observables present were identified and assessed regarding whether 
they provided definitive or indefinitive information about the actual aircraft state 
Using the report and sometimes information from an accident aircraft manual to supplement the report, 
possible observables available to the crew at each event were identified. Based on the situation, an 
assessment was made about whether the observable was an unambiguous indication of the actual state 
(definitive observable) or whether it could be an indication of more than one state (indefinitive  
observable).  
Step 5. For each event, the impact of the event on each individual process (indication system, 
expectation process, observation process, and association process) was assessed.  
Indication System Failures 
• Was there evidence of a component failure in the indication system, which provided false 
cues to the crew regarding the value of an observable? [Yes, No] 
o If Yes, then consider as evidence of indication system failure 
o If No, then consider as no evidence of indication system failure 
Expectation Process Failures 
• Was crew’s behavior and verbalization consistent with behavior if they had noticed the actual 
state or behavior if they assumed the nominal state? [Actual, Nominal] 
o If consistent with nominal state, then consider as evidence of expectation process 
failure  
o If consistent with actual state, then consider as no evidence of expectation process 
failure 
 Evidence of Poor System Understanding 
• Was actual state or human state assumption changed? 
o If action was taken, was behavior consistent with the knowledge of the actual state 
transition or consistent with the knowledge of a different state transition? [Actual, 
Different] 
§ If consistent with different state transition, then consider as evidence of poor 
system understanding 
§ If consistent with actual state transition, then consider as no evidence of poor 
system understanding 
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Evidence of Perpetuation of Divergence 
• Does unknown divergence exist? [Yes, No] 
o If Yes, then consider as evidence of perpetuation of divergence 
o If No, then consider as no evidence of perpetuation of divergence  
Observation Process Failures 
Evidence of Expectation Bias 
• Was expectation incorrect? [Yes, No] 
• If Yes, could it have affected the observation of observables? [Yes, No] 
o If Yes, then consider as evidence of expectation bias  
o If No, then consider as no evidence of expectation bias  
Evidence of Distraction 
• Were there other activities the crew was attending to at the time of divergence and once 
divergence had occurred that may have interfered with scanning of observables? [Yes, No] 
o If Yes, then consider as evidence of distraction 
o If No, then consider as no evidence of distraction  
Evidence of Workload Issues 
• Was the crew performing extra tasks or fewer tasks outside of nominal workload during the 
period of divergence? [Extra, Fewer, Nominal] 
o If Extra, then consider as evidence of high workload  
o If Fewer, then consider as evidence of low workload  
o If Nominal, then consider as no evidence of workload issues 
Evidence of Fatigue 
• Did the report conclude that fatigue was a factor in the accident? [Yes, No] 
o If Yes, then consider as evidence of fatigue  
o If No, then consider as no evidence of fatigue  
Association Process Failures 
Evidence of Poor Associative Understanding 
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• Was there evidence of observation of a definitive observable (from verbalization or behavior)?  
[Yes, No] 
• If Yes, was there evidence of a different response than what was expected if this observation had 
actually been made? [Yes, No] 
o If Yes, then consider as evidence of failure in associative understanding 
o If No, then consider as no evidence of failure in associative understanding 
Evidence of Ambiguity of Observables 
• Was a definitive observable observed? [Yes, No] 
• If No, was there evidence of observables whose presence could have been indicative of multiple 
different states concerning the state of interest? [Yes, No] 
o If Yes – then consider as evidence for ambiguity of observables  
o If No – then consider as no evidence for ambiguity of observables 
The outcome of execution for that event was also inferred from the accident report if action was taken or 
communication occurred in response to that event.  
Step 6. Repeated Steps 4 and 5 for each event in the divergence case 
When there was enough time for divergence to evolve, there were typically multiple events that were 
analyzed for a given case. Thus, steps 5 and 6 were repeated for each event involving divergence.  
4.3 Example Case Studies 
4.3.1 Case Study 1: Turkish Airlines Flight 1951  
 
Figure 4-1. Wreckage of Turkish 1951 (Dutch Safety Board, 2010) 
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The accident of Turkish Airlines Flight 1951, shown in Figure 4-1, occurred on February 25, 2009 in 
Amsterdam, Netherlands (Dutch Safety Board, 2010). In this accident a previous radar altimeter (RA) 
component failure had apparently caused the auto-throttle to transition to an abnormal flight mode at the 
top of the final approach descent.42 This abnormal mode caused the throttles to retard and remain in idle 
position. This mode change apparently went unnoticed by the crew, which appears to be a case of an 
observation process failure. However, while the crew was intercepting the glide path there were few 
definitive observables available to the crew regarding this abnormal mode, as most of the available 
indications were showing behavior that was consistent with behavior typically shown by the nominal 
mode in this situation. This illustrates the possibility of an association process failure if there were only 
indefinitive observations input into the association process and expectation process failure if the crew 
expected the nominal mode to be active during this time. As the airspeed dropped below reference 
airspeed, more observables appeared to become definitive, however there was no evidence that the crew 
recognized this abnormal mode until the stall warning system had activated close to 500 feet of altitude. 
The crew attempted to recover; however, the aircraft impacted the ground short of the runway (Dutch 
Safety Board, 2010).  
The flight profile and inferred divergence history for this accident is provided in Figure 4-2. The state of 
interest was the auto-throttle mode. Key events related to the apparent divergence and the implication of 
this divergence were identified and discussed in this analysis. The observables available to the crew 
throughout the timeline are presented at the end of this section in Figure 4-11. 
In this case, the abnormal auto-throttle transition to the abnormal mode of Retard Flare (Event E1) was 
considered to be the trigger for divergence in auto-throttle mode.  
 
                                                      
42 The crew action to perform a coupled approach with a radar altimeter failure indicates a system 
understanding failure influencing their expectation likely not incorporating this abnormal mode transition 
as an effect of flying a coupled approach with a radar altimeter failure.  
  
96 
 
Figure 4-2. Vertical flight profile and approximate airspeed profile for Turkish 1951 relative to overlaid 
inferred divergence history (Dutch Safety Board, 2010) 
 
4.3.1.1 Event E1: Initiation of Divergence 
Time Impact – 01m 39s 
Actual State Auto-throttle mode: Retard Flare (RETARD FLR) 
Situation Descending to intercept glide slope from above 
Event Trigger Change in actual state 
Divergence Type D-1a: Actual state transitions without input by the crew 
 
At Event E1, the apparent divergence in auto-throttle state was considered to be triggered by an abnormal 
transition to Retard Flare at the top of descent, which was not realized by the crew, who possibly 
defaulted their expectation to the nominal transition into SPD mode. This abnormal transition was 
attributed to a faulty radar altimeter reading. Without this failure, the auto-throttle should have 
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transitioned nominally to SPD mode, which included speed hold capability.43 If a failure in the 
expectation process had occurred, it is possible that it influenced the observation process, possibly 
contributing to a missed observation of the RETARD on the flight management annunciation (FMA), 
which was a definitive observable. There was also the possibility of an association process failure if 
exclusively indefinitive observables were observed. As introduced, at the initiation of divergence, failures 
in the observation, association, and expectation processes could have occurred. These are discussed in 
detail below.   
The observables available to the crew included one definitive observable of the “RETARD” shown on the 
FMA depicted at the top of Figure 4-3. In addition to this single definitive observable, a number of 
indefinitive observables were also apparently available to the crew such as values and trends of airspeed, 
pitch attitude, engine parameters, and throttle position. These observables were indefinitive because the 
aircraft was initiating its descent at this point in the timeline, and idle power (and all indications 
consistent with idle power) were indicative of not only the RETARD mode, but also the nominal SPD 
mode which the crew likely expected the aircraft to be in given their previous experience. This means that 
if the single definitive observable was missed in the observation process, discrimination between 
RETARD and SPD mode would not be possible in the association process.  
                                                      
43 The abnormal transition was the result of a component failure. Not only was the radar altimeter 
providing false data, but this false data coming into the automation was not flagged as failed; thus, the 
automation failed to prevent activation of the autopilot which would have nominally occurred if a fail flag 
was received by the automation (Dutch Safety Board, 2010).  
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Figure 4-3. Example primary flight display in the B777 (Dutch Safety Board, 2010) 
The data suggested the crew likely missed the definitive observable of RETARD on the FMA44.  In order 
to understand this observation process failure it was necessary to evaluate the environment and tasks the 
crew was attending to at Event E1. While intercepting the glide slope from above is not an uncommon 
procedure, nominal interception of the glide slope typically occurs from below. It may be possible that 
this non-standard vertical profile could have increased workload for the crew and introduced a distraction 
                                                      
44 CVR transcript and FDR shows behavior consistent with an expectation that the aircraft was in SPD 
mode. The assumption made here was that the data would have showed different behavior if the crew had 
observed the RETARD. Because the behavior was consistent with behavior expected in SPD, the 
evidence suggests that RETARD was not observed. Here, the lack of verbalization about the abnormal 
mode of RETARD on the FMA followed by the downstream surprise apparent in the “speed!” were 
supporting evidence that the RETARD was not observed.  
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from maintaining awareness of the auto-throttle mode.45 In addition to the situational influences of 
workload and distraction, it was important to investigate the system influences involved with the crew not 
noticing the transition. The single definitive observable available to the crew, the FMA, was purely a 
visual indication on the primary flight display. Due to this characteristic, the crew’s attention was likely 
required to be directed in the vicinity of the PFD in order to detect the transition. Thus, if the crew’s 
visual attentional resources were focused elsewhere due to a prioritized task it is possible that the FMA 
indication could have been missed. The investigation also concluded that fatigue was not a likely factor in 
the accident due to sleep in the previous days as well as a lack of behavior consistent with serious fatigue 
(Dutch Safety Board, 2010). 
Finally, as previously mentioned, it was likely that the crew held expectation of SPD mode formed from 
the numerous other times they had flown an ILS approach. It is also possible that this could have 
introduced expectation bias into the observation process contributing to the apparent missed observation 
of the FMA. System influences, situational influences, and expectation bias could all have played a part in 
this apparent observation failure.  
If the only definitive observable, the FMA, was missed, then only indefinitive observations would be 
input into the association process. This, by definition, would have likely resulted in the association 
processes outputting multiple states consistent with observation. These states would need to be filtered in 
the expectation process, where the correct state would result if the expectation was also correct. However, 
as discussed already, the crew likely had an incorrect expectation.  
Another influence on the association process can be traced back to system design. Because of a possibly 
ambiguous design, even if the RETARD indication was observed, the RETARD shown on the FMA 
could have indicated the RETARD Flare mode or the RETARD Descent mode, a mode that is commonly 
seen inflight. While RETARD Flare is not typically seen at the top of approach descent, this ambiguity 
could have potentially occurred in the association process if the RETARD had been observed. Also 
related to the situation, is the possibility that the crew did not believe RETARD could occur at the top of 
descent effectively removing it from the association process comparison. If this occurred, the RETARD 
mode option would not even make it into the state selection process. As can be seen, there were a number 
of potential sources of failures in the association process.  
                                                      
45 CVR transcript shows discussion about the vertical profile as divergence initiated through interception 
of the glide path  
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Figure 4-4. Human information processing model of divergence for Turkish 1951: Events E1 and E2 
The possible expectation process failure, coupled with possible association process and observation 
process failures, likely resulted in unknown divergence. Figure 4-4 shows the containment possibility of 
this situation and suggests that containment of this combination of failures would have been difficult. 
This set of failures continue through the interception of glide path until the airspeed decays below the 
reference airspeed set on the mode control panel, which brings us to Event E2.  
4.3.1.2 Event E2: Speed Decay below Vref 
Time Impact – 00m 39s 
Actual State Auto-throttle mode: Retard Flare (RETARD FLR) 
Situation Airspeed decay below reference airspeed 
Event Trigger Change in observables 
 
As airspeed decayed below Vref, some indefinitive observables would have become definitive. Airspeed, 
engine noise, throttle location, and pitch attitude became definitive observables as these indications would 
not reflect the values output if the auto-throttle were in SPD mode. These extra definitive observables 
could have reduced the dependency on the crew observation of the RETARD on the FMA. Yet, the 
observation process failure appeared to continue.46  
The association process, however, could have recovered due to the change of observables. If any of the 
added definitive observables were observed, they had the possibility to be associated with the correct 
                                                      
46 There was no evidence in the report of verbalization of new information or a change in behavior 
reflecting an observation being made.  
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state. In addition, the Retard Flare/Descent ambiguity, while it still existed, could have been diluted by the 
availability of other definitive observables. The FMA no longer appeared to be the sole variable the crew 
had to rely on. While failures originating in the association process were alleviating, the association 
process was still affected by the failure in the observation process. Again, this failure could have been 
trapped in the state selection process if expectation was correct, however the expectation process failure 
still appeared to exist. This combination of failures is represented in Figure 4-5. While more definitive 
information was available to the crew, this was not sufficient to overcome the expectation bias that likely 
prevailed. 15 seconds after the speed dropped below reference, the airspeed box on the PFD began 
flashing, providing yet another definitive observable to the crew regarding the state of the auto-throttle.   
 
Figure 4-5. Human information processing model of divergence for Turkish 1951: Events E2 and E3 
4.3.1.3 Event E3: Airspeed Box Begins Flashing on PFD 
Time Impact – 00m 24s 
Actual State Auto-throttle mode: Retard Flare (RETARD FLR) 
Situation Airspeed approaching stall regime 
Event Trigger Change in observables 
 
The next event involved the airspeed box on the PFD beginning to flash. This was designed as a low 
speed alert (Dutch Safety Board, 2010). In this case, the indication was a visual indication on the primary 
flight display. This indication had the same limitations discussed for the FMA. Presumably attention 
would need to be focused in the vicinity of the PFD in order to perceive the signal; thus, if the crew had 
their attention on the PFD, it was possible that the flashing could have captured their attention. However, 
the crew’s lack of response indicated that they did not observe this definitive observable either. The 
observation process failure and expectation process failure persisted, and as is still consistent with Figure 
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4-4, the crew remained in unknown divergence despite the added definitive observable. A highly salient 
cue from the system was used to break the expectation bias and indicate divergence to the crew.  
 
Figure 4-6. Example of flashing airspeed box on a B737 PFD [adapted from (pmFlight, 2014)] 
4.3.1.4 Event E4: Stick Shaker Activation  
Time Impact – 00m 15s 
Actual State Auto-throttle mode: Retard Flare (RET FLR) 
Situation Stall warning activation 
Event Trigger Change in observables 
 
As the airspeed decreased, the autopilot attempted to hold glide slope by increasing the angle of attack of 
the aircraft. Once the angle of attack exceeded a critical value, 15 seconds prior to impact, the stall 
warning system activated the stick shaker, warning the crew of impending aerodynamic stall. This stick 
shaker was a salient, definitive indication for low airspeed. The low speed could then provide definitive 
insight into the auto-throttle state in this case. Evidence from the cockpit voice recorder indicated that this 
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observable was apparently noted by the crew, highlighting recovery of the observation process.47 The 
only failure remaining when the stick shaker activated was the expectation process failure. 
Thus, because the expectation process failure appeared to be the only remaining process failure at this 
point, it became possible to contain in the state selection process when comparison was made between 
states consistent with observation and expectation of state. If the expectation was the SPD mode, the stick 
shaker observation would not be indicative of SPD mode because speed is protected, by definition in this 
mode. This discrepancy likely trapped the expectation process failure in the state selection process, 
apparently triggering known divergence. This containment is depicted in Figure 4-7. 
 
Figure 4-7. Human information processing model of divergence for Turkish 1951: Event E4 
The onset of known divergence would have triggered the ambiguity resolution process. The crew 
verbalized concern with the airspeed, indicating that the ambiguity resolution process could have resulted 
in a scan for more information and communication of the observation made. Following this 
communication, the crew apparently took action to recover by pushing the throttles forward.  
4.3.1.5 Event E5: First Attempted Recovery – Auto-throttle retards during recovery 
Time Impact – 00m 15s 
Actual State Auto-throttle mode: Retard Flare (RETARD FLR) 
Situation First attempt at recovery, however auto-throttle retards during recovery 
Event Trigger Change in human state assumption 
 
                                                      
47 10:25:47: Stickshaker On, followed by an immediate application of power by the first officer (Dutch 
Safety Board, 2010). This immediate reaction was consistent with what was expected if the stick shaker 
signal was observed.  
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The action taken to push the throttles forward was taken immediately following stick shaker activation, 
however this was not effective without disconnecting the auto-throttle system, uncovering another failure 
in the expectation process. The pilot flying (PF) could have expected that by pushing the throttles 
forward, they would remain there (or disconnect the auto-throttle), while in actuality since the auto-
throttle remained in RETARD mode. The auto-throttle reverted the levers back to idle once the pilot’s 
hand was removed from the throttle (to hand over control of the aircraft to the captain). Even though 
expectation was called into question in the previous event, the action taken updated the expectation of 
state to the result of that action during this event.  The crew immediately noticed the throttles retarding 
and this observation was likely inconsistent with their expectation as demonstrated by their disconnection 
of the auto-throttles once the captain took control of the aircraft. Figure 4-8 depicts human information 
processing for this combination of process failures.  As can be seen, the divergence was again trapped in 
the state selection process due to the pilots’ likely observation of indications that were inconsistent with 
the state they expected the auto-throttle to be in. The result was, again, apparently known divergence.  
 
Figure 4-8. Human information processing model of divergence for Turkish 1951: Event E5 
Again, known divergence would have triggered the ambiguity resolution process. Since the next action 
taken by the crew was to disconnect the auto-throttle, there are two possible paths in human information 
processing that could have resulted in this action.  
a) Option A. The crew decided in the ambiguity resolution process to disconnect the auto-throttle 
when any question existed to the state of the system. In this option, re-convergence would occur 
once the auto-throttle was disconnected.  
b) Option B: The crew decided in the ambiguity resolution process to search the observables again, 
however in the next cycle through the model, since an expectation was not involved, the state 
selection process possibly output RETARD as the human state assumption. In this option, re-
convergence would have occurred in the current cycle through human information processing and 
only became apparent once the auto-throttle was disconnected.  
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However, based on the information in the accident report, it is not possible to ascertain when exactly re-
convergence occurred. Since there is no explicit evidence of Option A or B, Option A was used as a 
conservative estimate of the timing of re-convergence. 
4.3.1.6 Event E6: Re-convergence 
Time Impact – 00m 12s 
Actual State Auto-throttle mode: OFF 
Situation Disconnection of auto-throttle 
Event Trigger Change in actual state 
Re-convergence Type  C-3 – Human state assumption and actual state 
transition to alternate state 
 
The action of disconnecting the autopilot would have presumably updated the actual state of the auto-
throttle as well as the human expectation of auto-throttle state. Figure 4-9 depicts human information 
processing in the next cycle through the process. The set of observations would likely be consistent with 
expectation resulting in a human state assumption of the auto-throttle being OFF. The timing of re-
convergence however did not apparently leave enough time to complete the recovery prior to impact.  
 
Figure 4-9. Human information processing model of divergence for Turkish 1951: Event E6 
Despite recovery actions initiated 6 seconds later, impact occurred 12 seconds after auto-throttle 
disconnection. Aircraft documentation from the manufacturer stated that at least 500 feet of altitude was 
needed to recover from a full stall (Dutch Safety Board, 2010). The report also stated that if the crew had 
followed stabilized approach procedures, they would have been required to execute a missed approach at 
1000 feet altitude, which would have prevented the accident. 
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4.3.1.7 Summary of Turkish 1951 
The timeline of divergence and re-convergence for Turkish 1951 is shown below. Initiation of divergence 
is depicted as a departure between the actual auto-throttle state line (in black) and the crew state 
assumption line (in blue). Re-convergence, on the other hand, is depicted as the unification of the actual 
auto-throttle state line and the crew state assumption line. The period shaded in gray indicates the period 
of known divergence. Time of imminent loss of control is shown with a red star, while time of impact (if 
applicable) is indicated by a blue cross. In addition, if point of unrecoverability was stated in the accident 
report, it was shown on the figure as a red hourglass. The time of imminent LOC was defined as the time 
of stick shaker activation, triggering of alpha floor protection, aerodynamic stall, or impact (whichever 
was earliest). Finally, period of recovery is shaded as a rounded green bar.  
 
 
Figure 4-10. Divergence timeline for Turkish 1951 accident. 
 
 
  
107 
 
Figure 4-11. Definitive observables for Turkish 1951 and timeline they were available to the crew 
The accident of Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 illustrated a full process of unknown divergence to known 
divergence to re-convergence. In this case, there were a number of factors influencing the observation 
process such as expectation bias, distraction and workload from the vertical profile and glide slope 
interception from above, and possible design influence of the insufficient salience of the FMA indication 
to capture the crew’s attention. In terms of the association process, there was no evidence of failures in 
associative understanding; however, there was likely a period of ambiguity of observables due to the 
descent masking many of the nominally definitive variables to the crew. Finally, expectation process 
failures were seen and possibly influenced by issues with system understanding of the effect of a radar 
altimeter failure on a coupled approach resulting in an abnormal transition, in addition to once divergence 
occurred it fed back into expectation, essentially perpetuating the false expectation. 
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Table 4-2. Summary of process failures for Turkish 1951 
       Failure 
 
 
Case 
Occurrence of 
Observation Process Failure 
Occurrence of 
Association Process 
Failure 
Occurrence of Expectation 
Process Failure 
Expect-
ation 
Bias 
Dist-
raction 
Work
-load Fatigue 
Design 
Influences 
Associative 
Under-
standing 
Ambiguity 
of 
Observables 
Abnormal 
Transition 
System 
Under-
standing 
Perpetuation 
of 
Divergence 
Turkish 
1951 x x 
x 
(high)  x  x x x x 
 
As in any case where divergence could play a part in the accident, it is generally a piece of a greater 
picture. In this case, a previous radar altimeter failure combined with a failure of the error checking code 
apparently caused the auto-throttle to revert to an abnormal mode on approach. Ultimately, it was the 
timeline of the divergence compared to recovery potential of the situation that likely led to the 
consequential impacts of this accident. The divergence however can be assessed in the greater accident 
context when illustrating causal factors. Turkish 1951 highlighted the impact of divergence in auto-
throttle state, however divergence in other automation states can also result in accidents. This is illustrated 
by the next case study, Air Inter Flight 148.  
4.3.2 Case Study 2: Air Inter Flight 148  
The accident of Air Inter Flight 148 occurred on January 20, 1992 near Strasbourg, France, the wreckage 
of which is shown in Figure 4-12. This accident occurred as the crew flew an abnormal approach into the 
airport. During the initiation of final approach descent, the crew apparently inadvertently input a descent 
rate of -3,300 fpm into their Flight Control Unit (FCU) when likely intending to set a -3.3 degree flight 
path angle (FPA). The vertical flight profile of divergence for this accident is provided in Figure 4-13, 
and the observables available to the crew throughout the divergence timeline is provided in Figure 4-20. 
The crew apparently did not recognize their mistake and the aircraft eventually impacted a mountain short 
of the runway. There were a number of likely human information process failures involved in this 
accident including missed observations, incorrect expectation, many non-definitive observables affecting 
the discriminability of state in the association process, and a possible associative understanding failure of 
the observables appropriate for a -3.3 degree glide path. The process model of divergence was used to 
identify the impacts of different failures in individual processes relating to the divergence in vertical flight 
path value (V/S or FPA).  
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Figure 4-12. Wreckage of Air Inter Flight 148  (Ministry of Transport, 1993) 
 
Figure 4-13. Altitude profile of Air Inter Flight 148 with divergence overlay (Bateman, 1991) 
 
 
  
110 
4.3.2.1 Event E1: Initiation of Divergence 
Time Impact – 00m 57s 
Actual State Vertical Rate Target: -3,300 fpm 
Situation Initiation of descent on final approach 
Event Trigger Change in actual state 
Divergence Type D-1b: Actual state transitions due to upstream input by the crew 
 
Table 4-3. Difference in flight path angle and vertical speed vertical flight path values (Ministry of Transport, 
1993) 
 
In this accident, divergence was considered triggered when the crew apparently inadvertently set -3,300 
fpm into the FCU while likely intending to set -3.3 degrees flight path angle (FPA). This section discusses 
how the crew could have failed to observe the correct vertical flight path value, could have held an 
incorrect expectation, and how indefinitive observations could have contributed to an inability of the 
association process to output a single definitive possible state that was consistent with the set of 
observations. At the initiation of divergence, failures in observation, association and expectation 
processes were apparent based on the crew’s behavior.  
Initially, it is relevant to discuss the observables available to the crew to discriminate the vertical flight 
path value. The single definitive observable available to the crew at this point was the text label (“V/S” or 
“FPA”) and decimal, shown in Table 4-3 on the FCU, as the two discriminating characteristics between 
the V/S and FPA modes (Ministry of Transport, 1993). The FCU was located on the forward panel of the 
cockpit between the two pilots, which could effect readability of the values on the panel. Typically the 
automation mode was also depicted on the FMA, however in this case, the A320 had not provided 
information on vertical path value on the PFD because these modes were linked to different lateral modes. 
Instead of providing indication on the FMA, the designers elected to provide subtle cues on the navigation 
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(NAV) display to differentiate vertical path value (Ministry of Transport, 1993). “The only differences in 
presentation between the two reference modes from the point of view of the method of displaying values 
concern, in fact, on the one hand the brightness and length of the yellow heading indicator, which are not 
as great in Track (TRK) TRK-FPA mode, and on the other the appearance of the navigation display 
horizontal marker in TRK mode for the selected magnetic track. However, there is also a vertical 
indicator (cyan-coloured) similar to the one used everywhere else as a heading indicator” (Ministry of 
Transport, 1993). 
While these observables may technically have been definitive observables, the report highlighted 
discriminability issues and that these observables which the crew was probably not trained to look for 
(Ministry of Transport, 1993). Thus, these observables would have been expected to exist in the pilot’s 
associative understanding of the flight path value modes. In addition to these definitive observables, there 
was the initiation of descent, which illustrates a change in altitude and vertical speed. These two 
observables were indefinitive because they could have potentially signified either the V/S or FPA mode 
until the descent was established. The observables discussed in this paragraph were the only indications 
available to the crew on the state of the system during the divergence timeline. We can use the human 
information processing model of divergence to assess how the crew responded to the unexpected mode 
transition with the above-mentioned observables.  
Because a descent was probably expected in the FPA mode the crew attempted to set, it is reasonable to 
assume that they observed the descent, but did not associate the initiation of descent with the correct 
mode. This failure in the association process is discussed later in this section, however because the non-
definitive observables were probably observed, the likely failure in the observation process probably 
involved missed observations of the definitive observables displayed on the FCU and navigation display. 
This failure could have strong ties to system design, since the strongest apparent indication the crew had 
into the vertical flight path value was the annunciation on the FCU. This indication however, was not 
actually very strong considering it was outside the normal field of view of the crew and in small font. The 
readability of the FCU was not the only display issue. There were the subtle indications on the navigation 
display. These distinctions relied on the crew identifying subtle differences in brightness and 
discriminating similar symbols that nominally referred to heading. Using brightness to discriminate 
modes posed a concern due to the environment in the cockpit such as varying ambient lighting causing 
contrast differences. Perceived brightness changes would not likely be expected to provide sufficiently 
discriminating indication between states. The final design consideration discussed is the possible use of 
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the heads up display (HUD) during this accident. It’s possible that use of the HUD could have influenced 
the observation strategy of the captain.48 If the HUD was used, this could have contributed to possible 
focus on the HUD, which did not have the flight path value depicted. As can be seen, there were a number 
of possible design aspects to the lack of observation of the vertical flight path value.  
In addition to design issues affecting observation of the definitive observables, the crew was also 
apparently busy performing a non-standard approach to the runway. This, coupled with confusion on 
lateral profile and confusion with air traffic control (ATC), could have resulted in high workload and 
distraction from nominal scan patterns, including the scan of parameters related to the vertical flight 
profile.49 In addition to the distraction, expectation bias could also have influenced the observation 
process since their expectation had likely updated to reflect their intended action of inputting -3.3 degrees 
FPA into the FCU. In addition if the crew had not understood the implication of not switching the vertical 
flight path value, this could indicate the presence of a systems understanding issue affecting expectation. 
There were many influences to the observation process, however failures in the association process were 
also possible at this stage. 
A possible association process failure could have occurred if observation of only indefinitive observables 
had been made. In addition, the lack of training (in addition to the readability issues) of the subtle cues on 
the NAV display likely resulted in a failure of associative understanding. The initiation of descent 
provided indefinitive observables, like altitude and vertical speed, which could have been attributed to 
both FPA and V/S. The transition apparently resulted in observables that, while nominally may be 
definitive, became indefinite for some period of time. This lack of definition would likely have dissipated 
once the descent rate was established which was three times more than the descent rate should have been 
for a -3.3 degree glide path (Ministry of Transport, 1993). The failures in the observation process and 
association process could have been trapped in the state selection process if the expectation was correct, 
however, as discussed, the expectation process at this point in the timeline was likely also failed. Figure 
4-14 illustrates the effect of the failures on human information processing. The combination of all of these 
three apparent failures could have led to unknown divergence of vertical flight path value; there would 
not have been a possible way to contain all of these all of these simultaneous failures in the context of the 
                                                      
48 While the data did indicate that the HUD was turned on, there was not data recorded on whether the 
HUD was actually deployed from its stowed position. Thus, its not possible to ascertain whether the crew 
was using the HUD during the approach.  
49 There was no evidence in the report to indicate that fatigue was a factor in this accident 
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model. While observation process failures were apparently a strong contributor to this divergence, there 
was a brief alleviation of the observation process failure 26 seconds prior to impact.  
 
Figure 4-14. Human information processing model of divergence for Air Inter 148: Event E1 
4.3.2.2 Event E2: Captain (PF) comments on descent 
At 26 seconds prior to impact, the pilot flying commented on the descent. Translated from French he 
declared, “We’ll have to watch it doesn’t descend” (Ministry of Transport, 1993).50 Since the captain had 
made observations independent of the first officer (FO), there was likely a difference in human 
information processing between them; thus, they were analyzed separately for this part of the divergence 
timeline. We’ll start with the captain as he had held pilot flying duties.  
4.3.2.2.1 Pilot Flying (Captain) 
Time Impact – 00m 26s 
Actual State Vertical Rate Target: -3,300 fpm 
Situation On final approach descent for runway 
Event Trigger Change in observation 
 
At this point in the timeline, the descent rate had become a definitive variable as it likely provided 
discriminating information between FPA and V/S. This was approximately three times the normal descent 
                                                      
50 It was not clear from the evidence how the crew observed the descent (i.e. via display, out the window, 
or HUD). The accident occurred at night one night following a full moon, however reports indicated a 
stratocumulus layer of clouds at 2000m. It was not determined whether the crew was IMC at any point in 
the descent. (Ministry of Transport, 1993) 
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rate for a -3.3 degree glide path, should have provided discrimination between FPA and V/S. However, 
this added observation apparently did not appear to alleviate the divergence, because while the 
observation process failure had possibly recovered, an underlying failure in associative understanding 
appeared to emerge.  
This possible failure in associative understanding was indicated by the captain not considering the descent 
rate as abnormal. It was expected that had the captain recognized the gravity of a -3,300 fpm descent that 
he would have prioritized taking action to arrest the descent. Because no action was taken, it is possible 
he did not have a clear mental model of the dynamics of the aircraft in different modes with which to base 
his associative understanding on. As mentioned, while this apparent associative understanding failure was 
uncovered, the association process failure due to the solely indefinitive set of observations feeding to the 
process, was likely alleviated once the descent rate was established at 3,300 fpm providing an added 
definitive observable that made it to the association process. Figure 4-15 shows the effect of the newly 
uncovered associative understanding failure. Despite the possibility that a definitive observable reached 
the association process, the combination of the emergence of a possible failure in associative 
understanding and the alleviation of the failure in the association process, resulted in a similar 
contamination of human information processing, likely contributing to continued unknown divergence for 
the captain.  
 
Figure 4-15. Human information processing model of divergence for Air Inter 148: Event E2 (captain) 
4.3.2.2.2 Pilot Not Flying (First Officer) 
Time Impact – 00m 26s 
Actual State Vertical Rate Target: -3,300 fpm 
Situation On final approach descent for runway 
Event Trigger Change in observable 
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The first officer, on the other hand, likely held a different interpretation of the system. Because the 
captain commented on the descent rate, a new observable was available to the first officer. Normally, this 
should trigger attention to be directed to the vertical speed indicator; however, the first officer 
simultaneously commented on the lateral profile. Because there was no evidence that the captain’s 
comment was heard, this likely indicated no change in his human information process, thus indicating 
continued observation process and expectation process failures for the first officer. This combination of 
failures is shown in Figure 4-16, illustrating that unknown divergence apparently continued for the first 
officer, despite the captain’s comment. The simultaneous comment made by the first officer is discussed 
in the next section, as it likely introduced another distraction from managing the vertical profile of the 
aircraft.  
 
Figure 4-16. Human information processing model of divergence for Air Inter 148: Event E2 (first officer) 
4.3.2.3 Event E3: First officer (PNF) comments on lateral profile 
Time Impact – 00m 26s 
Actual State Vertical Rate Target: -3,300 fpm 
Situation On final approach descent for runway 
Event Trigger Change in observation 
 
At the same time the captain commented on the descent rate, the first officer commented on the lateral 
profile that the crew had shown confusion with earlier. This distraction possibly caused the captain to 
refer his attention to the lateral profile possibly compromising the observation of descent rate, 
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reintroducing the observation process failure.51 In addition, the expectation process failure likely 
continued, and the captain’s possible failure of associative understanding, revealed in Event E2, also 
likely continued, since that understanding was formed from prior experience and not likely to be easily 
updated in real time. Figure 4-17 depicts this combination of failures and the effect on human information 
processing. If the observation process failure was re-introduced, no containment would have been 
possible for the combination of observation, association, and expectation process failures. Thus, despite 
the recovery in observation the captain possibly experienced in the previous event, the comment made by 
the first officer likely re-compromised the observation process and unknown divergence appeared to 
continue to prevail. 52 
 
Figure 4-17. Human information processing model of divergence for Air Inter 148: Event E3 
4.3.2.4 Event E4: “Two Hundred” radio altimeter call out 
 
 
                                                      
51 Simultaneously to the PF comment on descent, the PNF states “On centerline… Half a dot from 
centerline. There it is, it had been at sixty, it's good, you see here” (Ministry of Transport, 1993). In 
addition, if the crew had indeed observed the descent rate or any other definitive observable, it would be 
expected that they would have taken action immediately given the criticality of the situation. Since no 
action was taken, it was inferred that the observation process failed.  
52 The accident report indicated that the crew had missed numerous procedural callouts from the 
operations manual during the approach (Ministry of Transport, 1993). If conducted, these may have been 
sufficient to cue the crew to the abnormally high descent rate. No details about which callouts were 
missed were presented in the report.  
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Time Impact – 00m 01s 
Actual State Vertical Rate Target: -3,300 fpm 
Situation Immediately prior to impact 
Event Trigger Change in observables 
 
Unknown divergence likely continued until the radio altimeter made an altitude call out. One second prior 
to impact, the radio altimeter issued a “Two Hundred” aural call out. Since this signal was likely salient, it 
is possible that the crew observed this signal. Because the signal occurred 1 second before impact, there 
was no time for the crew to respond verbally or manually, so there was no evidence of whether the crew 
observed or did not observe the signal. If they did not observe the call out, unknown divergence likely 
continued until impact.  
If the call out was observed and associated correctly, this observation would have provided the 
association process a definitive observation to associate with possible states. This possible recovery of the 
observation process and its effect on human information processing is shown in Figure 4-18. 
This, in theory, would have output state(s) that were inconsistent with the incorrect expectation. The 
failure in the expectation process would have been trapped in the state selection process provided that the 
set of observations were actually associated with a state inconsistent with the expectation. This would 
have resulted in known divergence. However, due to the criticality of the situation, the crew would not 
have had enough time to recover even if they had recognized divergence at this point.53 
                                                      
53 Simulated behavior of the aircraft during final approach demonstrated that it takes 7 seconds to arrest 
the vertical speed “when break-off is initiated in auto-pilot (load factor approximately 1.25g). This is 
reduced to about 5 seconds if the break-off is initiated in manual mode and the control column is pulled 
fully back (load factor is then limited to 2g). In both cases, reaction to the alarm would have enabled the 
aircraft to avoid hitting Mont La Bloss. According to the manufacturer, flight tests would have shown that 
the average reaction time needed for the crew to take avoiding action is 5 to 6 seconds after the alarm 
sounds for the Mark II and III, and with pilots trained to use the GPWS in the simulator. A simple 
arithmetical calculation (6+7=13 is less than 18) therefore seems to confirm that a GPWS would have 
saved the aircraft, even for a flight path where the break-off was in auto-pilot. In fact, such confirmation, 
based on an order of magnitude whose significance is purely statistical (average reaction time), would be 
totally simplistic if it were to be applied to a particular event, because crew reaction time to a given alarm 
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Figure 4-18. Human information processing model of divergence for Air Inter 148: Event E4 
4.3.2.5 Summary of Air Inter 148 
 
Figure 4-19. Divergence timeline for Air Inter 148 accident 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
signal is not a deterministic process” (Ministry of Transport, 1993). 
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Figure 4-20. Definitive observables apparent in Air Inter 148 and the timeline when available to the crew 
The assessment of divergence, in this case involved the automation vertical rate target as the state of 
interest. Failures in the observation, association, and expectation processes could have played a part in 
this accident. Expectation bias, distraction and high workload due to abnormal lateral profile, and possible 
design influences of the indications of state could have all influenced the observation process failure. 
Since the captain may not have associated the excessive descent rate with the V/S mode, this would have 
indicated an associative understanding failure. There was also a period of ambiguity of observables when 
the descent was initiated. In terms of expectation problems, it is possible that if the crew did not 
understand the implication of the incorrect selection of the vertical flight path value, an abnormal 
transition, that this would indicate a problem in system understanding. It was apparent that divergence 
could have propagated this expectation failure as well.   
Table 4-4. Summary of process failures for Air Inter 148 
       Failure 
 
 
Case 
Occurrence of 
Observation Process Failure 
Occurrence of 
Association Process 
Failure 
Occurrence of Expectation 
Process Failure 
Expect-
ation 
Bias 
Dist-
raction 
Work
-load Fatigue 
Design 
Influences 
Associative 
Under-
standing 
Ambiguity 
of 
Observables 
Abnormal 
Transition 
System 
Under-
standing 
Perpetuation 
of 
Divergence 
Air Inter 
148 x x 
x  
(high) no data x x x x x x 
 
It is important to recognize where this assessment fit in terms of the greater situation awareness picture. 
The crew also had lapses in position awareness over terrain. Another aspect of this accident involves the 
use of the ground warning proximity system (GWPS), which the airline had elected not to equipped their 
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fleet with at the time of the accident (Ministry of Transport, 1993). This GWPS could have given the crew 
a salient indication of upcoming terrain, indirectly giving them information regarding descent rate. These 
organizational issues combined with the systems and human factors involved with divergence in vertical 
flight path value likely contributed to the consequential effects of this case of divergence. 
4.3.3 Case Study 3: Eastern Airlines Flight 401  
The accident of Eastern Airlines Flight 401 occurred on December 29, 1972 in the Florida Everglades, 
shown in Figure 4-21 (National Transportation Safety Board, 1973). In this accident, the crew established 
the aircraft in a holding pattern using an auto-pilot altitude hold mode while the crew troubleshot a 
landing gear failure. While troubleshooting, the autopilot altitude hold disconnected and the aircraft began 
a slow descent, apparently unbeknownst to the crew. This descent is illustrated in Figure 4-22 and the 
definitive observables available to the crew throughout the descent is shown in Figure 4-28. The crew’s 
verbalization indicated that they recognized the altitude deviation just prior to impact (National 
Transportation Safety Board, 1973). This accident illustrated failure in the observation process, likely 
attributed to distraction while troubleshooting the gear failure, and could have been compounded by a 
failure in the expectation process introducing expectation bias. The detailed events of the apparent 
divergence in this accident are described below.  
 
Figure 4-21. Wreckage of Eastern Airlines Flight 401 (Markowitz, 1972) 
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Figure 4-22. Approximate altitude profile for Eastern Airlines Flight 401 accident with divergence overlay 
(National Transportation Safety Board, 1973) 
4.3.3.1 Event E1: Initiation of Divergence 
Time Impact – 04m 48s 
Actual State Auto-pilot vertical mode: OFF 
Situation In holding pattern at 2000 feet 
Event Trigger Change in actual state 
Divergence Type D-1b: Actual state transitions due to upstream input by the crew. 
 
Event E1 presumably triggered the divergence when while diagnosing the landing gear failure, the 
autopilot altitude hold disengaged, and the aircraft began a slow descent. At this point in the timeline 
there was evidence of an observation process failure as the crew showed no behavioral evidence of 
recognizing the disconnect, as well as an expectation process failure as the crew had manually set the 
altitude hold mode prior to beginning troubleshooting; Thus, without observing new information, they 
likely had no reason to believe that this state had changed. The details of these failures are described 
below. 
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While no conclusive cause of the disconnect was found, the reigning hypothesis was that a moderate force 
applied to the yoke caused the automation to disconnect (National Transportation Safety Board, 1973).54 
The automation was not designed to aurally annunciate with a disconnection. Because the automation 
disconnected without aural annunciation, the only observables available to the crew are depicted in Figure 
4-23 and included (1) a visual change in both the captain’s (shown) and first officer’s (not shown) 
annunciation panel, and (2) the extinguishing of the altitude mode select light on the autopilot control 
panel.55 These both classify as definitive observables, along with any deviation of altitude from their 
2000-foot target. Despite the availability of multiple definitive observables available to the crew, the crew 
                                                      
54 The accident report describes that when the altitude hold is established in control wheel steering mode, 
which it was for this accident,“… pilot-applied pitch forces on the control wheel [of 20 lbs. or greater] 
will cause disengagement of the altitude hold function, reverting the autopilot pitch channel to attitude 
stabilization sensitive to control wheel inputs. … It is possible, therefore, to disengage altitude hold 
without an accompanying “CMD DISC” warning appearing on the captain or first officer annunciator 
panels. The normal indications of such an occurrence would be only the extinguishing of the altitude 
mode select light on the glare shield and the disappearance of the “ALT” annunciation on both 
annunciator panels.” (National Transportation Safety Board, 1973) 
Provided the above logic in the automation, the following was hypothesized to have occurred by the 
investigative team. “At approximately 2337, some 288 seconds prior to impact, the DFDR readout 
indicates a vertical acceleration transient of 0. 04 g causing a 200-fpm. rate of descent. For a pilot to 
induce such a transient, he would have to intentionally or inadvertently disengage the altitude hold 
function. It is conceivable that such a transient could have been produced by an inadvertent action on the 
part of the pilot, which caused a force to be applied to the control column. Such a force would have been 
sufficient to disengage the altitude hold mode. It was noted that the pitch transient occurred at the same 
time the captain commented to the second officer to “Get down there and see if the . . . nose wheel’s 
down. ” If the captain had applied a force to the control wheel while turning to talk to the second officer, 
the altitude hold function might have been accidentally disengaged! Such an occurrence could have been 
evident to both the captain and first officer by the change on the annunciator panel and the extinguishing 
of the altitude mode select light.”  (National Transportation Safety Board, 1973) 
55 Due to design of the system, the altitude mode select light may have been inhibited below 2,500 ft. 
(National Transportation Safety Board, 1973) 
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appeared to have resulted in unknown divergence. The report did not include data on fatigue effects on 
the crew. 
 
Figure 4-23. Depiction of captain’s annunciator panel and altitude mode-select light in the L1011 [adapted 
from (“L1011 Main Panel Features,” 2010)] 
There was no evidence that the crew observed the auto-pilot altitude hold disconnect or any observables 
related to it due to the lack of response (to fly manually or re-connect the altitude hold) that would have 
been expected if the crew had observed the disconnect. While the lack of salience of the disconnect 
possibly played a part, the most prominent factor was likely related to the distraction the crew was facing 
with troubleshooting the landing gear failure. This apparently captured attentional resources of the entire 
crew, also highlighting crew resource management issues that could have contributed to these missed 
observables. Finally since the crew had taken action to set the autopilot to altitude hold at 2000 feet, their 
expectation had likely updated to reflect that action. It is also possible that expectation of altitude hold 
could also have resulted in expectation bias influencing the scan of the observables. In addition, the report 
also noted that the crew likely were not aware of the force required to disengage the altitude hold 
(National Transportation Safety Board, 1973). If this was true, it would indicate the presence of a systems 
understanding issue affecting expectation. The effect of this combination of failures on human 
information processing is shown in Figure 4-24. The combination and interaction of the failures in the 
expectation process and observation process likely contaminated the association and state selection 
processes preventing the individual failures from being contained in those downstream processes. Thus, 
this apparently resulted in unknown divergence at this point in the divergence timeline.  
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Figure 4-24. Human information processing model of divergence for Eastern 401: Event E1 and Event E2 
4.3.3.2 Event E2: Aural Annunciation of 250 feet low 
Time Impact – 01m 34s 
Actual State Auto-pilot vertical mode: OFF 
Situation In holding pattern, slow descent 
Event Trigger Change in observables 
 
While the disconnect did not alert aurally, the crew did apparently receive an aural annunciation that the 
altitude was low. At 1,850 feet mean sea level (MSL), a half second, c-chord, aural annunciation 
reportedly triggered indicating that the aircraft was 250 feet below its target altitude. This provided an 
additional definitive observable into the state of the autopilot. This added information could have 
triggered known divergence if it had been observed by the crew. However, the distraction from the gear 
failure was apparently ongoing at this point in the accident timeline, and there was still no evidence 
apparent in the report that the crew heard the alert. This combination of failures is shown in Figure 4-24. 
Because the added observable was apparently missed and expectation probably held steady, the crew 
likely remained in unknown divergence through this time frame. 
4.3.3.3 Event E3: First Officer Notices Low Altitude 
The first officer eventually verbalized concern about the altitude, which was approximately 400 ft. MSL 
at this point.56 This verbalization was likely the result of an observation made by the first officer of the 
altimeter (based on his comment). At this point prior to verbalization, there was inconsistency between 
                                                      
56 First officer states “We did something to the altitude.” 
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the first officer’s and the captain’s assumption of state. Because the event was triggered by the first 
officer alone noticing the altitude deviation, the captain’s state was not expected to change during this 
intermediate event (of the FO noticing the low altitude). Thus, this section is discussed purely concerning 
the first officer’s human information process.   
Time Unknown57 
Actual State Auto-pilot vertical mode: OFF 
Situation In holding pattern, slow descent 
Event Trigger Change in observation 
 
At this point in the timeline, the crew had completed troubleshooting the landing gear failure and had 
decided to return to the airport for landing. This could have alleviated the workload and distraction 
limitation on the observation process, likely allowing the first officer an opportunity to scan the flight 
instruments. Failures in the expectation process likely remained despite the apparent observation of the 
definitive observable of altitude by the first officer. Figure 4-25 shows the recovery of the observation 
process and its effect on human information processing. The discrepancy between expectation and 
observation apparently caused the failure to be trapped in the state selection process. This would result in 
the first officer moving into known divergence. As indicated by the first officer verbalizing his concern 
for the altitude, the result of the ambiguity resolution process, showed evidence of the first officer 
attempting to use communication (at least in part) to resolve the ambiguity. The next event discusses the 
captain’s update in human information process when the first officer told him about the altitude concern.  
                                                      
57 Time of first officer observation of the altimeter was not available in the data, however could have been 
just prior to verbalization. This verbalization behavior would have been consistent with expected behavior 
provided he recognized the potential criticality of the situation.  
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Figure 4-25. Human information processing model of divergence for Eastern 401: Event E3 (first officer) 
4.3.3.4 Event E4: First Officer Notifies Captain about Altitude  
Time Impact – 00m 07s 
Actual State Auto-pilot vertical mode: OFF 
Situation In holding pattern, slow descent 
Event Trigger Change in observation 
 
Seven seconds prior to impact the first officer verbalized confusion regarding the altitude. This apparently 
averted the captain’s attention to the altimeter, and the altitude was likely observed as indicated by the 
confusion verbalized by the captain. If the observation process had recovered, the expectation process 
failure was likely the only failure that remained.  
 
Figure 4-26. Human information processing model of divergence for Eastern 401: Event E4 (captain) 
Similarly to the first officer’s transition to known divergence, the captain also likely had a failure of the 
expectation process that was caught in the state selection process, when the expectation was compared to 
the states consistent with observation. This is shown in Figure 4-26. The captain’s verbal response 
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indicated scanning for more information and attempting to resolve the ambiguity.58 Impact occurred, 
however, prior to any recovery action by the crew.59 
4.3.3.5 Summary of Eastern Airlines Flight 401 
 
 
Figure 4-27. Divergence timeline for Eastern 401 accident 
In this case, the divergence state of interest was the vertical autopilot mode, which directly affected the 
aircraft altitude. The loss of awareness of the altitude apparently had consequential effects and was 
initially triggered by the inadvertent disconnection of the autopilot altitude hold. This case is different 
from the other accidents discussed here considering the availability of definitive observables. In the other 
accidents, definitive observables were minimally available until a point much later in the divergence 
timeline. Here, definitive observables were apparently readily available to the crew immediately 
following the disconnection.  
                                                      
58 “At 2342:05 , the first officer said, ‘We did something to the altitude.’ The captain’s reply was, ‘What?’ 
At 2342:07, the first officer asked, ‘We’re still at two thousand, right?’ and the captain immediately 
exclaimed, ‘Hey, what’s happening here?’ (National Transportation Safety Board, 1973) 
59 No assertions were made regarding the point of recoverability in the report of this accident.  
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Figure 4-28. Definitive observables in Eastern 401 that were available during the divergence timeline  
It appears that the observation process failure was impacted by the distraction of troubleshooting the 
failure. This is further supported by the observation of altitude being made by the first officer soon after 
the troubleshooting had ended and the crew had decided to return to the airport for landing. In addition to 
distraction there was also likely expectation bias, high workload due to troubleshooting, and design 
aspects of inhibiting the mode select light below 2,500 ft. that could have affected the observation process 
failure. There was no evidence of associative understanding problems or ambiguity of observables given 
the number of definitive observables available to the crew. Finally, the expectation process failure could 
have been influenced by lack of system understanding of the force required to disengage the altitude hold, 
an abnormal state transition for the given situation, and was likely perpetuated by divergence. Also, 
because this divergence occurred during a holding pattern to troubleshoot a failure, there were not 
apparently a required checklist or procedure for that flight regime that would have caught this divergence.  
Table 4-5. Summary of process failures for Eastern 401 
       Failure 
 
 
Case 
Occurrence of 
Observation Process Failure 
Occurrence of 
Association Process 
Failure 
Occurrence of Expectation 
Process Failure 
Expect-
ation 
Bias 
Dist-
raction 
Work
-load Fatigue 
Design 
Influences 
Associative 
Under-
standing 
Ambiguity 
of 
Observables 
Abnormal 
Transition 
System 
Under-
standing 
Perpetuation 
of 
Divergence 
Eastern 401 x x x (high) no data x   x x x 
 
These characteristics highlight the influence of situational factors on divergence, information that can be 
used when aiming mitigations. This was the third and final case study discussed in detail in the body of 
this thesis, however the next section provides a summary of findings from all of the case studies that were 
analyzed.  
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4.4 Findings in All Case Studies 
The remaining accidents and incidents in Table 4-1 were analyzed in a similar manner to those presented 
in the previous section and are provided in Appendix D. The full set of cases were evaluated for trigger 
timing of divergence and re-convergence, and for process failures that contributed to divergence. Based 
on the full set of cases, a number of findings were apparent. These findings are presented in this section.  
4.4.1 Mechanisms behind Initiation of Divergence 
 
Finding A-1: Divergence was shown in 9 occurrences to be triggered by an automation 
transition, in 1 occurrence to be triggered by a human transition, and in 3 occurrences to be 
triggered by both the human and automation transitioning. 
 
 
Table 4-6 provides the list of accidents and incidents evaluated, along with the transitions that resulted in 
divergence. The underlined modes in Table 4-6 indicate the transition trigger for each accident and 
incident.  
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Table 4-6. Summary of initiating divergence event in case studies analyzed (underlined states appeared to 
transition during the divergence event) 
Case 60 State of 
Interest 
Actual State Inferred Human 
State 
Assumption 
Description of Divergence Divergence Type 
Divergence Trigger 
Divergence Origin 
Before 
Event 
After 
Event 
Before 
Event 
After 
Event 
A
ut
o-
th
ro
ttl
e 
C
as
es
 L
ow
 E
ne
rg
y 
C
as
es
 
Asiana 
214 
Auto-
throttle 
Mode 
THR HOLD THR SPD 
Unexpected mode transition 
following improper use of FLCH to 
descend 
D-3 
Both Transition 
Human Origin 
Turkish 
1951 
Auto-
throttle 
Mode 
SPD RET SPD SPD 
Radar altimeter failure caused the 
transition to RETARD when it 
would nominally have transitioned to 
SPD mode 
D-1a 
Automation Transition 
Automation Origin 
Thomson-
fly 
(incident) 
Auto-
throttle 
Mode 
SPD OFF SPD SPD A/T disengaged (cause unknown) 
D-1a 
Automation Transition 
Unknown Origin 
American 
903 
(incident) 
Auto-
throttle 
Mode 
SPD OFF SPD SPD A/T disengaged (cause unknown) 
D-1a 
Automation Transition  
Unknown Origin 
Indian 
605 
Auto-
throttle 
Mode 
SPD IDLE SPD SPD Transition due to MCP Select 
D-1b 
Automation Transition 
Human Origin 
IDLE IDLE IDLE SPD 
Crew behavior indicated that they 
considered the A/T mode to recover 
when they turned off FD1 
D-2 
Human Transition 
Human Origin 
H
ig
h 
En
er
gy
 C
as
es
 
Tarom 
381 
(incident) 
Auto-
throttle 
Mode 
SPD THR SPD SPD 
Thrust increased to reach present 
MCP altitude due to momentary flap 
overspeed 
D-1 
Automation Transition 
Unclear Origin 
China 140 
Auto-
throttle 
Mode 
SPD THR SPD SPD Crew inadvertently triggered TOGA 
D-1b 
Automation Transition 
Human Origin 
OFF THR OFF OFF Alpha floor initiations 
D-1a 
Automation Transition 
Automation Origin 
Air 
France 72 
Auto-
throttle 
Mode 
SPD THR SPD SPD 
Transition to TOGA at end of 
descent point due to lack of 
disengagement of the autopilot prior 
to end of descent point 
D-1b 
Automation Transition 
Human Origin 
C
FI
T 
C
as
es
 
Air Inter 148 
Vertical 
Flight 
Path 
Value 
ALT V/S ALT FPA 
Crew set FPA for descent however 
apparently neglected to switch value 
from V/S to FPA 
D-3 
Both Transition 
Human Origin 
American 965 
Lateral 
A/P 
Target 
FMS- 
Cali 
VOR 
FMS- 
ROZO 
FMS- 
Cali 
VOR 
FMS-- 
ROMEO Crew inadvertently set the first 
waypoint in the “RO” list likely 
intending to input ROZO, however 
enacting ROMEO 
D-3 
Both Transition 
Human Origin 
Vertical 
Flight 
Path wrt 
Terrain  
On 
Path – 
Clear 
of 
Terrain 
Off 
Path 
On 
Path – 
Clear 
of 
Terrain 
On Path 
– Clear 
of 
Terrain 
Eastern 401 
Vertical 
A/P 
Mode 
ALT OFF ALT ALT 
Crew likely inadvertently 
disconnected the altitude hold during 
a holding procedure 
D-1b 
Automation Transition 
Human Origin 
 
 
                                                      
60 References of the reports reviewed for each event are provided in Section 4.2 
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The divergence trigger was identified as the transition in the state of interest that resulted in divergence. 
The Asiana 214, Air Inter 148, and American 963 cases showed evidence of both the automation and the 
human transition, however to different states. During American 963, for example, a transition was likely 
expected by the crew as they input a target into the FMS, however the target transitioned to a different fix 
than the crew’s expectation. In these three cases, a problem occurred where transitions may have been 
expected while other occurrences involve either the human or automation transitioning on its own.  
The one case where the human state assumption transitioned without any change in the actual state 
occurred during the 2nd divergence event in the Indian 605 accident. In this case, the evidence indicated 
that the crew could have considered the auto-throttle to recover when they turned off FD1.  
In 9 of these transitions, there was evidence of transitions in automation without updates to the human 
state assumption. Despite the divergence trigger typically being a result of automation, the origin of why 
these automation transitions occurred was worth investigating.  
While the divergence transition was signified by various combination of human and automation triggers, 
the underlying origin of many transitions appeared to be predominantly due to human input.  
 
Finding A-2: Of the 12 cases where automation transitioned during a divergence event, 7 
of these cases involved human action causing unexpected automation transition later in the 
timeline.   
 
 
As can be seen in Table 4-6, of the 12 cases where automation mode transitioned during the divergence 
event (including automation transition only and both human/automation transition), 6 cases showed 
evidence of the automation transitioning as a result of a human action upstream.61 The Asiana 214, Air 
France 072, and Indian 60562 cases apparently involved the crew knowingly commanding a vertical auto-
                                                      
61 For example, in the Asiana 214 case, the crew’s abnormal use of vertical autopilot FLCH mode along 
with the action of retarding the throttles to idle apparently caused the auto-throttle to revert to the less 
frequently used HOLD mode. This HOLD mode transition was considered as the event where divergence 
initiated, however it was triggered by human input upstream. 
62 During China 140, the auto-throttle transition to TOGA appeared to be the result of an accidental 
activation of the TOGA button by the crew. Because this cause appears to be a slip versus a conscious 
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pilot mode, however due to the coupling between the auto-pilot and the auto-throttle, the auto-throttle also 
reverted to a non-normal mode at some point downstream to the auto-pilot command, initiating 
divergence.  
The presence of human origin in initiation of divergence could indicate a deficiency in the crew’s 
understanding of automation mode effects and interactions. Procedures can sometimes be designed to 
attempt to reduce this knowledge burden on the human. In many of these cases, procedures actually 
appeared to be in place, which if followed, could have prevented the abnormal transition. Thus, this 
indicates that failure to follow procedures could have contributed to the divergence.  Overall, the results 
indicated that while divergence could originate with an automation transition, the cause could often be 
attributed to an upstream human input. While it is possible that automation transition could trigger 
without upstream crew input, the cases analyzed appear to err toward human involvement in initiation of 
divergence.   
 
Finding A-3: Of the 12 cases where automation transitioned during a divergence event, 2 
of these transitions could have been attributed to the system design or failure.   
 
 
Table 4-6 shows that two cases of divergence could have been attributed to the system design or failure, 
Turkish 1951 and Tarom 381. In the Turkish 1951 case, the transition was likely attributed to the faulty 
radar altimeter (Dutch Safety Board, 2010). In the Tarom 381 incident, a transient airspeed overspeed 
appeared to caused the envelope protection to activate and increase pitch and thrust to maintain airspeed 
within the flight envelope (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses, 2000). As can be seen, in one case 
divergence was apparently caused by a component failure, in the other it was apparently caused by 
environmental factors associated with a temporary overspeed situation. These two examples highlight the 
direct design influence on divergence.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
decision by the crew, the discussion focuses on conscious crew input that appeared to result in an 
unexpected result.   
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4.4.2 Occurrence of Known Divergence and Re-convergence 
 
Finding B-1: Re-convergence was apparent in 6 of 8 auto-throttle accidents and none of 
the CFIT accidents.  
 
 
Re-convergence was identified when actual state of the system and human state assumption appeared to 
align following divergence. This process was considered as a two step process: the first step is the human 
identifying divergence and moving into known divergence, and the second step is the alignment of the 
actual state and human state assumption. A summary of the re-convergence process for each accident and 
incident analyzed is shown in Table 4-7. As can be seen, re-convergence was apparent in 6 of 8 
autothrottle accidents and none of the CFIT accidents. The details of this difference in re-convergence 
between different accident types is discussed in further detail below. 
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Table 4-7. Summary of re-convergence event details in cases analyzed (underlined states are states which 
appeared to transition during the re-convergence event) 
Case63 State of 
Interest 
Actual Auto Throttle 
State 
Inferred Human 
State Assumption 
Known 
Divergence  
Trigger 
Re-
convergence  
Trigger 
Re- Conv. 
Type 
Before 
Div. 
Event 
After 
Div. 
Event 
After 
Con. 
Event 
Before 
Div. 
Event 
After 
Div. 
Event 
After 
Con. 
Event 
A
ut
o-
th
ro
ttl
e 
C
as
es
 
Lo
w
 E
ne
rg
y 
C
as
es
 
Asiana 
214 
Auto-
throttle 
Mode 
THR HLD THR THR SPD THR 
Crew recognition 
of speed decay 
(Observation) 
Crew action to 
advance 
throttles 
(Expectation) 
C-3 
Both Trans. 
Human Origin 
Turkish 
1951 
Auto-
throttle 
Mode 
SPD RET OFF SPD SPD OFF 
Stick shaker 
activation 
(Observation) 
Crew 
disconnection 
of auto-throttle 
(Expectation) 
C-3 
Both Trans. 
Human Origin 
Thomson-
fly 
(incident) 
Auto-
throttle 
Mode 
SPD OFF OFF SPD SPD OFF 
Crew recognition 
of speed decay 
(Observation) 
Crew 
recognition of 
speed decay 
(Observation) 
C-2 
Human Trans. 
Human Origin 
American 
903 
(incident) 
Auto-
throttle 
Mode 
SPD OFF OFF SPD SPD OFF 
Crew recognition 
of speed decay 
(Observation) 
Crew 
recognition of 
speed decay 
(Observation) 
C-2 
Human Trans. 
Human Origin 
Indian 
605 
Auto-
throttle 
Mode 
ALT IDLE IDLE ALT SPD IDLE 
Crew notices 
IDLE on display 
(Observation) 
Crew notices 
IDLE on 
display 
(Observation) 
C-2 
Human Trans. 
Human Origin 
IDLE IDLE THR IDLE SPD THR 
Crew recognizes 
thrust increase 
when Alpha 
Floor Activates 
(Observation) 
Crew 
recognizes 
thrust increase 
when Alpha 
Floor Activates 
(Observation) 
C-3 
Both Trans. 
Human Origin 
H
ig
h 
En
er
gy
 C
as
es
 
Tarom 
381 
(incident) 
Auto-
throttle 
Mode 
SPD THR OFF SPD SPD OFF 
Crew 
Recognition that 
thrust was 
increasing 
(Observation) 
A/T automatic 
disengagement 
due to loss of 
AOA data 
(Actual State 
Change) 
C-3 
Auto Trans. 
Auto Origin 
China 140 
Auto-
throttle 
Mode 
SPD THR OFF SPD SPD OFF 
Crew recognition 
of thrust increase 
(Observation) 
Disconnection 
of Auto-throttle 
(Expectation) 
C-3 
Both Trans. 
Human Origin 
OFF THR - OFF THR - 
Crew recognition 
of thrust increase 
(Observation) 
No Evidence of 
Re-convergence - 
Air 
France 72 
Auto-
throttle 
Mode 
SPD THR - SPD SPD - 
Crew recognition 
of thrust increase 
(Observation) 
No Evidence of 
Re-convergence 
- 
- 
 
     
 
(Table continued on following page) 
 
                                                      
63 References of the reports reviewed for each event are provided in Section 4.2 
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C
FI
T 
C
as
es
 
Case State of 
Interest 
Actual Auto Throttle 
State 
Inferred Human 
State Assumption Known 
Divergence  
Trigger 
Re-
convergence  
Trigger 
Re- Conv. 
Type Before 
Div. 
Event 
After 
Div. 
Event 
After 
Con. 
Event 
Before 
Div. 
Event 
After 
Div. 
Event 
After 
Con. 
Event 
Air Inter 148 
Vert. 
Flight 
Path 
Value 
ALT V/S - ALT FPA - 
No Evidence 
Known 
Divergence64 
 
No Evidence of 
Re-convergence - 
American 965 
Lateral 
A/P 
Target 
FMS- 
Cali 
VOR 
FMS- 
RO-
ZO 
HDG  
SEL 
Cali 
VOR 
RO-
ME-
O 
HD
G 
SEL 
ATC call for 
position update 
prompts crew to 
scan navigation 
display and 
recognize the 
divergence 
(Observation) 
Selection of 
Heading Select 
Mode to control 
lateral target 
(Expectation) 
C-3 
Both Trans. 
Human Origin 
Vertical 
Flight 
Path wrt 
Terrain 
On 
Path – 
Clear 
of 
Terrai
n 
Off 
Path - 
On 
Path – 
Clear 
of 
Terrai
n 
On 
Path 
– 
Clea
r of 
Terr
ain 
- 
EGPWS 
Annunciation 
(Observation) 
No Evidence of 
Re-convergence - 
Eastern 401 
Vert. 
A/P 
Mode 
ALT OFF - ALT ALT - 
Crew recognizes 
low altitude 
(Observation) 
No Evidence of 
Re-convergence - 
 
 
Finding B-2: Within the auto-throttle cases, the likelihood of re-convergence appeared to 
be tied to whether the case was low energy or high energy.  
• Five of five low energy auto-throttle cases showed evidence of re-convergence 
occurring prior to impact for accident cases and prior to recovery for incident 
cases. Three of these were accident cases. 
• One of three high energy auto-throttle cases showed evidence of re-convergence 
occurring. This was the only incident case. Neither of the high energy accident 
cases showed evidence of re-convergence. 
 
 
                                                      
64 Known divergence could have possibly occurred when the radar altimeter annunciated 200 ft, however 
there was no evidence to confirm known divergence. This annunciation occurred one second before 
impact and no response or action was recorded on the CVR or FDR. 
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Re-convergence was analyzed for the different types of auto-throttle cases. Table 4-7 shows that in the 
auto-throttle cases, re-convergence apparently occurred in all low energy cases analyzed and in one of 
three high energy cases. The distribution of how re-convergence was attained in these accident cases 
provided insight about how this process can occur; the underlined modes table indicate what transition 
triggered re-convergence. Re-convergence of Types C-2 and C-3 were common in the case studies and 
could potentially be stimulated by using operational procedures.  
Table 4-7 also shows that re-convergence was attained in only one of the accidents that resulted in CFIT, 
however even though re-convergence occurred in the lateral mode target, divergence appeared to continue 
in the crew’s awareness of vertical clearance from terrain. This is likely due to the nature of these 
accidents where poor of situation awareness of position could contribute to the eventual impact with the 
terrain (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2003).  
4.4.3 Transition to Known Divergence 
 
Finding C-1: For all cases where the transition from unknown to known divergence 
occurred, observation triggered ultimate awareness of divergence in all cases, including 
cases that resulted in full re-convergence and those that only resulted in known 
divergence.  
 
 
Assuming re-convergence is a two step process, its relevant to assess the occurrence of known divergence 
in addition to the occurrence of re-convergence. Regardless of whether the full re-convergence was 
achieved, a clear pattern emerges in Table 4-7 that observation is a critical piece of the re-convergence 
process in order to overcome divergence. In these cases, known divergence was consistently triggered by 
an observation of information contrary to an expectation in all but one case. While observation was used 
to transition into known divergence, it was not always effective at promoting full re-convergence or 
mitigating accidents. A critical parameter in these cases is the time available for re-convergence. For 
example, in the Eastern Airlines 401 case, the crew identified divergence seven seconds before impact 
and were in the process of assessing the observation when they impacted the ground. In other cases, a 
poor understanding of the system could result in a situation where crews reach known divergence but not 
re-convergence. In the case of poor understanding, the mental model cannot be considered recovered, as 
this problem most likely outlives the event, incident, or flight. However, in some cases, a recovery of the 
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mental model may not be necessary for re-convergence.  For example, in the Turkish Airlines 1951 case, 
the crew could have had a flawed mental model illustrated by the lack of understanding of the divergence 
transition in the first place. However, when the crew reached known divergence recognizing that their 
expectation of auto-throttle state had been flawed, they disconnected the auto-throttle to force re-
convergence by moving the automation to a state that was unambiguous to them. Thus, the case studies 
indicate that a full recovery of mental models may not necessary in order for re-convergence to occur.  
4.4.4 Timing of Divergence and Re-convergence 
The accident and incident reports allowed the analysis of the divergence timeline in each of the cases. 
Time of known divergence and re-convergence were recovered from these reports and indicated on the 
divergence timeline. Figure 4-29 shows the timeline of divergence events for each of the auto-throttle 
cases, and Figure 4-31 shows the timeline of divergence events for each of the cases that resulted in CFIT. 
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Figure 4-29. Timing of divergence, re-convergence, recovery, and impact for auto-throttle cases 
For the auto-throttle cases, Figure 4-29 reiterates that re-convergence occurred in 6 of 8 cases.  The green 
bars with rounded corners in Figure 4-29 show that the appropriate recovery action was taken in six of 
eight cases, an average of 3 seconds (SD = 4 seconds) following re-convergence. However, in the three 
cases where an accident was avoided, the recovery process took an average of 43 seconds (SD = 12 
seconds). 
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The location of the crosses in Figure 4-29 show that for the cases where recovery was not successful, 
impact occurred an average of 17 seconds (SD = 16 seconds) following re-convergence. The data suggest 
that the crews in these accident cases lacked sufficient time to successfully recover following re-
convergence. This statement implies that if re-convergence had occurred earlier, recovery would have 
been attempted earlier, therefore increasing the chance of recovery being initiated before the situation 
degraded to an unrecoverable state (Silva & Hansman, 2015). The basis of unrecoverability typically 
refers to the time at which, despite execution of the correct recovery action, successful recovery would 
not be possible given the flight dynamics. However for this thesis, the point of unrecoverability also 
includes the time for the human to process the anomaly after it is first detected in addition to minimal 
execution time of the maneuver governed by the flight dynamics. The time between re-convergence and 
initiation of recovery (averaging 3 seconds (SD=4s)) provides some insight into the minimum buffer time 
necessary for human reaction once a re-convergence occurs. Thus, any recovery would ideally 
incorporate the time to avoid LOC, plus the 3 second human processing buffer. Timing data was not 
always available for known divergence since it was typically internal to the human, but the time taken 
was from the first indication of known divergence, which sometimes coincided with re-convergence or 
recovery. 
 
Finding D-1: For all low energy cases analyzed, the divergence timeline initially involved 
unknown divergence that prevailed for some time. Then the transition from unknown to 
known divergence occurred after speed decayed to a point where it was either observed by 
the crew or a low speed alert such as stall warning was annunciated. If the transition to 
known divergence occurred early enough, recovery actions could be taken prior to the 
situation becoming unrecoverable. 
 
 
In low energy auto-throttle cases, Figure 4-29 shows that unknown divergence appeared to prevail for a 
significant amount of time in the divergence timeline. The period of known divergence, re-convergence, 
and initiation of recovery were all in much shorter time frames compared to the period of unknown 
divergence. For the low energy cases, known divergence also appeared to occur when the situation 
approached the point of imminent loss of control. These data suggest that, because an appropriate recover 
action was taken in a timely manner following known divergence and re-convergence, if known 
divergence had been promoted prior to the point of unrecoverability for these cases, full recovery could 
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have been successfully accomplished in the accident cases. This is depicted for a low energy approach 
case in Figure 4-30.  
 
Figure 4-30. Depiction of recoverability profile for low energy approach cases 
 
Finding D-2: For all high energy cases analyzed, unknown divergence was not apparent. A 
direct transition to known divergence was observed. In 2 of 3 cases known divergence 
continued until impact. In only one case was re-convergence apparent and this occurred 
when the automation reached an envelope protection limit and disconnected the auto-
throttle.  
 
 
As shown in Figure 4-29, contrary to the low energy cases, in the high energy cases, known divergence 
occurred immediately following divergence but the appropriate recovery action was not consistently 
taken. In these three high energy cases, divergence initiated with an increase in thrust on approach and 
while this was typically recognized, the crews in these cases elected to continue the approach. This failure 
in decision making could have been tied to the lack of understanding of the origin of the thrust increase, 
which may have caused all three crews to misjudge the consequences of physically resisting the 
automation. The result was an out of trim situation for two of the three cases. These characteristics are 
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different from the low energy cases as correct recovery action was commonly attempted shortly after 
known divergence. This difference could be indicative of a fundamental difference in training practices 
between low energy and high energy cases or a inherent belief of difference in criticality between the two 
cases. It may be possible that crews interpret a high energy situation as less critical and be more inclined 
to try and “save” the approach, rather than aborting the approach in an impending stall situation. This 
result indicates that divergence may need to be addressed differently for these two types of auto-throttle 
cases. 
 
Finding D-3:  The three CFIT cases analyzed, showed different characteristics than the 
auto-throttle cases. For all CFIT cases analyzed, unknown divergence prevailed for a 
majority of the divergence timeline. 
 
 
The timing of the CFIT cases was plotted separately due to the different time frame of divergence in these 
accidents. Figure 4-31 shows the timing of divergence for the CFIT cases. Only one case resulted in re-
convergence prior to impact, however this plot only depicts re-convergence of lateral mode target. It 
appears that divergence in vertical flight path was also apparent and likely contributed to the outcome of 
this accident as seen in Figure 4-32. Eastern 401 and Air Inter 148 apparently did not achieve full re-
convergence. There was evidence that Eastern 401 achieved known divergence 7 seconds prior to impact, 
however there would not have been enough time to prevent the accident.  
  
142 
 
Figure 4-31. Timing of divergence, re-convergence, recovery, and impact for example CFIT cases 
 
Figure 4-32. Divergence timeline for American 965 
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The results of the accident timing analysis suggest that accidents can be prevented if recovery begins 
before the system degrades to an unrecoverable state, however the crew must identify the divergence 
before the appropriate response can be expected from them. Overall, this suggests that it may be prudent 
to focus mitigation efforts on promoting re-convergence well before the situation exacerbates to an 
unrecoverable state to avoid consequential effects.  
4.4.5 Discussion of Factors Influencing Information Processing Failures 
The apparent failures affecting divergence were analyzed within the construct of the model of divergence. 
A summary of these possible process failures apparent in these cases is provided in Table 4-8. 
Table 4-8. Process failures apparent in case studies analyzed 
 
       Failure 
 
 
Case 
Occurrence of 
Observation Process Failure 
Occurrence of 
Association Process 
Failure 
Occurrence of Expectation 
Process Failure 
Expect-
ation 
Bias 
Dist-
rac-
tion 
Work
-load Fatigue 
Design 
Influences 
As-
sociative 
Under-
standing 
Ambiguity 
of Ob-
servables 
Ab-
normal 
Trans. 
System 
Under-
stand-
ing 
Perpetuation 
of 
Divergence 
Lo
w
 E
ne
rg
y 
A
ut
o-
th
ro
ttl
e 
C
as
es
 
Asiana 214 x x x  (high) x x  x x x x 
Turkish Air 
1951 x x 
x  
(high)  x  x x x x 
Thomsonfly 
(Incident) x x   x x x x  x 
American 
903 
(Incident) 
x x x  (high)  x  x x  x 
Indian Air 
605 x x   x . x x x x 
H
ig
h 
En
er
gy
 
A
ut
o-
th
ro
ttl
e 
C
as
es
 
Tarom 381 
(Incident) x x 
x  
(high) no data    x x  
China 
Airlines 140  x 
x  
(high) no data    x   
Air France 
072  x  x  x  x x  
C
FI
T 
C
as
es
 AirInter 148 x x x  (high) no data x x x x x x 
American 
965 x x 
x  
(high)  x x x x x x 
Eastern 401 x x x  (high) no data x   x x x 
 
As was seen in the in-depth analysis of each of the case studies above, three main aspects apparently 
influenced the outcome of the accidents: expectation failures, availability of definitive observables, and 
observation failures.  
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One important finding is the prominence of expectation process failures, which seems to have occured in 
all accidents and spanned both the auto-throttle (A/THR) accidents as well as the CFIT accidents. In 
addition to expectation process failures, a considerable number of observation failures were also apparent 
in the case studies analyzed. As discussed throughout this thesis, the combination of observation process 
failures and expectation process failures likely provides no containment possibility for the failures 
resulting in unknown divergence. This phenomenon was consistently seen in these accidents.  
Furthermore, the case studies also showed that when known divergence was attained by the crew, it was 
the result of an observation. In some cases, this observation triggered re-convergence or triggered the 
crew to force re-convergence by some other means, for example, the disconnection of the automation. 
This data suggests that the mechanism for containment overcoming expectation bias by correct 
observation. This explanation was consistent with the human information processing model of 
divergence, which identified this form of recovery processes shown in Figure 4-33 below (reproduced 
from Chapter 3). Thus, in order to effectively mitigate these types of accidents, it was necessary to 
understand the contributors to these process failures. These contributors of observation and expectation 
failures are discussed in the following section.  
 
Figure 4-33. Containment of expectation process failure in state selection process 
4.4.5.1 Impact of Expectation Process Failures 
 
Finding E-1: Expectation failures were apparent in all of the cases analyzed. 
 
 
Expectation, or projection, appears to have a strong effect on human cognition and decision making (D. 
Jones & Endsley, 1996) and is exemplified in the accident reports discussed in this chapter.. For Turkish 
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1951, Asiana 214, Indian 605, Thomsonfly, and American 903, crew behavior was consistent with an 
expectation of airspeed being maintained within safe limits by the auto-throttle. This reliance possibly 
played a role in scanning new information and assessing dissenting information (Performance Based 
Aviation Rulemaking Committee & Commercial Aviation Safety Team, 2013). For Air Inter 148, the 
crew possibly expected the vertical speed target to be -3.3 degrees FPA and correspondingly did not 
question or verify their input. For Eastern 401, the crew likely expected the auto-pilot to hold altitude and 
failed to crosscheck the altitude. All of the case studies analyzed showed evidence of expectation 
perpetuating divergence, confirming an incorrect expectation, a cycle that typically remained until 
expectation bias was broken by a correct observation. This result is consistent with research regarding 
plan continuation where “practitioners continue with a plan of action in the face of cues that, in hindsight, 
warranted changing the plan” (Dekker, 2003; Helmreich, 1997; Khatwa & Helmreich, 1999; Orasanu & 
Martin, 1998). Orasanu and Martin evaluated aircraft accidents for errors and found that plan continuation 
errors were a frequent occurrence (Orasanu & Martin, 1998). They suggest that these errors are the result 
of the higher “cognitive effort needed to revise one’s understanding of the situation and consider a new 
course of action.” If these changes are required in times of high workload and other stressors, the crew 
may not have enough cognitive resources to devote to them. Orasanu also suggests that evidence must be 
unambiguous and of sufficient weight to prompt a change of plan. This suggestion is consistent with the 
results seen on the progression to known divergence in the case studies analyzed in this chapter. A 
sufficiently unambiguous observation was made to move into known divergence in these cases.    
 
Finding E-2: Deficiencies in system understanding were prevalent in 8 of 11 cases. 
 
 
The other aspect of expectation is a deficiency in systems understanding. System understanding 
influences the decisions that are made and the expectation of actions. Deficiencies in system knowledge 
were apparent in 8 of 11 cases. The details of specific deficiencies are discussed in Appendix D, however 
overall these cases can be summarized by an incorrect anticipation of behavior for given inputs to the 
automation. For example, in Indian 605, the crew appeared to turn off the flight director in an effort to 
regain a nominal auto-throttle mode, however in reality both flight directors needed to be turned off for 
the auto-throttle to revert to SPD mode. These cases could indicate a possible deficiency of systems 
understanding of automation logic.  
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Knowledge deficiency has been recognized in aviation operations and effects there of have been analyzed 
extensively in the situation awareness literature (D. Jones & Endsley, 1996; Performance Based Aviation 
Rulemaking Committee & Commercial Aviation Safety Team, 2013). Knowledge deficiency can also 
involve a poor or incorrect mental model, affecting the actual projection of the expectation and possibly 
introducing errors downstream (Kieras & Bovair, 1984; Mumaw, Sarter, & Wickens, 2001; Norman, 
1983; Rasmussen, 1985; Reason, 1990).. 
 
Finding E-3:  Many events analyzed showed evidence of actual state transitions that were 
rare or abnormal and were likely inconsistent with the crew’s state assumption, which 
presumably involved a more common state transition. 
 
 
In addition to the human holding the incorrect expectation, Table 4-8 shows that it was commonly seen 
that the mode transitions apparent in these cases were abnormal to the crew for the given situation. While 
automation can offload human task load in normal situations, it becomes much more difficult for the 
human to manage in non-normal situations. (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; Parasuraman, Sheridan, & 
Wickens, 2000; Wiener, 1988). Thus, the human’s expectation likely followed a nominal transition 
however the system behaved abnormally, a normalization of a non-normal situation. As discussed, the 
causes of these transitions were apparently due to component failures or even upstream input from the 
crew. Regardless of cause however, abnormal situations and transitions were apparent in all of these 
cases. In addition, it appeared that once unknown divergence occurred, it continued for multiple event 
cycles illustrating the possible perpetuation of divergence due to confident, but incorrect, expectation. The 
details of these cases can be found in Appendix D. 
Within the human information processing model, expectation process failures propagate into both the 
observation process and the state selection process making them highly impactful and also very difficult 
to contain. This difficulty highlights the importance of identifying discrepancies in human expectation 
and mitigating them to avoid catastrophic effects. As discussed, one way to break expectation bias is with 
a correct observation however, as discussed, observation process failures typically accompany  
expectation process failures for some portion of the divergence timeline. Before discussing observation 
failures however, it is relevant to discuss the inputs to the observation process.  
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4.4.5.2 Availability of Definitive Observables   
The availability of definitive observables proves insight into what information was available to the crew 
to clearly distinguish between states at different points on the divergence timeline. Recall from Chapter 2 
that definitive observables refer to observables that provide unambiguous information regarding the state 
of the system. 
 
Finding F-1: For the low energy cases analyzed, unknown divergence typically began with 
a limited set of definitive observables. In these cases, airspeed data was available as an 
observable, however this indication was ambiguous since for a period of the divergence 
timeline, airspeed decay was expected and indicative of multiple possible states. As 
airspeed decayed below the target airspeed, observables related to airspeed decay became 
definitive, however did not always promote known divergence presumably due to salience 
of these cues. If the airspeed decay was not observed, other definitive observables became 
available and were in the form of low speed alerts.  
 
 
The evidence discussed in Section 4.3 and Appendix D show that for the low energy cases, unknown 
divergence typically began with limited definitive observables that were discrete in nature such as the 
flight management annunciation or panel light annunciations. When airspeed decayed below a preset 
airspeed, more definitive observables became available. These observables tended to be dynamic in 
nature, such as airspeed or engine settings—variables whose values were available prior, but provided 
ambiguous information about the state of the system. Ultimately, known divergence and re-convergence 
occurred due to either observation of dynamic variables such as airspeed, or discrete annunciations of stall 
warning. In the Turkish 1951 accident case, when divergence first occurred, the only definitive 
observable available to the crew was a depiction on the FMA. As airspeed decayed below reference 
airspeed, the indication of speed below target provided another definitive observable to the crew, in 
addition to indications such as engine parameters and throttle location. Finally, as the situation decayed to 
stall, further definitive observables such as low speed indications on the PFD and stall warning occurred. 
In this case, the stall warning is the observable that appeared to promote known divergence and re-
convergence in this case.  This general timeline was similar for all low-energy cases. 
 
  
148 
 
 
Finding F-2: For the high-energy cases, multiple definitive observables were available to 
the crew at the initiation of divergence. These appeared to be salient enough for the crew 
to transition directly into known divergence.  
 
 
The evidence discussed in Section 4.3 and Appendix D indicates that for the high energy cases, many 
definitive observables were available to the crew following the initiation of divergence. These 
observables were both dynamic (such as engine thrust) and discrete (such as a mode annunciation). For 
example, during the Tarom 381 incident, as the auto-throttle mode transitioned to thrust mode during final 
approach, the engine thrust increased. This relatively salient definitive observable was accompanied by 
many other definitive observables such as pitch attitude increases and departure from glide path. In this 
case, the crew’s behavior appeared to change immediately, indicating known divergence, in an attempt to 
address the abnormal situation. As indicated in Figure 4-29, for all of the high energy cases, known 
divergence was commonly achieved immediately following the initiation of divergence. The details of the 
cases discussed in Appendix D show that the definitive observables available at the initiation of 
divergence continued to be available throughout the divergence timeline with few, if any, additional 
observables becoming available later.   
 
Finding F-3:  For the CFIT cases, many definitive observables were available to the crew 
following the initiation of divergence. For the cases analyzed, these observables included 
observables such as mode annunciations, altitude deviation and excessive vertical speed. 
These were available throughout the divergence timeline including through unknown and 
known divergence; however in the three cases analyzed, these appeared to have been 
missed possibly due to expectation bias or distraction. 
 
 
The evidence discussed in Section 4.3 and Appendix D shows that for the CFIT cases, the evolution of 
the observables was different from many of the auto-throttle cases, particularly the low energy auto-
throttle cases. In all three accidents, there was arguably a sufficient amount information provided to the 
crew following the initiation of divergence of the actual system state. Contrary to the high energy auto-
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throttle cases, in the CFIT cases, known divergence did not appear to occur immediately following 
divergence.  
In Air Inter, the descent rate was 3 times the normal rate. In Eastern 401, the altitude was decreasing. In 
American 965, the aircraft initiated a turn immediately. For the cases analyzed, the observables included 
discrete observables such as mode annunciations, and dynamic observables such as altitude deviation and 
excessive vertical speed. These observables typically remained available to the crew throughout the 
divergence timeline, however in one case the GPWS annunciated providing another definitive observable 
just prior to impact.   
As indicated above, the evolution of definitive observables through the divergence timeline involved both 
dynamic information that changed frequently, like airspeed, and static information that changed less 
frequently, such as automation state changes. While discrete indications of automation transitions are 
typically accompanied by a change in the set of definitive observables, dynamic variables only became 
definitive observables if they fell into a regime that was inappropriate for the situation.  Overall, the 
frequency of change of the set of observables appeared dependent on the frequency of discrete observable 
transition and the frequency of dynamic variable transition between appropriate and inappropriate values.  
4.4.5.3 Impact of Observation Failures 
Considering that overcoming expectation bias could be dependent on correct observations, it is not 
surprising that these expectation biases apparently remain intact given the prominence of accompanying 
observation process failures in the cases analyzed as shown in Table 4-8. In all of the cases analyzed, at 
least one definitive observable was available to the crew, however in many of these cases, these 
observables were missed for a significant portion of the divergence timeline. 
 
Finding G-1: Observation failures were apparent in all of the cases analyzed 
 
 
Table 4-8 indicates that despite observables being available, observation failures continued to occur. This 
observation is consistent with identified monitoring problems in the flight deck have been the subject of 
many studies as automation levels in the aircraft increase (Bjorklund, Alfredson, & Dekker, 2006; Civil 
Aviation Authority, 2004; Federal Aviation Administration, 2003; Mumaw et al., 2001; Parasuraman & 
Riley, 1997; Sarter et al., 2003; Sarter, Mumaw, & Wickens, 2007; Sumwalt, Thomas, & Dismukes, 
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2002). When assessing optimal human automation task allocation, it has been seen that human 
performance decreases on tasks that require high vigilance, such as monitoring of flight data (Grier et al., 
2003; Parasuraman, Warm, & See, 1998; Warm, Parasuraman, & Matthews, 2008; Wright & McGown, 
2001). For example, a study published by the NTSB found that throughout 37 accidents, 23% of 302 
errors were related to inadequate monitoring (National Transportation Safety Board, 1994). Another 
study, conducted by the UK civil aviation authority, identified a number of challenges and barriers to 
effective monitoring (Civil Aviation Authority, 2013).  The challenges spanned human limitations in a 
corporate climate, however the barriers of specific concern for this thesis include the human factors 
limitations, lack of feedback to pilots when monitoring lapses occur, design of flight deck systems, and 
inadequate mental models of autoflight systems. These problems are consistent with the factors 
influencing information processing failures presented in this chapter. The main influences presented in 
this chapter that impact observation process failures included expectation bias, distraction, workload, 
fatigue, and design.  
 
Finding G-2: Expectation bias appeared to have influenced the observation of definitive 
observables in 9 of eleven cases.  
 
 
Table 4-8 also shows that expectation bias was apparent in nine of eleven cases. In these cases, there was 
evidence suggesting that an incorrect expectation could have affected scan strategies of the human in the 
observation process, possibly corrupting observations, though the reports did not include information that 
would identify corruption of observations within the human. As discussed earlier in the thesis, 
confirmation bias has been observed in complex systems and relates to the selection of expectation-
affirming information for comprehension (M. Jones & Sugden, 2001; Klayman, 1995; Lehner et al., 2008; 
Nickerson, 1998). Some accidents could show evidence of confirmation bias. In Turkish 1951, it could be 
that the humans chose only to perceive information that was consistent with their expectation, which was 
that the aircraft was in speed mode, such as airspeed decay in the earlier portion of the accident timeline. 
However, as the accident timeline progressed and affirming cues disappear, it becomes apparent that 
expectation bias could have also played a part in bypassing all of the feedback available to the crew, 
possibly for the entire timeline. Expectation, however, was not the only plausible explanation for the 
missed observables.   
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Finding G-3:  In most cases, observation failures were tied to insufficient allocation of 
attention in monitoring definitive observables. In some cases, distraction and workload 
may have contributed to this.  
 
 
In addition to expectation bias, Table 4-8 shows that situational influences, such as distraction and 
workload, also affect observation. Of the eleven accidents analyzed, all showed evidence of distraction 
and, eight showed evidence of abnormal procedures or troubleshooting that could have contributed to an 
increased workload for the crew and possible distraction from the task of maintaining awareness of the 
mode of interest. While high workload was only apparent in some accidents, distraction was apparent in 
all of the case studies analyzed. In the Turkish 1951 accident, the crew was intercepting the glide path 
from above and was apparently behind the aircraft performing checklists later than normal. In Air Inter 
148, the crew was apparently distracted by confusion on the lateral profile of an abnormal approach 
procedure. In Eastern 401, the crew was apparently distracted troubleshooting a landing gear failure. The 
high workload and distraction consumed an increased proportion of the attention allocation and 
potentially affected the observation process and probability of correctly observing definitive observables 
of relevance. The detrimental effects of workload and distraction on human performance have been well 
documented in the multi-tasking literature (Loukopoulos, Dismukes, & Barshi, 2003). Crew resource 
management (CRM) has been used as an attempted mitigation to the limitations of human attentional 
resources. CRM, however, focuses on task splitting, rather than strategies for an individual crew member 
to handle multiple tasks (Flight Safety Foundation, 2014). In addition, while challenge-response 
checklists have been implemented as a part of CRM to address monitoring issues, it has been found that 
non-compliance with checklists continues to be prevalent in actual operations (Performance Based 
Aviation Rulemaking Committee & Commercial Aviation Safety Team, 2013). The PARC report also 
stated reasoning for non-compliance being tied to high workload or abnormal situations relating to 
distraction from the primary flight task. This may explain why many of the crews in these accidents failed 
to conduct a checklist which could have caught the divergence prior to unrecoverability (Berman & 
Dismukes, 2010; Charbonneau, 2010; Degani & Wiener, 1993). 
In nominal workload levels without abnormal distractions, its possible the crew could have defaulted to 
their nominal scan patterns of the flight instruments and their nominal compliance with checklists 
(National Transportation and Safety Board, 2010). This lack of compliance could indicate that mitigations 
could include measures to manage the effects of workload and distraction especially during critical flight 
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regimes. In addition to managing workload and distraction in the cockpit, design of feedback to the crew 
could also influence the observation.  
 
Finding G-4:  Eight of eleven cases analyzed showed evidence that design of displays and 
systems could have been a factor in the crew’s observation process failure. 
 
 
As shown in Table 4-8 eight of eleven cases analyzed showed evidence that design of displays and 
systems could have been a factor in the crew’s observation process failure. In the Turkish 1951, the 
transition to RETARD was only visually shown on the Flight Management Annunciator. In Air Inter 148, 
there was an apparent lack of distinguishing indications that were reasonably located within the crew’s 
field of view and held sufficient readability and distinguishability for the crew to realistically observe. In 
Eastern 401, the autopilot disconnected without aural annunciation to the crew. In addition, many of the 
analyzed cases included mode indication on the FMA. Despite the training that crews receive to cross 
check the FMA, the common occurrence of these observation process failures suggests the possible lack 
of efficacy of the FMA as a salient indication of mode transitions in critical flight regimes (Nikolic et al., 
2004; Sarter et al., 2003). Nikolic et al. found that color similarity, movement of background elements, 
and target eccentricity reduced detection performance of the FMA. In addition to contrast aspects, change 
blindness could also play a part in the lack of efficacy of the FMA (Flight Safety Foundation, 2014). 
Change blindness in cognition refers to the phenomenon where “unless a change to a visual scene 
produces a localizable change or transient at a specific position on the retina, generally, people will not 
detect it” (Simons & Levin, 1997). This phenomenon relates to the temporal processing of individual 
visual scenes to form a stable representation across views (Caplovitz, Fendrich, & Hughes, 2008; 
O’Regan, Rensink, & Clark, 1999). This research suggests that even if the crew was scanning the PFD, it 
could be possible to miss a change on the FMA (Flight Safety Foundation, 2014). While it does not 
appear that crews are appropriately prioritizing crosscheck of the FMA, these physiological limitations 
could also inhibit perception of mode transitions. These two reasons suggest that relying on humans to 
observe a minimally salient signal during high workload or abnormal situations may not be realistic.  
It is also important for designers to consider what observables are actually available to crews. Seven of 
the eleven accidents involved ambiguity of state observables for at least part of the divergence timeline. 
For example, observables such as airspeed and engine noise were seen to be situationally masked by 
descents where idle power was expected in the nominal case for at least part of the divergence timeline. 
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Pritchett and Johnson found evidence that pilots may rely on these dynamic variables to maintain 
awareness of their vertical flight path, reinforcing the potentially negative effect if these dynamic 
variables were masked (Johnson & Pritchett, 1995). As illustrated by these accidents, with fewer 
definitive observables, a failure in observation of the definitive observables could become much more 
susceptible to association process failures and expectation bias. Providing more definitive variables could 
increase the chance that the crew will observe any definitive variable possibly contributing to maintaining 
integrity of human information processing. As aircraft become more automated and humans move to 
functioning “on” the loop, the number of definitive observables could naturally diminish. This is why it 
may be important that the definitive observables that remain be salient enough to provide an effective 
indication of flight critical information.  
4.5 Summary 
Divergence is inherently a dynamic process that evolves with time. These dynamics of divergence were 
evaluated in eleven case studies of accidents involving automation mode confusion. Findings included:  
A. Manifestation of Divergence 
• Finding A-1: Divergence was shown in 9 occurrences to be triggered by an automation 
transition, in 1 occurrence to be triggered by a human transition, and in 3 occurrences 
triggered by both the human and automation transitioning. 
• Finding A-2: Of the 12 cases where automation transitioned during a divergence event, 7 
of these involved human action causing unexpected automation transition later in the 
timeline.   
• Finding A-3: Of the 12 cases where automation transitioned during a divergence event, 2 
of these transitions could have been attributed to the system design or failure.   
B. Occurrence of Re-convergence 
• Finding B-1: Re-convergence was apparent in 6 of 8 auto-throttle accidents and none of 
the CFIT accidents. 
• Finding B-2: Within the auto-throttle cases, the likelihood of re-convergence appeared to 
be tied to whether the case was low energy or high energy.  
o Five of five low energy auto-throttle cases showed evidence of re-convergence 
occurring prior to impact for accident cases and prior to recovery for incident 
cases. Three of these were accident cases. 
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o One of three high energy auto-throttle cases showed evidence of re-convergence 
occurring. This was the only incident case. Neither of the high energy accident 
cases showed evidence of re-convergence. 
C. Occurrence of Known Divergence 
• Finding C-1: For all cases where the transition from unknown to known divergence 
occurred, observation triggered ultimate awareness of divergence in all cases, including 
cases that resulted in full re-convergence and those that only resulted in known 
divergence. 
D. Timing of Divergence and Re-convergence 
• Finding D-1: For all low energy cases analyzed, the divergence timeline initially involved 
unknown divergence that prevailed for some time. Then the transition from unknown to 
known divergence occurred after speed decayed to a point where it was either observed 
by the crew or a low speed alert such as stall warning was annunciated. If the transition to 
known divergence occurred early enough, recovery actions could be taken prior to the 
situation becoming unrecoverable. 
• Finding D-2: For all high energy cases analyzed, unknown divergence was not apparent. 
A direct transition to known divergence was observed. In 2 of 3 cases known divergence 
continued until impact. In only one case was re-convergence apparent and this occurred 
when the automation reached an envelope protection limit and disconnected the auto-
throttle. 
• Finding D-3:  The three CFIT cases analyzed, showed different characteristics than the 
auto-throttle cases. For all CFIT cases analyzed, unknown divergence prevailed for a 
majority of the divergence timeline possibly due to the lack of salient cues or crosscheck 
of information. 
E. Expectation Failures 
• Finding E-1: Expectation failures were apparent in all of the cases evaluated. 
• Finding E-2: Deficiencies in system understanding were prevalent in 8 of 11 cases. 
• Finding E-3: Many events analyzed showed evidence of actual state transitions that were 
rare or abnormal and were likely inconsistent with the crew’s state assumption, which 
presumably involved a more common state transition. 
F. Availability of Definitive Observables 
• Finding F-1: For the low energy cases analyzed, unknown divergence typically began 
with a limited set of definitive observables. In these cases, airspeed data was available as 
an observable, however this indication was ambiguous since for a period of the 
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divergence timeline, airspeed decay was expected and indicative of multiple possible 
states. As airspeed decayed below the target airspeed, observables related to airspeed 
decay became definitive, however did not always promote known divergence presumably 
due to salience of these cues. If these were not observed, other observables became 
available and were in the form of low speed alerts.  
• Finding F-2: For the high-energy cases, many definitive observables were available to the 
crew following the initiation of divergence. These appeared to be salient enough for the 
crew to transition directly into known divergence.  
• Finding F-3:  For the CFIT cases, many definitive observables were available to the crew 
following the initiation of divergence. For the cases analyzed, these observables included 
observables such as mode annunciations, altitude deviation and excessive vertical speed. 
These were available throughout the divergence timeline including through unknown and 
known divergence; however in the three cases analyzed, these appeared to have been 
missed possibly due to expectation bias or distraction. 
G. Observation Failures 
• Finding G-1:  Observation failures were apparent in all of the cases analyzed. 
• Finding G-2: Expectation bias appeared to have influenced the observation of definitive 
observables in 9 of eleven cases. 
• Finding G-3:  In most cases, these observation failures were tied to insufficient allocation 
of attention in monitoring definitive observables. In some cases, distraction and workload 
may have contributed to this. 
• Finding G-4:  Eight of eleven cases analyzed showed evidence that design of displays and 
systems could have been a factor in the crew’s observation process failure. 
The analysis showed that the concepts of unknown divergence, known divergence, and re-convergence 
were understandable in the context of the human information processing model of divergence, illustrating 
that it can be a useful tool in diagnosing accidents and incidents. This research can be used to infer 
divergence patterns in varying cases and tie these influences to information flow through the human 
information processing system, explaining cases of divergence between human state assumption and 
aircraft system state. The representation of human information processing was useful in determining 
failure in processes, origins of those failures, and impact of failures on divergence. Unknown divergence, 
in these cases, was explained by the various combinations of process failures that held no avenue for 
containment. When failures in processes were apparently alleviated to a point where they had the 
potential to be contained, they were typically contained in a process downstream, generally resulting in 
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known divergence. Using the knowledge gained from this case study analysis, implications of these 
findings are discussed in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 5           
             
             
                 
Implications of Findings 
This chapter explores the implications of the findings of the case studies discussed in Chapter 4. The 
model of divergence allowed systematic analysis of multiple accidents and incidents. The consistency of 
analysis provided between cases can be used to understand underlying patterns in a set of 
accidents/incidents. The findings can be split into two main discussions. One discusses the implications 
that involve understanding of the process failures that contributed to divergence and delayed/inhibited re-
convergence (Findings F, G, C). This understanding can be used to inform what kind of mitigations may 
effectively alleviate consequences of divergence. The other discussion focuses on implications that 
involve the occurrence and timing of divergence and re-convergence (Findings A, B, D, E). This 
understanding can be used to explore how the mitigations can be implemented in order to maximize 
chances of successful alleviation of divergence.  
5.1 Occurrence of Human Information Processing Failures 
The information gained by understanding how processing failures may have contributed to divergence or 
inhibited re-convergence can be used to explore mitigations that can target these failed processes. 
Expectation failures (Finding E), observation failures (Finding G), and the recovery of expectation bias 
with observation (Finding C) occurred in all of the accidents analyzed. Due to the interdependence 
between the expectation and observation processes, these implications are discussed as a together. 
 E. Expectation Failures 
• Finding E-1: Expectation failures were apparent in all of the cases evaluated. 
• Finding E-2: Deficiencies in system understanding were prevalent in 8 of 11 cases. 
• Finding E-3: Many events analyzed showed evidence of actual state transitions that were 
rare or abnormal and were likely inconsistent with the crew’s state assumption, which 
presumably involved a more common state transition. 
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G. Observation Failures 
• Finding G-1:  Observation failures were apparent in all of the cases analyzed. 
• Finding G-2: Expectation bias appeared to have influenced the observation of definitive 
observables in 9 of eleven cases. 
• Finding G-3:  In most cases, these observation failures were tied to insufficient allocation 
of attention in monitoring definitive observables. In some cases, distraction and workload 
may have contributed to this. 
• Finding G-4:  Eight of eleven cases analyzed showed evidence that design of displays and 
systems could have been a factor in the crew’s observation process failure. 
 C.  Occurrence of Known Divergence 
• Finding C-1: For all cases where the transition from unknown to known divergence 
occurred, observation triggered ultimate awareness of divergence in all cases, including 
cases that resulted in full re-convergence and those that only resulted in known 
divergence. 
The model of divergence allowed us to observe the possible effect of expectation bias within the accident 
cases. Failures in both the expectation process and the observation process were observed in every case 
analyzed including both auto-throttle and CFIT cases (Findings E and G). The analysis indicated the  
magnitude of the impacts of these failures on the human state assumption. While poor expectation and 
monitoring have been found to contribute to accidents in the past, this model highlighted the link between 
those two failures. Furthermore, since the expectation failures were contained eventually by correct 
observation, the model possibly showed the recovery of expectation bias (Finding C). This suggests that 
mitigations that can promote observation to force reconsideration of the current expectation of state may 
be effective in alleviating the consequences of divergence.  
Training the crew to be more robust to cases of expectation bias could involve crew training or 
incorporating procedural crosschecks to strengthen observations that could challenge expectation. This 
proposal is consistent with recommendations in the field relating to training effective monitoring and 
training automation logic.  
Currently, a number of initiatives exist as monitoring of the flight profile has been established as an area 
of concern in aviation (Flight Safety Foundation, 2014; Performance Based Aviation Rulemaking 
Committee & Commercial Aviation Safety Team, 2013). Hutchins et. al. suggests that the training of 
monitoring can be improved and work can be done to evaluate the interaction between pilot flying and 
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pilot monitoring (Hutchins, Weibel, Emmenegger, Fouse, & Holder, 2013). Crew resource management 
was not explicitly discussed as a factor in this thesis, however it can be used as a powerful tool to enhance 
monitoring efficacy (Performance Based Aviation Rulemaking Committee & Commercial Aviation 
Safety Team, 2013).  As part of this, the Flight Safety Foundation in their report on pilot monitoring 
suggests that clearly defining monitoring tasks for each pilot could improve monitoring performance 
(Flight Safety Foundation, 2014).  
The data in this thesis suggests the benefit of training crews to challenge expectations. This training could 
be incorporated into the current flight management monitoring initiatives of training susceptibility to 
monitoring errors (Flight Safety Foundation, 2014). In addition to training on why humans are vulnerable 
to errors and lapses, ground training could also include why humans are susceptible to expectation bias 
and the gravity of the effects if expectation is incorrect. Current monitoring recommendations include 
training to be aware of monitoring lapses, which goes hand in hand with training crews to be aware of 
their expectation. Because expectation bias has been shown in the case studies to be naturally contained 
with a correct observation, this training should reinforce the current efforts in improving flight path 
monitoring.  
The Flight Safety Foundation suggests that some of the current training of predictable scenarios can be 
replaced with scenario-based training of unanticipated distractions that are more representative of the 
stressors found in flight (Flight Safety Foundation, 2014). Scenarios that require challenging of 
expectations can be incorporated into this initiative as the goals go hand in hand. Mode transitions of 
concern that can be used to inform scenarios, for example, can be identified using analysis such as the one 
done in Chapter 4. In this thesis, an example of a mode transition of concern is the disconnection of the 
auto-throttle (or reversion to a flight idle mode) during final approach which commonly appeared in the 
accidents and incidents analyzed. This scenario could be paired with workload and distraction aspects to 
create a realistic environment with which divergence could occur, and included in a crew training 
program. In addition, there is work being conducted on methods to predict the user’s knowledge of 
system behavior by taking into account the frequency with which the transition scenarios are experienced 
and the contexts in which they occur (Javaux, 2002). With further development of this research it may be 
possible to identify transitions that may be more problematic for the crew.  
Currently, the FAA is providing airlines with a guidelines to address issues with pilot monitoring (Lowy, 
2016). Thus, efforts in mitigating monitoring issues are on their way to being implemented. If the crews 
in the case studies were effectively trained on challenging expectation by monitoring, it could have been 
possible to mitigate nine of the eleven cases studied including, Asiana 214, Turkish 1951, Thomsonfly, 
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American 903, Indian 605, Air Inter 148, American 965, and Eastern 401.65 The success would have been 
dependent on successful identification of the abnormal situation before the situation became 
unrecoverable.  
5.2 Occurrence and Timing of Divergence and Re-convergence 
Since areas to target improvement within the human information processing system were identified, it is 
necessary to understand how these improvements can be implemented in order to address cases of 
divergence. 
 A. Manifestation of Divergence 
• Finding A-1: Divergence was shown in 9 occurrences to be triggered by an automation 
transition, in 1 occurrence to be triggered by a human transition, and in 3 occurrences 
triggered by both the human and automation transitioning. 
• Finding A-2: Of the 12 cases where automation transitioned during a divergence event, 7 
of these involved human action causing unexpected automation transition later in the 
timeline.   
• Finding A-3: Of the 12 cases where automation transitioned during a divergence event, 2 
of these transitions could have been attributed to the system design or failure.   
Information of how divergence triggers informs areas to target to prevent divergence. Considering 
triggers of divergence spanned both the human and automation, mitigations should not necessarily be 
limited to only addressing design or only improving training. Focusing on one aspect of the human and 
automation system could limit the effectiveness of the mitigation. In addition, information about how 
automation transitions occurred informs how these can specifically be targeted. In these cases 
specifically, the human appeared to be the origin of many divergence triggers within the analysis. This 
could point to mitigations that address failures in system understanding in order to improve the accuracy 
                                                      
65 While the remaining cases, China 140, Air France 72, and Tarom 381, showed evidence of expectation 
failures typically during the divergence transition, the dynamics of the aircraft (increase in thrust) 
following divergence was typically highly salient indicating divergence, thus many of these crews moved 
into known divergence immediately and may not have been affected by expectation bias during the time 
of divergence.   
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of expectation and enable the anticipation of abnormal modes. These could be in the form of training to fit 
the human to the system or simplified automation logic to fit the system to the human (Vakil & Hansman, 
2002). Issues with preventing divergence in this manner arise however with limitations of long term 
memory and increasingly complex systems. In addition, monetary and resource limitations arise when 
discussing automation re-design. For these reasons, prevention of divergence may not be the most 
practical way to address divergence. Since re-convergence was possible in these cases, it may be effective 
to focus efforts on promoting re-convergence if prevention of divergence is impractical.  
 B. Occurrence of Re-convergence  
• Finding B-1: Re-convergence was apparent in 6 of 8 auto-throttle accidents and none of 
the CFIT accidents. 
• Finding B-2: Within the auto-throttle cases, the likelihood of re-convergence appeared to 
be tied to whether the case was low energy or high energy.  
o Five of five low energy auto-throttle cases showed evidence of re-convergence 
occurring prior to impact for accident cases and prior to recovery for incident 
cases. Three of these were accident cases. 
o One of three high energy auto-throttle cases showed evidence of re-convergence 
occurring. This was the only incident case. Neither of the high energy accident 
cases showed evidence of re-convergence. 
Re-convergence was apparent in all of the low energy auto-throttle cases analyzed. While individual 
accident reports may allude to the crew recognizing a situation, the result that re-convergence occurs 
relatively consistently shows that in these cases, the problem may not have been with the actual triggering 
of re-convergence alone. As mentioned in Chapter 4, timing of the re-convergence process with respect to 
criticality of the situation also appeared to have an effect. The implication of this relationship is explored 
later in the discussion related to Finding D.  
High energy auto-throttle cases typically resulted in immediate known divergence, however delayed or 
non-existent re-convergence. In these cases, it is possible that focusing mitigations on fully re-converging 
could be effective at reducing the catastrophic impact of some of these cases. Because known divergence 
is typically gained immediately, mitigations promoting observation may not be effective since failures in 
system understanding were also apparent. In many of these cases, despite observation of definitive 
observables, such as the FMA, full re-convergence did not occur due to this breakdown in associative 
understanding. Thus, in these high energy auto-throttle cases, the results suggest that procedures aimed at 
forcing re-convergence, by disconnecting the automation for example if the crew is confused about what 
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the automation is doing, may be more effective at alleviating the consequential results of divergence in 
these situations. 
CFIT cases, while sometimes showing evidence of known divergence, did not show evidence of re-
convergence in any of the accidents analyzed. These cases were unique compared to the auto-throttle 
cases because the data suggested that known divergence could have been promoted in these cases and 
efforts could be made to force re-convergence. These mitigations are dependent on the timing and are 
further discussed in the discussion for Finding D below.  
 D. Timing of Divergence and Re-convergence 
• Finding D-1: For all low energy cases analyzed, the divergence timeline initially involved 
unknown divergence that prevailed for some time. Then the transition from unknown to 
known divergence occurred after speed decayed to a point where it was either observed 
by the crew or a low speed alert such as stall warning was annunciated. If the transition to 
known divergence occurred early enough, recovery actions could be taken prior to the 
situation becoming unrecoverable. 
• Finding D-2: For all high energy cases analyzed, unknown divergence was not apparent. 
A direct transition to known divergence was observed. In 2 of 3 cases known divergence 
continued until impact. In only one case was re-convergence apparent and this occurred 
when the automation reached an envelope protection limit and disconnected the auto-
throttle. 
• Finding D-3:  The three CFIT cases analyzed, showed different characteristics than the 
auto-throttle cases. For all CFIT cases analyzed, unknown divergence prevailed for a 
majority of the divergence timeline possibly due to the lack of salient cues or crosscheck 
of information. 
While individual accident reports may allude to the crew recognizing a situation, the result that re-
convergence occurs relatively consistently shows that in low energy cases, the problem may not have 
been with the actual triggering of re-convergence alone, but the timing of re-convergence relative to 
criticality of the situation. This was further supported by the timing analysis for the auto-throttle cases. 
For auto-throttle mode confusion cases resulting in low energy, the timing between known divergence/re-
convergence and recovery was minimal. This small time difference could indicate that once known 
divergence occurs, recovery could be initiated and mitigations could target promoting known divergence 
for the low energy cases. The analysis of incidents also illustrated the extensive amount of time it took to 
recover in those cases. The time between recovery and impact for the accident cases, and the time to 
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successfully recover in the incident cases alludes to the accident crews effectively “running out of time” 
to recover the aircraft.  
High energy auto-throttle accidents showed evidence of known divergence occurring immediately 
following initiation of divergence, however re-convergence was rare and these cases sometimes ended in 
accidents. Thus, as introduced in the discussion regarding B-2, attaining known divergence alone in these 
cases is not apparently successful at promoting re-convergence and appropriate recovery. This lack of 
appropriate action indicates the need to promote re-convergence in these cases as opposed to only known 
divergence.  
There were some differences between the three CFIT cases and the auto-throttle cases. For the CFIT 
cases, known divergence, if it occurred, occurred much closer to impact. Of the three cases analyzed, 
American 965 was the only one to show any recovery behavior, likely due to the annunciation of the 
ground proximity warning system and the immediate action required by that cue. In Air Inter 148, there 
was not evidence of known divergence prior to impact, and in Eastern 401, the known divergence 
appeared to occur 7 seconds prior to impact. This pattern may be inherent in this class of accidents 
provided that the result was “controlled” flight into terrain. Divergence, however provided an explanation 
that spanned multiple accidents, suggesting that if known divergence can be promoted early enough for 
recovery to be successful, it may be effective at mitigating these types of accidents. This also provides 
some insight into the possible efficacy of the GPWS, considering the only accident with the equipment 
involved was the only one to initiate recovery action prior to impact with terrain. This analysis only 
reviewed 3 accidents, however with further analysis its possible that further patterns may emerge.    
When considering promoting known divergence and re-convergence, the analysis of divergence indicated 
that a point of unrecoverability can exist in a situation after which, successful recovery would not be 
possible. These points may be different based on the phase of flight, but the approach phase of flight can 
be used as an example. 66 
                                                      
66 The FSF evaluated areas of vulnerability on a typical flight profile (Flight Safety Foundation, 2014). 
This document highlights that where ever transitions (vertically, laterally, or speed) occur are at a higher 
vulnerability for monitoring errors, however they consider the possible consequences of those to be less 
in severity compared to flight within 1,500 feet of the ground. 
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When determining the point on the approach where known divergence should occur by, it should 
incorporate (1) the potential (time available) for recovery based on aircraft dynamics, and (2) the time 
required to recognize divergence, initiate recovery, and recover without impacting terrain.  
However research can be done to evaluate the optimal point on the approach where known divergence 
must occur by for successful recovery to be possible. This research would have to include aircraft 
dynamics information as well as incorporate a buffer time for human recognition and execution of missed 
approach. Alternatively, the case studies such as the one presented in chapter 4 could also provide insight 
based on the calculation of the point of unrecoverability.  
This information about the point of unrecoverability could be used to inform the best time on approach to 
implement an automation crosscheck of the FMA. Crosschecking the FMA during critical phases of flight 
can remain a useful tool in confirming or denying expectation. For example, doing an automation check at 
the final approach fix at 2000 ft. altitude could provide plenty of time for a crew to recognize and recover 
from divergence, however divergence actually occurred following this point in some of the accidents 
studied.67 Thus, this shows that conducting a crosscheck too early allows time for divergence to develop 
following the crosscheck increasing susceptibility to consequential divergence. However, as discussed, re-
convergence must occur before the situation becomes unrecoverable in order to avoid catastrophic 
consequences.  
A possible addition to the stabilized approach criteria could incorporate a check of the FMA.68 As can be 
seen, typically these checks occur at 1000 ft. or 500 ft. and based on the operational evidence a go around 
initiated at these altitudes could occur successfully (Charbonneau, 2010). If an automation crosscheck 
was incorporated into the stabilized approach criteria at 500 feet and divergence successfully identified by 
the crew, this could have been successful at mitigating four of the eleven of the accidents evaluated in 
Chapter 4, including Asiana 214, Turkish 1951, Air France 72, and Indian 605.69  
                                                      
67 The following cases involved the initiation of divergence following the FAF: Indian 605, Turkish 1951, 
Thomsonfly, AF 72, Asiana 214, China 140, Air Inter 148 (7/11 cases) 
68 Some airlines have already incorporated this into their stabilized approach criteria 
69 It is important to discuss a major limitation of procedural cross checks (Degani & Wiener, 1993). As 
seen in the case studies analyzed, non-compliance with or delayed checklists was common. The reasons 
behind this non-compliance likely parallel the issues in observation seen with divergence. Typically 
workload and distraction were apparent. In addition to these factors, there has been research that discusses 
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With a defined point of unrecoverability, it also may be possible to design an alert for the crew that 
annunciates prior to that point if a situation has degraded beyond acceptability or is projected to degrade 
beyond acceptability. For the auto-throttle cases, this alert could occur for low energy or energy predicted 
to go below acceptable values following the point of unrecoverability. The purpose of this kind of 
mitigation would be to stimulate known divergence via observation, by providing a salient definitive 
observable, prior to the unrecoverability point. A procedure complimenting this alert could mandate a go-
around minimizing time between known divergence, re-convergence, and recovery and improve chances 
of success of a recovery procedure. This philosophy is consistent with the implementation of the 
enhanced ground proximity warning system (GPWS) to prevent CFIT accidents (Loomis & Porter, 1982). 
This system alerts the crew about impending collision with terrain and procedures and training 
correspondingly provide guidance on the appropriate escape maneuver.  This system likely contributed to 
the 100 fold decrease in the risk of CFIT accidents between 1974 and 2003 (Honeywell, n.d.). 
Furthermore in the 3 CFIT accidents analyzed in this thesis, the only one that showed any recovery action 
was the one that received a GPWS warning.  
In addition to alerts, it may be affective to provide the crew with a display that includes information on 
the limits of the flight envelope and integrates the point of unrecoverability into the observables available 
to the crew. This integration is consistent with efforts to use displays to enhance crew situation awareness 
when using envelope protection systems (Ackerman et al., 2012).  
 F. Availability of Definitive Observables  
• Finding F-1: For the low energy cases analyzed, unknown divergence typically began 
with a limited set of definitive observables. In these cases, airspeed data was available as 
an observable, however this indication was ambiguous since for a period of the 
divergence timeline, airspeed decay was expected and indicative of multiple possible 
states. As airspeed decayed below the target airspeed, observables related to airspeed 
decay became definitive, however did not always promote known divergence presumably 
                                                                                                                                                                              
complacency and fatigue affects on check list compliance (Berman & Dismukes, 2010; Degani & Wiener, 
1993; Performance Based Aviation Rulemaking Committee & Commercial Aviation Safety Team, 2013; 
Smith, Jamieson, & Curtis, 2013). Thus, it is important to consider efforts to improve compliance with 
procedures in order for an automation crosscheck to be effective at mitigating divergence. 
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due to salience of these cues. If these were not observed, other observables became 
available and were in the form of low speed alerts.  
• Finding F-2: For the high-energy cases, many definitive observables were available to the 
crew following the initiation of divergence. These appeared to be salient enough for the 
crew to transition directly into known divergence.  
• Finding F-3:  For the CFIT cases, many definitive observables were available to the crew 
following the initiation of divergence. For the cases analyzed, these observables included 
observables such as mode annunciations, altitude deviation and excessive vertical speed. 
These were available throughout the divergence timeline including through unknown and 
known divergence; however in the three cases analyzed, these appeared to have been 
missed possibly due to expectation bias or distraction. 
Another pattern revealed when using the model of divergence for the auto-throttle cases is the dynamic 
behavior of observables as the divergence timeline progressed. While individual accident reports suggest 
the indications available to the crew, divergence allowed us to see that in many cases, limited definitive 
cues were available to the crew, specifically for the low energy auto-throttle cases. This insight highlights 
this period in an accident timeline where cues could be strengthened or added prior to the situation 
becoming critical for the auto-throttle cases. The analysis also indicated that while visual mode 
information was provided to the crew at the beginning of the divergence timeline, more dynamic 
observables such as airspeed and engine noise became definitive as the situation degraded. Ultimately, 
analysis indicated that in most cases, crews reached known divergence through observation of these 
dynamic variables, possibly highlighting that prediction of these dynamic variables may provide an added 
buffer time of recognizing that these parameters, which may be nominal for a current situation, but 
abnormal for a future situation.  
Since many observables were available for the high energy auto-throttle cases and were effective at 
promoting known divergence, these observables were not effective in promoting re-convergence. These 
could be related to breakdowns in system understanding; thus, consistent with the in the discussion of 
Finding B-2, forcing re-convergence using procedures may be effective at preventing these types of 
accidents. 
For the CFIT cases, the evolution of the set of observables was different from many of the auto-throttle 
cases. In all three accidents, there was arguably a sufficient amount of information provided to the crew 
following the initiation of divergence of the actual system state. In Air Inter, the descent rate was 3 times 
the normal rate. In Eastern 401, the altitude was decreasing. In American 965, the aircraft initiated a turn 
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immediately. Thus, it may not be effective to provide more indications to the crews in these accident 
cases, however it may be beneficial to target the factors influencing the observation failures tied to the 
divergence such as distraction. Air Inter and American 965 were pre-occupied with their lateral profile 
and Eastern 401 was preoccupied with troubleshooting a failure. Thus, enforcing operational requirements 
such as not accepting a visual approach may keep workload to a minimum. Efforts could also focus on 
prioritization of tasks during training. 
5.3 Summary 
The findings above indicated that timing between the re-convergence process and the criticality of the 
situation is important to address. Using this information, mitigations can target promoting re-convergence 
prior to the situation becoming unrecoverable. In order to do this, the findings suggest that targeting 
mitigation of expectation and observation process failures may be most effective. The dependent nature of 
these two process failures should also be addressed in order to effectively mitigate these cases.70 
The information on how divergence, known divergence, and re-convergence manifest in the different 
types of cases informed what mitigations may be more effective for those cases given the observation and 
expectation failures seen. Low energy cases showed a clear trend of unknown divergence with a period of 
limited observables followed by an increase in observables. These cases eventually resulted in known 
divergence, followed quickly by re-convergence and recovery. The implications of these results indicate 
that if known divergence can be promoted in the low-energy cases, with procedures, improved feedback, 
or training, chances for successful recovery may increase. For high energy cases, observables were 
available early in the divergence timeline. Known divergence typically occurred immediately, but did not 
guarantee re-convergence. This finding suggests that procedures to force re-convergence in these cases 
may be more effective than other mitigations such as those that provide more or more salient observables. 
Finally, the results for CFIT cases indicated that mitigations targeting both promotion of known 
                                                      
70 It should be noted that this thesis makes no claim that these initiatives have not already been proposed 
in the field. On the contrary actually, this thesis provides more data to support the possible effectiveness 
of these mitigations. It is also important to remember that this is by no means an exhaustive list of how to 
address divergence.  
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divergence and forcing of re-convergence may be most effective due to the apparent lack of known 
divergence prior to unrecoverability and time criticality of these flight profiles.  
This chapter discussed the implications of the findings of the case study analysis. Overall, information 
gained by using the model of divergence to analyze this set of accidents not only identifies the patterns, 
but also provides a framework with which to understand how potential mitigations could affect the human 
state assumption and, ultimately, divergence. 
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Chapter 6               
             
             
                   
Summary and Conclusions 
6.1 Summary 
This thesis defines and develops the concept of divergence between the human state assumption and the 
aircraft system state. The concept of divergence can be used to evaluate human-system interaction in 
many different types of systems, however this thesis specifically discussed the interaction between the 
crew and automation systems of modern commercial aircraft. Divergence was explored as a concept by 
(1) reviewing the pertinent literature regarding human error, human information processing, situation 
awareness and mode awareness, (2) developing a framework that can be used to understand possible 
causes of divergence, (3) illustrating use of the framework with accident case studies, and (4) discussing 
the implications of the findings of the case studies.  
Since divergence could ultimately result in unsafe situations, it was important to understand current 
frameworks of human error and where divergence fit within them. Since error can originate from human 
processing of information, as suggested by divergence, it was necessary to understand the current work on 
human information processing and how that relates to the human state assumption.  The basic elements of 
models developed by Wickens and Endsley were incorporated into the model of divergence (Endsley, 
1995; Wickens & Hollands, 2000). These include aspects of perception, cognition, decision making, and 
execution. Certain processes were adapted to discuss determination of state specifically, and the result 
maintained consistency with the established literature. Reason’s Fallible Machine was also used to 
develop details of the association and expectation processes (Reason, 1990). The model of divergence 
incorporated different aspects of the current literature to understand the human processes with which a 
human state assumption is formed.  
With this information processing framework, failures affecting individual processes could be evaluated 
for their impact on divergence. The framework highlighted the interaction of indications in the system, 
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and the processes of observation, association, state selection, expectation, and ambiguity resolution in the 
human. The model was used to identify causes of divergence as process failures and evaluate the effects 
of those failures on downstream processes and the human state assumption. Ultimately, the impacts of 
process failures were assessed for consequential effects using accident case studies.  
Eleven accident case studies involving automation mode confusion were conducted to evaluate 
divergence using the process model of divergence. Eight of these cases related to auto-throttle failures. 
The other three cases evaluated were selected as examples of mode confusion outside of the auto-throttle 
realm that resulted in CFIT illustrating possible generalizability of the concept on another type of accident 
important to current safety initiatives.  The case studies were used to identify trends in divergence and 
successfully illustrated the use of divergence to analyze the mode confusion. Findings of the case studies 
showed prevalence of observation and expectation process failures in the time frames involving 
divergence. The implications of these findings on the industry were then discussed.  
6.2 Conclusions 
This thesis explored the concept of divergence and its effect as a potential source of human error. 
Accidents and incidents related to human error and auto-throttle mode confusion where divergence 
appeared to play a role were analyzed. The 11 cases analyzed involved low energy auto-throttle mode 
confusion, high energy auto-throttle mode confusion, and CFIT. Since the analysis focused on accidents 
and incidents, divergence was assessed primarily in cases that resulted in dangerous situations. Due to the 
lack of detailed data on cases of divergence that do not result in accidents or incidents, the findings 
focused on divergence cases with highly consequential effects. These highlighted how divergence can be 
a problem for aircraft operations.  
A number of findings resulted from the analysis. In the 11 cases of divergence analyzed, re-convergence 
appeared to be prevalent, particularly in the low energy auto-throttle cases including accidents. This 
finding indicates that re-convergence alone may not be the only factor important to the outcome of a 
situation. Timing of unknown divergence, known divergence, and re-convergence showed trends in when 
these transitions occur and how the timing of the re-convergence process relates to the success of any 
possible recovery action. In multiple cases, such as on final approach, there appeared to be a critical point 
by which appropriate recovery must have been initiated in order for the recovery to be successful. The 
analysis showed however, that the timing of recovery action was dependent on recognizing the 
divergence. This relationship provides insight about where mitigation efforts may need to focus in order 
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to be effective. Since re-convergence was prevalent in the low energy cases, it suggests that mitigation 
efforts may need to instead target earlier transitions to known divergence. This finding was specific to the 
low energy cases. 
The analysis also showed differences in how divergence and re-convergence occurred between types of 
cases. There were differences in the number and type of observables that were available for low energy 
auto-throttle, high energy auto-throttle, and CFIT cases. The different types of accidents also showed 
varying levels of effectiveness of observables at promoting known divergence and re-convergence.  
Analysis of the failures in the human information processing system that could have contributed to 
divergence and the inhibition of re-convergence was conducted. Of all of the cases analyzed, expectation 
process failures and observation process failures were apparent in every case. The dominant mechanisms 
behind expectation failures involved issues with systems understanding as well as situations that may 
have included abnormal or rare automation modes. The key mechanisms affecting observation failures 
included expectation bias, distraction, and workload. A relationship between expectation and observation 
was apparent as expectation bias, where a strong expectation could have inhibited the observation of 
information that may be contrary to the expectation. It appeared that a strong expectation bias must have 
been overcome in order to achieve known divergence and ultimately re-convergence. The transition to 
known divergence from unknown divergence consistently involved observation of a definitive observable. 
Occasionally this included an observation of airspeed decay, however often unknown divergence 
prevailed until an imminent warning was annunciated such as stall or ground proximity.  
The information on how divergence, known divergence, and re-convergence occurred in the different 
types of cases can inform what types of mitigations may be more effective for those cases given the 
observation and expectation failures seen. Low energy cases showed a clear trend of unknown divergence 
with a period of limited observables followed by an increase in definitive observables which led to re-
convergence. These cases eventually resulted in known divergence, followed quickly by re-convergence 
and recovery. The implications of these results indicate that if known divergence can be promoted in the 
low-energy cases, with procedures, improved feedback, or training, chances for successful recovery may 
increase. For high energy cases, observables were available early in the divergence timeline. Known 
divergence typically occurred immediately, but did not guarantee re-convergence. This finding suggests 
that operational procedures to force re-convergence (such as by disconnecting automation if the crew is 
unsure of its behavior) in these cases may be more effective than other mitigations such as those that 
provide more or more salient observables. Finally, the results for CFIT cases indicated that mitigations 
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targeting both promotion of known divergence and forcing of re-convergence may be most effective due 
to the persistence of unknown divergence observed in the CFIT cases.   
This framework was built on assumptions such as the deterministic behavior of processes. Because the 
relationship between inputs and outputs of processes may be more complex than as modeled in this thesis, 
further work can be conducted to expand the use of the model. For example, the association, state 
selection, and expectation processes were modeled using basic comparison or decision tree logic. It is 
well known that these processes can be very complex and effort can be directed into developing a more 
robust model of these processes possibly incorporating Bayesian methods. For expectation in particular, 
the relationship between confidence and expectation is likely more complicated that modeled in this 
thesis. Current research in the expectation field only relates to marketing aspects of expectation and there 
is a gap in the literature that looks more deeply into the process of how expectations are formed, refuted, 
or reinforced in dynamic systems. In addition, the ambiguity process was used for its outputs, however 
this work did not address how those outputs were formed, so this could be a rich area to explore and 
contribute to the existing decision making literature. Finally, the mitigations discussed in the previous 
chapter can be explored in more detail and evaluated for feasibility. As can be seen, while this work 
explored the concept of divergence and developed a functional framework, there are many opportunities 
for further exploration of the divergence concept, framework, and example mitigations.  
While this framework of divergence has been shown to provide insight into flight deck issues, it is not 
restricted to use within the aviation industry. The process model of divergence can be applied to any 
human-machine system such as human-robot interaction in the medical field, nuclear power plant 
operation, or other transportation operations such as rail transport or air traffic control. Divergence can be 
used as a systematic framework to assess patterns in human performance, the findings of which can 
inform safety improvements within these systems.  
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Appendix A: Definitions 
• Abnormal Transition – State transition that is not included in the nominal set of transitions for a 
situation 
• Actual System State – Actual value or trend of actual system state  
• Ambiguity of State Assumption – Level of ambiguity associated with the human state assumption 
• Ambiguity Resolution Process – Process by which ambiguity is resolved when an ambiguous state 
signal is present.  
• Association Process – Process by which each of the set of observations are assessed for 
consistency with the human’s expected observables for a given state 
• Associative Understanding – Understanding of the observables associated with each state of the 
system 
• Decision Making Process – Process by which human state assumption is used to make decisions.  
• Definitive Observable – Observable which must be observed in order to discriminate between 
multiple possible states   
• Event – The occurrence of any of the following in the system:  
o Change in actual state or human state assumption 
o Change in observables, observations or expectation of state 
o Change in situation 
• Execution Process – Process by which decisions are executed 
• Expectation of State – Human expectation of state of system  
• Expectation Process – Process by which an expectation of state is formed, reinforced, or refuted 
• Human State Assumption – Human’s assumption of state of system 
• Human Variables – Variables providing information such as attention, fatigue, workload, 
salience, distraction, and information gathering.  
• Indication System – Process by which observables are provided to the human 
• Observable – Variables whose information could be useful for the user in determining the state of 
the system 
• Observation Process – Process by which each of the observables are observed by the human 
• Observations – The value/trend of observables that were actually observed 
• Situation – Description of contextual variables relevant to the situation including phase of flight, 
position, aircraft configuration, air traffic control clearance, etc. The situation is included in the 
actual state of the system and includes its own observables to provide insight into the situation.  
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• States Consistent with Set of Observations – List of states where the set of observations is 
consistent with the human’s understanding of the system.  
• State Selection Process – Process by which the human state assumption is selected or ambiguity 
is detected.  
• System State(s) of Interest – System state(s) being analyzed for divergence 
• System Understanding – Understanding of the system based on prior experience including flight 
and ground training.  
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Appendix B: Detailed Human Information Processing Model 
of Divergence 
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Appendix C: Assumptions of Human Information 
Processing Model of Divergence 
Assumptions were made throughout the development of human information processing of divergence 
representation. In general, the reader should remember that in operation, uncertainty can exist throughout 
the entire process, affecting both inputs and outputs. Many processes were discussed deterministically, 
however this limitation should be considered when using the model to assess cases in a non-ideal world 
where uncertainty is prominent and results could occur stochastically. Specific assumptions affecting 
individual processes are summarized below.   
Association Process Assumptions 
• The association process is modeled as a director comparator  
• The states used for comparison in the association process may be limited   
• The observables used for comparison in the association process include only the 
observables observed, correctly or incorrectly, in the observation process.  
State Selection Process Assumptions 
• The state selection process is modeled with decision tree logic 
Expectation Process Assumptions 
• The expectation process is modeled with decision tree logic and simple comparison 
• An expectation can only be formed for states which the human has a mental model. 
(Known states versus unknown states) 
Decision Making Processes Assumptions 
• Ambiguity resolution and nominal decision making processes are parallel processes 
The assumptions made in this model above illustrate the boundaries of the model. Decision tree logic and 
simple comparators for the association, determination, and execution processes may be overly simplified 
and not exactly mapped with true dynamics of those systems. Further research can be conducted to 
investigate other hypotheses for modeling of these processes.  
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Appendix D: Accident/Incident Case Studies  (Auto-throttle) 
D1: Accident: Asiana Airlines Flight 214 
 
Figure D- 1. Wreckage of Asiana Flight 214 (National Transportation Safety Board, 2013) 
The accident of Asiana Airlines Flight 214 occurred on July 6, 2013 in San Francisco, California. During 
final approach the crew attempted to descend using FLCH mode, however this caused a mode transition 
to THR, in response the crew retarded throttles manually causing the auto-throttle to revert to a dormant 
HOLD mode.71 In the crew interviews indicated that their assumption during the approach was that the 
auto-throttle system would capture approach speed, however in actuality the auto-throttle had defaulted to 
a dormant mode that maintained throttle position, which had been set to idle power (National 
Transportation Safety Board, 2013). In this case, there was an apparent divergence between the state of 
the auto-throttle in actuality (HOLD mode) and the human state assumption. In this accident, while in 
HOLD mode and throttles at idle, the speed of the aircraft decayed below the pre-set approach airspeed. 
                                                      
71 According to FDR data, the AFCS-initiated forward movement of the thrust levers that began when the 
A/T mode changed to THR was manually overridden, and the thrust levers were moved aft.   
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The analysis of divergence may explain the delayed crew response to this low speed situation. The crew 
eventually noticed the low airspeed, however was not able to recover in time to avoid impacting the sea 
wall short of the runway threshold. 
Event E1: Initiation of Divergence 
Time Impact – 01m 17s 
Actual State HOLD 
Situation Recovery from abnormal use of FLCH that caused THR mode 
on final descent 
Event Trigger Change in actual state 
Divergence Type D-1b: Actual state transitions due to upstream input by the crew 
 
Unknown divergence apparently initiated when the auto-throttle reverted to HOLD mode. This was 
apparently a result of the PF attempting to descend using FLCH. This input caused the auto-throttle to 
transition to THR mode. The PF reduced the throttles in response to this, however this action caused the 
auto-throttle to revert to HOLD mode, unbeknownst to the crew (National Transportation Safety Board, 
2013).  
In this case, because the aircraft was high on the approach already, the HOLD on the FMA was likely 
their only definitive variable at this point. Airspeed information, pitch information, and engine thrust 
feedback were all indefinitive since the aircraft was high and descending to intercept a normal glide path. 
The observables would have been indicative of SPD mode as well as HOLD mode.  
The evidence suggested that the crew did not observe the HOLD on the FMA since no action was taken to 
recover engine control until 7 seconds prior to impact. There were apparently a number of factors 
influencing the observation failure.  The crew could have been distracted with their late checklists and 
unstabilized approach possibly causing them to fixate on the vertical profile. In addition, during the 
initiating mode transition for divergence the crew was still conducting their checklists.72 In addition, 
workload could have been higher than normal due to the lack of a glide slope signal for the approach. The 
                                                      
72 1126:33, the thrust levers reached the idle position, and the A/T mode changed to HOLD. Immediately 
before the A/T mode change occurred, at 1126:32.5, the PM stated, “flight director,” and immediately 
after the change, at 1126:34.0, the PF replied, “check.”  
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PF was also being evaluated which could have put additional pressure on him to recover the vertical 
profile. In addition, the crew’s behavior had indications consistent with behavior under fatigue.73 As 
discussed in other accidents, the HOLD on the FMA has not been shown to be a very salient cue, thus this 
design influence could also have affected the likely missed indication of the single definitive observable.74 
Finally, expectation bias also may have influenced the observation process if the crew held an incorrect 
expectation.  
If the HOLD on the FMA was not observed, the only observations that fed into the association process 
were likely indefinitive indicating the effect of high ambiguity of observables. This failure could have 
been trapped in the state association process if expectation were correct, however an expectation process 
failure was also likely. The behavior of the crew and crew interviews stated that they had expected the 
auto-throttle to capture the mode control panel (MCP) airspeed. This shows a problem with system 
understanding since they did not understand that their actions could have resulted in the aircraft auto-
throttles reverting to HOLD mode. Once this occurred, it’s apparent that the divergence propagated the 
expectation failure.  
                                                      
73 “The PF made several errors that might be attributable, at least in part, to fatigue. These errors included 
his selection of FLCH SPD at 1,550 ft. without remembering that he had already selected the go-around 
altitude in the MCP altitude window less than 1 minute earlier, being slow to understand and respond to 
the observer’s sink rate callouts, not noticing the decrease in airspeed between 500 and 200 ft., and not 
promptly initiating a go-around after he detected the low airspeed condition.  
The PM also made several errors that might be attributable, at least in part, to fatigue. These errors 
included not noticing the PF’s activation of FLCH SPD at 1,550 ft. or subsequent indications on the 
FMA, not ensuring that a “stabilized” callout was made at 500 ft., not noticing the decay in airspeed 
between 500 and 200 ft., and not immediately ensuring a timely correction to thrust was made when he 
detected the low airspeed. “ 
74 During a post accident interview, the PF stated that he considered pressing the FLCH push-button to 
obtain a higher descent rate but could not recall whether he did so or not. When interviewed, none of the 
three flight crewmembers recalled seeing the changes to the A/T mode displayed on each primary flight 
display’s (PFD) flight mode annunciator (FMA) that resulted from the selection of FLCH.  
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Figure D- 2.  Human information processing model for Asiana 214: Event E1 
Event E2: Speed Decay Below MCP Set Airspeed   
Time Impact – 00m 35s 
Actual State HOLD 
Situation Final approach descent 
Event Trigger Change in observables 
 
At 35 seconds prior to impact, the speed decayed below the MCP set airspeed of 137 knots. The HOLD 
on the FMA remained a definitive observable at this event, however more observables also became 
definitive. Airspeed value and airspeed trend, throttle location, pitch attitude, engine parameters all 
became definitive once the airspeed dropped below 137 knots. In addition, pitch forces would have 
increased as the aircraft speed decayed toward stall.75 
Since no change in behavior was apparent, the crew likely continued to miss the FMA indication as well 
as the other definitive observables. The workload, distraction, and fatigue factors remained. Again here, 
the crew was conducting checklists at the time the speed decayed below the MCP speed.76 The design 
                                                      
75 If airspeed decreases below the minimum maneuvering speed, further nose-up pitch trim is inhibited. 
As speed decreases within the amber band’s range, the force required to pull back on the control column 
increases. The pilot may still override the force with increased effort. These features are designed to 
provide a tactile cue that the airspeed is dropping below the minimum maneuvering speed. 
76 1127:15.1 Airspeed drops below MCP-speed; 1127:16.6 PF: "landing checklist"; 1127:17.5 PM: 
"landing checklist complete cleared to land"; 1127:19.8 PM: "on glide path sir" / PAPI WWRR; 
1127:21.2 PF: "check" (National Transportation Safety Board, 2013) 
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issue of salience on the FMA also remained however at this point, the crew had multiple other cues so the 
effect of the design issue could have alleviated if any other observable were actually observed. 
Due to the added definitive observables, it the ambiguity of observables likely alleviated in the 
association process, however this process likely continued to be affected by the observation failure. The 
expectation failure also likely remained due to the divergence feedback into expectation.  
 
Figure D- 3. Human information processing model for Asiana 214: Event E2 
Event E3: Recognition of Speed Decay (Pilot Monitoring) 
Time Impact – 00m 17s 
Actual State HOLD 
Situation Final approach descent 
Event Trigger Change in observation 
 
During post-accident interviews, the PM stated that “at about 200 ft. RA, the airspeed was about 120 
knots; he saw four red lights on the PAPI and thought perhaps the A/T was not working” (National 
Transportation Safety Board, 2013). This indicates a that the PM may have moved into known divergence 
at this point due to a recovery of his observation process failure.  
This recovery of the observation process failure, also likely recovered its downstream effect on the 
association process. In this case, the expectation failure that remained would have been trapped in the 
state selection process for the pilot monitoring.  
It is possible that the PM attempted to verbalize the low airspeed to the PF. Immediately after the 200 ft. 
RA call, the PM stated “it’s low,” and the PF responded, “yeah.” It is unclear however, whether the PM 
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was verbalizing about the low altitude or the low airspeed. Regardless, this verbalization did not appear to 
trigger a transition from unknown to known divergence for the PF.  
 
Figure D- 4. Human information processing model for Asiana 214: Event E3 
It may be debatable however, whether this verbalization reaction was an appropriate decision given the 
gravity of the situation. Immediate recovery action was likely warranted given the low speed of the 
aircraft. Since the PM decided not to take action to recover the aircraft immediately given his observation, 
this could be considered as a failure in the ambiguity resolution process.  
E4: Low Airspeed Alert Annunciates 
Time Impact – 00m 11s 
Actual State HOLD 
Situation Final approach descent 
Event Trigger Change in Observables 
 
Six seconds after the PM reportedly identified that the airspeed was low, an added indication became 
available. The B777 was designed to provide an “AIRSPEED LOW” EICAS message annunciation, 
accompanied by a caution-level aural alert when the airspeed drops below maneuvering speed.77 The 
quadruple chime was recorded on the CVR, 11 seconds prior to impact.  
                                                      
77 “The 777 low airspeed alerting systems include a low airspeed alert and a stick shaker. The low 
airspeed alert is a caution-level alert and occurs when airspeed decreases about 30% below the top of the 
amber band. The visual cues that accompany a low airspeed alert include changing the color of the 
airspeed box on the PFD to amber, displaying an “AIRSPEED LOW” caution message on the EICAS, 
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Since the PM had likely already reached known divergence, it’s possible that this added cue did not 
change the status of his processes. However, it may have helped him to decide to take control of the 
aircraft three seconds later, possibly addressing the ambiguity resolution failure.  
 
Figure D- 5. Human information processing model for Asiana 214: Event E4 
There was no evidence of the PF updating his state assumption, likely until the PM took control of the 
aircraft and went around.  
Event E5: Pilot Monitoring Verbalization of “Speed” and Advances Thrust Levers 
Time Impact – 00m 08s 
Actual State THR 
Situation Transition to go around 
Event Trigger 
Re-convergence Type 
Change in Actual State 
C-3 
 
At 8 seconds prior to impact, the PM stated “speed,” and advanced thrust levers. Since he takes action, 
it’s likely that his expectation updated to reflect the THR expected with the go around. This action would 
have updated the actual state and his state assumption likely resulting in re-convergence.  
                                                                                                                                                                              
and illuminating the master caution lights. The caution-level aural alert (quadruple chime) will also 
sound.” (National Transportation Safety Board, 2013) 
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Figure D- 6. Human information processing model for Asiana 214: Event E5 
Despite recovery actions, the aircraft impacted the seawall short of the runway. Analysis in the report 
suggested that if recovery had been initiated 3 seconds earlier, the accident could have been prevented 
(National Transportation Safety Board, 2013).  
On the topic of whether this accident could have been prevented if checklists were complied with, the PM 
verbalized a 1000 ft. call out, however no stabilized criteria was discussed in response to that call. Thus, it 
is possible that if the crew had complied with stabilized approach criteria that they would have scanned 
the airspeed and recognized that the auto-throttles were not maintaining it.  
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Figure D- 7. Profile view of the final 40 seconds of Asiana Flight 214 (National Transportation Safety Board, 
2013) 
The accident of Asiana 214 exhibited failures in the observation, association, and expectation processes. 
Within observation, the likely crew’s expectation of SPD could have influenced their scanning strategies 
of new information. In addition, the crew could have been experiencing high workload and distraction 
due to their unstabilized approach, late checklists, and a lack of a glide slope. During at least two events 
that could have provided the crew with information regarding the change of state of the aircraft, the crew 
was actively conducting checklists illustrating the effect of this distraction. The report also suggested that 
the crew’s behavior could have been consistent with fatigue effects. In addition, design of the FMA and 
the lack of salience there of, could have also played a part in the observation failure. In addition to the 
observation failure, there was ambiguity in many observables at the beginning of the divergence timeline 
due to a descent. Finally, systems understanding failures were apparent from the crew’s action to use 
FLCH to descend on approach, and illustrated by the confusion verbalized in the cockpit after this action 
and the lack of response to the HOLD mode transition, a likely abnormal transition to the crew. This 
systems understanding problem combined with the perpetuation of divergence once divergence had 
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occurred, likely contributed to the expectation failure not being caught until later in the divergence 
timeline. 
Table D - 1. Summary of information processing failures in Asiana 214 accident 
       Failure 
 
 
Case 
Occurrence of 
Observation Process Failure 
Occurrence of 
Association Process 
Failure 
Occurrence of Expectation 
Process Failure 
Expect-
ation 
Bias 
Dist-
raction 
Work
-load Fatigue 
Design 
Influences 
Associative 
Under-
standing 
Ambiguity 
of 
Observables 
Abnormal 
Transition 
System 
Under-
standing 
Perpetuation 
of 
Divergence 
Asiana 214 x x x (high) no data x  x x x x 
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D2: Incident: Thomsonfly Airlines – Aerodynamic Stall on Landing Approach 
This incident occurred on September 23, 2007 on approach to Bournemouth Airport, Hampshire, UK 
(Department for Transport/Air Accidents Investigation Branch, 2009).  During the final approach segment 
with the auto-throttles engaged in SPD mode and auto-pilot on, the auto-throttle disconnected. This 
disconnection apparently went unnoticed by the crew, despite an aural tone accompanying the disconnect 
which required a manual button press to silence. The crew apparently noticed the low speed and initiated 
a go around. The crew recovered the aircraft, however did suffer an aerodynamic stall when performing 
the missed approach. The data for this analysis was taken from the aircraft’s Quick Access Recorder 
(QAR) and crew interviews. The incident was not reported immediately, thus the FDR and the CVR had 
been overwritten.  
Event E1: Initiation of Divergence 
Time Initiation of Recovery – 01m 04s 
Actual State OFF 
Situation Final approach descent 
Event Trigger Change in actual state 
Divergence Type D-1  
 
The initiation of divergence apparently occurred when the auto-throttle disconnected and the crew did not 
notice this disconnect. The source of the disconnect was not determined. The aircraft was at an altitude of 
approximately 2200 feet on the glide slope but fast on the approach. When the disconnect occurred, the 
crew was configuring the aircraft for landing and the thrust lever was full aft according to the QAR data. 
In the B737, there were a number of indications to the crew regarding this disconnect (Department for 
Transport/Air Accidents Investigation Branch, 2009). The FMA would have transitioned to blank in the 
Auto-throttle mode box. Apparently a continuous aural auto-throttle warning annunciated. A green 
annunciator light beside the auto-throttle switch would have extinguished, and a flashing red A/T P/RST 
autoflight status annunciator on the instrument panel would have illuminated. This panel is shown below.  
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Figure D- 8.  Flashing red A/T P/RST (Department for Transport/Air Accidents Investigation Branch, 2009) 
 
Figure D- 9. Flashing amber A/T P/RST (Department for Transport/Air Accidents Investigation Branch, 
2009) 
Despite a number of definitive observables, of both visual and auditory modality, it appears that these 
indications could have all been missed, since one would have expected the crew to take manual control of 
the throttles if they had recognized the failure. During crew interviews, the captain stated that he didn’t 
notice the auto-throttle failure until he put his checklist down and saw the airspeed. This observation 
failure could have been influenced by a number of different factors. There was not evidence of 
abnormally high workload the crew was facing. Distraction could have played a part since they were 
conducting checklists during the final approach. There were no fatigue issues reported by the pilots. In 
addition, the indications to the crew regarding the disconnect included multiple definitive observables 
thus not indicating a design influence affecting observation. Finally, expectation bias could have been a 
factor. The crew reported not hearing the auto-throttle disconnect tone, which could have been a result of 
the expectation bias since the crew’s comments suggested they expected the auto-throttle to be in SPD 
mode.   
In addition to the apparent observation failure, there could have also been association failures that led to 
this case of divergence. There was apparently ambiguity of observables given that when the auto-throttle 
disconnected, the thrust was at IDLE in order to decay airspeed. This would have been indicative of SPD 
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mode as well as OFF in this case. The report states that “The aircraft’s Indicated Airspeed (IAS) decayed 
in line with crew expectations for an idle thrust approach and this constant deceleration approach masked 
the disengagement of the autothrottle”78 (Department for Transport/Air Accidents Investigation Branch, 
2009). 
In addition to this failure in association, another failure in association could have explained the crew’s 
lack of response to a flashing AT/WARN light. In addition to flashing red in the case of an auto-throttle 
failure, this annunciator will also illuminate with a flashing amber if the auto-throttle is not holding the 
target speed.79 The report also stated that on “approach, with the aircraft decelerating, the caption will 
routinely flash for extended periods” (Department for Transport/Air Accidents Investigation Branch, 
2009). Considering the flashing amber was common, it may have been possible that the crew discounted 
this flashing signal as an observable of value if they considered these nuisance alerts. In this case, it could 
indicate a failure in associative understanding if they did not realize that red flashing was a different 
indication that amber flashing. The alternative to this hypothesis is that expectation bias could have 
manipulated the color of the light when it fed into association or purely the flashing was perceived and 
not the color. Either way – the association process would have likely treated this cue as an ambiguous 
observable. Both failures in ambiguity and associative understanding could have been possible here.  
The combination of failures in the observation, association, and expectation processes likely resulted in 
unknown divergence.  
                                                      
78 The autopilot remained engaged and continued to track both the localizer and the glideslope. The 
aircraft’s speed decayed at about one knot per second, in line with the PF’s expectations for the approach. 
As the speed decreased below 150 kts, flap 25 was selected. The autopilot tracked the glideslope 
accurately, gradually increasing the pitch of the aircraft to minimize glideslope deviation and adjusting 
the stabilizer angle to keep the aircraft in trim. Temporary reductions in pitch were evident during flap 
position transitions.  
79 “There are three conditions when this light will flash; the airspeed is 10 kts above the target speed and 
not decreasing, the airspeed is 5 kts below the target speed and not increasing, or the airspeed has dropped 
to alpha floor (a factor of 1.3 above the stall speed) during a dual channel autopilot approach.” 
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Figure D- 10. Human information processing model for Thomsonfly: Event E1 
Event E2: Speed drops below MCP set airspeed  
Time Initiation of Recovery – 00m 11s 
Actual State OFF 
Situation Final approach descent – Speed below MCP airspeed 
Event Trigger Change in observables 
 
At 11 seconds prior to the initiation of recovery the speed drops below the MCP set airspeed introducing 
a number of definitive observables (Department for Transport/Air Accidents Investigation Branch, 2009). 
Airspeed, airspeed trend, engine parameters, and throttle location could have provided additional 
information to the crew regarding the state of the system. There was no change in behavior, nor any 
verbalization at this point in the approach, so it is not likely that the crew updated their state assumption.  
While the ambiguity of observables may have alleviated at this point, the possible failure in associative 
understanding could have remained indicating a continued association process failure. In addition, there 
was no evidence to suggest that the crew’s expectation had changed during this event. Thus, the 
continuing failures in the observation, association, and expectation processes likely contributed to 
continuing unknown divergence.  
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Figure D- 11. Human information processing model for Thomsonfly: Event E2 
Event E3: Pilot Monitoring Notices Speed Decay  
Time Initiation of Recovery – 00m 00s 
Actual State OFF 
Situation Final approach descent 
Event Trigger Change in observation 
 
The captain, who held PM duties at this point in the timeline, reported in his interview that once he 
completed the landing checklist, he scanned the flight instruments and noticed that the speed had decayed 
to 125 knots.80 Because airspeed was a definitive variable at this time, the possible failure discussed 
previously in associative understanding was likely overcome by definitive information. Thus, this left the 
                                                      
80 The commander stowed the checklist on top of the instrument panel and when he looked down he saw 
an IAS of 125 kt. He called “SPEED”, the PF made a small forward movement with the thrust levers and 
the commander called “I HAVE CONTROL”. The commander moved the thrust levers fully forward and 
called “GO-AROUND FLAP 15 CHECK THRUST”(Department for Transport/Air Accidents 
Investigation Branch, 2009).  
Recorded data shows that, at a CAS of 110 kts and an altitude of 1,540 ft., the autothrottle manual 
disconnect was pressed and the thrust levers moved forward slightly. Within 1.5 seconds the stick-shaker 
(stall warning) activated and in the following two seconds the thrust levers were advanced to the full 
forward position.  
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expectation as the remaining failure. Human information processing model shows that since the airspeed 
information was different from the expectation, this would have resulted in known divergence.  
 
Figure D- 12. Human information processing model for Thomsonfly: Event E3 – Known Divergence 
 
Figure D- 13. Human information processing model for Thomsonfly: Event E3 - Re-convergence 
Event E4: Re-convergence: Initiation of Recovery 
Time Initiation of Recovery – 00m 00s 
Actual State OFF 
Situation Initiation of go around 
Event Trigger Change in actual state 
 
Apparently as the flight descended on the glide path, the autopilot had trimmed the airplane nose up to 
counteract the lack of thrust and stay on the glide path. Thus when the thrust was advanced for recovery, 
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the high nose up trim apparently made recovery difficult ultimately leading to an aerodynamic stall. The 
crew was able to recover the aircraft however, it took 49 seconds to complete the recovery.81  
 
Figure D- 14. Human information processing model for Thomsonfly: Event E4 
Summary 
In the incident of Thomsonfly, there were failures apparent in the observation, association, and 
expectation processes. Since the crew had begun the approach with the auto-throttle in SPD mode, it is 
possible they held this expectation throughout the divergence timeline until known divergence. This 
expectation could have influenced the crew’s scan pattern of new information or not perceive the aural 
auto-throttle disconnect tone. In addition, the crew conducting checklists during divergence timeline, 
which could have distracted them from maintaining speed awareness. In addition, there were design 
influences involving nuisance alerting that could have contributed to the crew possibly disregarding the 
flashing light observable. This adaptation to disregarding the flashing light, could have occurred in 
associative understanding where the observable could have no longer been useful in determining state of 
the system. In addition to this association failure, the speed was high on approach, so idle power was 
expected by the crew for some period of the divergence timeline suggesting an ambiguity of observables. 
Finally, as mentioned prior the expectation was likely propagated by the occurrence of divergence, 
however no evidence of problems with crew system understanding was identified in this incident.    
 
 
                                                      
81 Because the crew initiated recovery above 1000 ft. altitude, the stabilized approach checklist would not 
be expected to have been conducted at this point in the approach. 
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Table D - 2 Summary of information processing failures in Thomsonfly incident 
       Failure 
 
 
Case 
Occurrence of 
Observation Process Failure 
Occurrence of 
Association Process 
Failure 
Occurrence of Expectation 
Process Failure 
Expect-
ation 
Bias 
Dist-
raction 
Work
-load Fatigue 
Design 
Influences 
Associative 
Under-
standing 
Ambiguity 
of 
Observables 
Abnormal 
Transition 
System 
Under-
standing 
Perpetuation 
of 
Divergence 
Thomsonfly 
(Incident) x x   x x x x  x 
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D3: Incident: Tarom Airlines Flight 381 
The incident of Tarom Airlines Flight 381 occurred on September 24, 1994 on an approach to Orly, 
France (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses, 2000). During this accident, a mode transition of the auto-
throttle occurred to a transient flap overspeed condition, apparently causing divergence. The reaction of 
the crew to push forward on the yoke in response to this transition caused an out of trim condition that 
eventually led to a stall and recovery. Divergence could have occurred on multiple channels here however 
the auto-throttle state is chosen as the state of interest.  
Event E1: Initiation of Divergence: A/T mode transition due to flap overspeed 
Time Initiation of Recovery – 01m 09s 
Actual State THR 
Situation Initiation of Go Around 
Event Trigger Change in actual state 
 
The transition of the auto-throttle from SPD to THR mode during the approach was apparently the source 
of divergence. The crew had set the go around altitude into the MCP earlier than normal and when the 
overspeed occurred, the automation transitioned to thrust to climb to that altitude of 4000ft. In this case, 
definitive observables were prevalent such as the FMA, increase in thrust, and increase in engine 
parameters. It was apparent that the crew recognized the abnormal behavior of the aircraft, considering 
they likely had an expectation that the auto-throttle was in SPD mode from when they set it82 (Bureau 
d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses, 2000)  
Workload was likely increased due to the shortened approach path and ILS intercept suggested by ATC. 
Because of this abnormal approach, the autopilot would not automatically capture the glide path. In 
response, the crew disconnected the autopilot and flew with only the auto-throttle engaged. It was stated 
                                                      
82 Captain “Hey! What’s it doing?” The co-pilot said "take over manually". At 10 h 4 m 01 s, the Captain 
 declared "Hey, its doing a go around" (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses, 2000),   
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in the report that crew resource management was an issue in addition to checklists being performed out of 
sequence.83   
However despite, the high workload encountered by the crew, the observation of the mode transition was 
made. If the crew likely believed the aircraft would remain in SPD mode, this expectation would have 
conflicted with the behavior observed by the pilots and likely trapped the divergence in the state selection 
process, apparently triggering known divergence.  
 
Figure D- 15. Human information processing model for Tarom 381: Event E1 
The crew at this point showed confusion regarding the behavior of the automation. Relevant to auto-
throttle awareness, the crew manually manipulated the throttles to retard and later increased84 
 
                                                      
83 “Premature selection of the go around altitude and precipitous setting of the  configuration with slats 
and flaps at 20-20, which led to activation of the speed  protection” Crew showed “Difficulty in 
understanding the action of the auto-throttle increasing thrust in its  overspeed protection function” 
(Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses, 2000)   
84 “To try and explain the first positioning of the throttle levers to maximum thrust, we can propose two 
hypotheses : (a) the Captain, noticing the strong reduction in the VC trend, may have thought that the 
speed was going to decrease significantly. He may have advanced the throttle to avoid stalling,  (b) the 
Captain, noticing the problem in the pitch attitude, which would prevent him from continuing his landing, 
seems to have decided to climb so as to obtain more favorable conditions to deal with the problem“ 
(Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses, 2000)  
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Event E2: Re-convergence: A/THR automatically disconnects – due to loss of AOA data – strong inflight 
drift 
Time Initiation of Recovery – 00m 04s 
Actual State OFF 
Situation Auto-throttle automatically disconnects at high angle of attack 
Event Trigger 
Re-convergence Type 
Change in actual state 
C-1 
 
Approximately 4 seconds prior to the initiation of recovery, the auto-throttle automatically disconnected 
due to loss of angle of attack data, likely due to strong inflight drift corrupting flow over the sensors. If 
the crew believed that the auto-throttle was off, this would have brought the crew into re-convergence. 
However, it is difficult to surmise the crew state assumption due to the confusion verbalized, however 
their recovery procedure following the disconnect was appropriate according to Tarom standards (Bureau 
d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses, 2000).  
 
Figure D- 16. Human information processing model for Tarom 381: Event E2 
Initiation of Recovery occurred 4 seconds later and the recovery process took approximately 30 seconds 
to complete. The crew performed a successful go around and returned for an uneventful landing.  
Summary 
The incident of Tarom 381 showed evidence of observation process failures and expectation process 
failures. The expectation bias of the aircraft remaining in SPD mode could have influenced their scan 
patterns. The crew was apparently distracted by a shortened approach procedure, which likely increased 
their workload as well. In terms of expectation failures, the report suggested that a lack of crew 
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understanding of the envelope protection function could have contributed to their lack of anticipation of 
the mode change. These failures combined resulted in known divergence for some period of this incident.   
Table D - 3. Summary of information processing failures in Tarom 381 incident 
       Failure 
 
 
Case 
Occurrence of 
Observation Process Failure 
Occurrence of 
Association Process 
Failure 
Occurrence of Expectation 
Process Failure 
Expect-
ation 
Bias 
Dist-
raction 
Work
-load Fatigue 
Design 
Influences 
Associative 
Under-
standing 
Ambiguity 
of 
Observables 
Abnormal 
Transition 
System 
Under-
standing 
Perpetuation 
of 
Divergence 
Tarom 381 
(Incident) x x 
x 
(high) no data    x x  
 
In this accident, the dynamics were complex and it is possible that analysis of divergence of the auto-
throttle mode isn’t sufficient for understanding of all impacts of information processing failures. For this 
accident, additional analysis could have been conducted on vertical flight path awareness, vertical auto-
pilot mode, or airspeed. However, the results found for the auto-throttle state did provide some insight 
and can be compared with other cases involving auto-throttle mode awareness.   
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D4: Incident: American Airlines Flight 903 
The incident of American Airlines Flight 903 occurred near West Palm Beach, Florida on May 12, 1997 
(National Transportation Safety Board, 1998). During this case, the crew was flying a holding pattern due 
to adverse weather in the area. During a descent to 16,000 feet, the auto-throttle disconnected, however 
this apparently went unbeknownst to the crew. Upon level-off, the speed decayed to a point where 
aerodynamic stall was imminent. The flying pilot apparently recognized the speed decay prior to the 
point, however the aircraft departed controlled flight. The crew recovered from the stall at approximately 
13,000 ft. altitude.  In this case, the disconnection of the auto-pilot, which went unnoticed by the crew, 
was apparently the initiation of divergence.  
Event E1: Disconnection of Auto-throttle 
Time Initiation of Recovery  - 03m 13s to 00m 46s85  
Actual State OFF 
Situation Descent to 16,000 feet in a holding pattern 
Event Trigger Change in Actual State 
 
The initiation of divergence apparently occurred when the auto-throttle disconnected on the descent. The 
exact time of disconnection was not recorded, however was inferred to be between the last recorded input 
to the auto-throttle 03m13s prior to initiation of recovery and the beginning of level off which was 46s 
prior to recovery. Because no action was taken by the auto-throttle to increase speed during level off 
contrary to what was expected if the auto-throttle was engaged in SPD mode, it was apparent that the 
auto-throttle had disconnected prior to that point at some point during the descent. Since the auto-throttle 
likely disconnected during the descent, the lack of information on the FMA would have been a definitive 
observable of the state of the system. Because the crew stated that they did not notice anything abnormal 
until after level off, it can be considered that the crew missed the FMA observable. In addition, the crew 
was facing high workload due to weather in the area and planning of a possible diversion. This could have 
also led to distraction from performing a normal scan. In addition, during crew interviews the flying pilot 
stated that he had opted to enter the hold manually because he didn’t think there was adequate time to 
                                                      
85 Exact time of autothrottle disconnection was not recorded. The range of times provided are the time of 
last input to auto-throttle to the time of level off where throttle input would have been expected. 
Theoretically, the disconnection could have occurred anywhere in that time frame. 
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“build it into the FMS” (National Transportation Safety Board, 1998). This manual entry to a holding 
pattern, while trained early in a pilot’s career, could have increased his workload as well as he may have 
had to remember the details of the entry if he hadn’t completed a manual hold entry recently. No 
definitive fatigue conclusion was provided in the report. Finally, the crew likely held an expectation that 
the auto-throttle was in speed mode as they had initiated the descent with that mode engaged (as they 
reported in their post-incident interview). It is possible that this expectation influenced their scan 
strategies for gathering new information.  
As mentioned, the only definitive variable to the crew was the FMA, however many indefinitive 
observables existed and rendered ambiguous due to the descent. Idle thrust, throttle location, airspeed, all 
could have been indicative of either SPD mode or the failed auto-throttle OFF mode.  
 
Figure D- 17. Human information processing model for American 903: Event E1 
Event E2: Level off of Descent  
Time Initiation of Recovery – 00m 46s 
Actual State OFF 
Situation Level off at 16,000 feet in a holding pattern 
Event Trigger Change in Observables 
 
At 46 seconds prior to the initiation of recovery, the aircraft leveled off at 16,000 feet and more 
observables became definitive indications of an auto-throttle failure. These included the lack of engine 
thrust, the lack of throttle moving forward, speed decay and progress below the MCP set speed of 210 
knots. It appears however that these indications were missed as well. This is inferred from the lack of 
crew response but also the crew’s report during the post-incident interview. The PF stated he noticed the 
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speed decay sometime following level off. At this point, the ambiguity of observables had alleviated since 
more definitive observables were available, however expectation likely continued to hold strong.  
 
Figure D- 18. Human information processing model for American 903: Event E2 
Event E3: PF notices speed  
Time Initiation of Recovery – 00m 06s 
Actual State OFF 
Situation Level at 16,000 feet in a holding pattern 
Event Trigger Change in Observations 
 
At approximately 6 seconds prior to the initiation of recovery, the pilot flying reports noticing that the 
speed had decayed below 210 knots.86 In his interview, he stated that he thought that the auto-throttle was 
not holding airspeed.87 Because of this insight, it is possible that this point in the timeline could have 
signified both known divergence and re-convergence. The observation process failure had recovered and 
recovered the association process as well. With these processes uncorrupted, the expectation process 
failure was likely trapped in the state selection process when the expectation was inconsistent with the 
states consistent with the observation.  
                                                      
86 Because the situation was in a holding pattern, there were not necessarily procedures the crew missed 
that would have cued them to the auto-throttle failure.  
87 The PF mentioned “Sorry about the speed” to the PM once he recognized the divergence. (National 
Transportation Safety Board, 1998) 
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Figure D- 19. Human information processing model for American 903: Event E3 – Known Divergence 
 
Figure D- 20. Human information processing model for American 903: Event E3 – Re-convergence 
Event E4: PF pushes throttles forward to recover 
Time Initiation of Recovery  - 00m 00s 
Actual State OFF 
Situation Level at 16,000 feet in a holding pattern 
Event Trigger Actual State Transition 
 
Upon recognizing that the auto-throttle wasn’t functioning as expected, the flying pilot pushed the 
throttles forward manually to recover from the low energy situation.88 This recovery however, was too 
late and the aircraft stalled and departed controlled flight 9 seconds later. It took 41 seconds for the 
recovery to complete successfully.  
                                                      
88 “FO said he pushed up the throttles because auto-throttles were not responding to maintain 210 knots 
and the trend arrow did not go up as it should“ (National Transportation Safety Board, 1998) 
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Figure D- 21. Human information processing model for American 903: Event E4 
Summary 
In the incident of American 903, failures in the observation, association, and expectation processes were 
apparent. Since the crew likely held an expectation of the auto-throttle being in SPD mode since they had 
set it prior, it’s possible that this expectation caused them to rely on this expectation and not scan the 
flight instruments effectively. In addition the crew were likely distracted with high workload due to the 
weather in the area and planning for a possible diversion. Finally, the FMA indication could have had 
salience issues in notifying the crew of an auto-throttle disconnection. Situationally, many observables 
were indefinitive due to the descent, and only became definitive during level off. The was not evidence of 
problems with crew understanding of systems, however the expectation failure was likely propagated by 
the divergence.  
Table D - 4. Summary of information processing failures in American 903 incident 
       Failure 
 
 
Case 
Occurrence of 
Observation Process Failure 
Occurrence of 
Association Process 
Failure 
Occurrence of Expectation 
Process Failure 
Expect-
ation 
Bias 
Dist-
raction 
Work
-load Fatigue 
Design 
Influences 
Associative 
Under-
standing 
Ambiguity 
of 
Observables 
Abnormal 
Transition 
System 
Under-
standing 
Perpetuation 
of 
Divergence 
American 
903 
(Incident) 
x x x (high)  x  x x  x 
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D5: Accident: China Airlines Flight 140 
The accident of China Airlines Flight 140 occurred on April, 26, 1994 in Nagoya, Japan (Aircraft 
Accident Investigation Commission - Ministry of Transport, 1996). During this case, the flying pilot 
apparently inadvertently activated TOGA mode during final approach descent, likely initiating 
divergence. Despite recognizing the error almost immediately, the crew continued to show behavior of 
confusion and inappropriate decision actions. One of these inappropriate actions initiated with the 
engagement of the autopilot. The autopilot attempting to Go Around combined with the pilot’s forward 
yoke pressure caused an out of trim position and eventually when Go Around did occur, the aircraft 
pitched up uncontrollably and the aircraft stalled. It impacted the ground in a stalled condition.  
Event E1: Initiation of Divergence: Activation of TOGA 
Time Impact  - 01m 40s 
Actual State THR 
Situation Final Approach Descent 
Event Trigger Actual State Transition 
 
The initiation of divergence apparently occurred when the flying pilot (F/O) inadvertently activated the 
Go Around  (GO) Lever on approach to the runway.89 This action caused the auto-throttles to transition 
                                                      
89 “It is considered that the F/O may have mistaken the GO lever for the AT disconnect push button in an 
attempt to change the ATS into manual thrust, or that he tried to move the thrust levers to control the 
thrust and thereby inadvertently triggered the GO lever. The reasons why are not clear, but, at any rate, he 
inadvertently triggered the GO lever” The GO lever of the A300-600R type aircraft is positioned below 
the thrust lever knob. The direction that the GO lever is operated in is the same as the direction in which 
the thrust lever is retarded, or as the same direction that the fingers move when gripping the thrust lever 
knob. With this arrangement, the possibility exists for an inadvertent activation of the GO lever during 
normal operation of the thrust levers  It is recognized that the F/O (P/F) triggered the GO lever at 1114:05 
, judging from the following: the increase in engine thrust starting at 1114:05, as recorded on DFDR; the 
CAP's (PNF) utterance at 1114:06, the sound of LANDING CAPABILITY CHANGE at 1114:09, the 
CAP's caution at 1114:10, and the F/O’s response at 1114:11, all of which were recorded on CVR.” 
(Aircraft Accident Investigation Commission - Ministry of Transport, 1996)  
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from SPD mode into THR mode. This transition would have been indicated by a change in the FMA, 
engine noise and parameters increasing, and corresponding effect on the flight path. The FMA and engine 
parameters would have likely been definitive observables at this point.  
According to verbalization from the PNF (Captain) the observables were apparently recognized.90 No 
apparent failures in association were identified. However, there was likely an expectation failure since the 
pilot did not intend to trigger TOGA, he likely would have expected that the aircraft would have remained 
in SPD mode. This discrepancy between expectation and the observables would have likely have been 
trapped in the state selection process and triggered known divergence. 
 
Figure D- 22. Human information processing model for China 140: Event E1 
Event E2. Disconnection of the Auto-Throttle by the First Officer 
Time Impact  - 01m 37s 
Actual State OFF 
Situation Final Approach Descent  
Event Trigger Change Actual State 
 
Following the recognition that thrust was increasing, the pilot flying responded by disconnecting the auto-
throttle and retarding throttles. This caused a change in the state of the auto-throttles to an off mode. 
Given that the first officer performed this action, it is reasonable to assume that his expectation also 
updated to reflect this action, which could have forced re-convergence in terms of auto-throttle state. This 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
90 The report “considered that at 1114:06 the CAP said "EH. EH. AH," on seeing the display change on 
the FMA” (Aircraft Accident Investigation Commission - Ministry of Transport, 1996)  
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was likely true for the pilot flying (First officer), however there is no evidence on the captain’s state 
assumption at this point.  
  
Figure D- 23. Human information processing model for China 140: Event E2 
Following this action, much confusion ensued in the cockpit. The crew’s behavior showed much 
confusion and inappropriate resource management throughout the divergence timeline, however the main 
actions the crew took are discussed in this thesis.91 The first of these actions include the engagement of 
the autopilot in response to the TOGA activation. It was not determined why the crew engaged the 
autopilot, however it appeared that they could have expected to use it to use LAND mode to override the 
Go Around mode.92 The FDR indicated that the crew attempted to activate LAND mode 47 seconds prior 
to impact (Aircraft Accident Investigation Commission - Ministry of Transport, 1996). 
                                                      
91 At 1059:04 and 1113:14, the CAP (PNF) read out the approach checklist and the landing checklist at 
the request of the F/O (PF), but these were not performed in the proper manner because the CAP (PNF) 
read the items only to himself, including those to which the CAP and F/O (PF) should responded together. 
The FCOM 2.03.18 (page 3) stipulates under the title of "STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES - 
STANDARD/APPROACH" that if the speed exceeds VAPP +10 Kts. or becomes less than V APP -5 
Kts., or if the aircraft deviates a dot or more from the glide slope during an approach, the PNF should call 
out the fact. At 1114:17, the aircraft deviated more than a dot upward from the glide slope, and speed 
decreased to less than -5 Kts. from the VAPP of 140 KCAS as the aircraft continued approach. Despite 
this, the CAP did not call out these facts as PNF (Aircraft Accident Investigation Commission - Ministry 
of Transport, 1996). 
92 “The reason why either the CAP or the FIO engaged the APs may have been that the crew intended to 
regain the normal glide path by selecting LAND mode and engaging the AP” “In order to disengage GO 
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Event E3. Initiation of alpha floor 
Time Impact  - 00m 48s 
Actual State THR 
Situation Alpha Floor Initiates  
Event Trigger Change in Observables 
 
The activation of the auto-pilot in Go around mode and the manual thrust reduced, eventually caused a 
speed decay to the point that alpha floor initiated 48 seconds prior to impact. This resulted in the auto-
throttle transitioning to THR mode. An observation was apparently made by the PF (F/O) who reported 
that “Sir, throttle latched again" after presumably observing the THR-L on the FMA(Aircraft Accident 
Investigation Commission - Ministry of Transport, 1996). As observed, this action appeared unexpected 
by the crew93 and likely resulted in known divergence due to the conflict between observations and 
expectation in the state selection process.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
AROUND mode, both lateral mode and longitudinal mode (except LAND mode) must be selected. Direct 
access to the LAND mode button cannot disengage GO AROUND mode (by selection of either lateral or 
longitudinal mode a display of GO AROUND on FMA will turn off). However, judging that GO 
AROUND mode still remained engaged, it is estimated that what the crew's operation on FCU was not 
correct procedure to disengage it : he must only have pulled LAND mode button. And also, taking into 
account that the CAP said "I, that LAND mode?" at 111458, the CAP seemed to have intended to 
disengage the GO AROUND mode and select LAND mode. The procedure for performing an approach 
by disengaging GO AROUND mode once engaged and then engaging LAND mode is unusual in the final 
phase of approach. However, the fact that the crew did not change modes as intended seems to have been 
due to their lack of understanding of the Automatic Flight System (AFS).” (Aircraft Accident 
Investigation Commission - Ministry of Transport, 1996). 
93 “The CAP (PF) said, "What's the matter with this? Damn it, how comes like this?" It is considered that 
the CAP's words expressed his puzzlement that the nose-up tendency was continuing, even though he had 
pushed the control wheel fully forward and decreased thrust.” (Aircraft Accident Investigation 
Commission - Ministry of Transport, 1996). 
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Figure D- 24. Human information processing model for China 140: Event E3 
Summary 
During the accident of China Airlines Flight 140, failures in observation and expectation of auto-throttle 
state were found. There was evidence of distraction, once divergence occurred due to the crew attempting 
to maintain the glide path and control of the aircraft. Workload was also likely high for these same 
reasons of the unstabilized approach.  
Table D - 5. Summary of information processing failures in China Airlines Flight 140 accident 
       Failure 
 
 
Case 
Occurrence of 
Observation Process Failure 
Occurrence of 
Association Process 
Failure 
Occurrence of Expectation 
Process Failure 
Expect-
ation 
Bias 
Dist-
raction 
Work
-load Fatigue 
Design 
Influences 
Associative 
Under-
standing 
Ambiguity 
of 
Observables 
Abnormal 
Transition 
System 
Under-
standing 
Perpetuation 
of 
Divergence 
China 
Airlines 
140  
x x (high) no data    x   
 
Ultimately, this analysis of the accident provided insight regarding the complexity of these types of 
accidents. Divergence in auto-throttle state was not necessarily the only channel of divergence, and it is 
possible that other channels could provide more information regarding the breakdowns seen in this 
accident such as autopilot mode or airspeed. It does not appear that the analysis of only auto-throttle state 
was sufficient here. An analysis of autopilot mode for example would have uncovered a number of 
systems understanding problems underlying expectation such as the lack of understanding of when how 
the Go Around mode could be disconnected.  
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D6: Accident: Air France Flight 72 
The accident of Air France Flight 72 occurred on September 13, 1993 in Tahiti (Bureau d’Enquêtes et 
d’Analyses, 1999). In this accident, during the final approach into the airport, the automation transitioned 
to go around at the end of descent point along the approach. This transition was apparently unexpected by 
the crew. The crew responded by attempting to disconnect the auto-pilot and when that did not have an 
effect, the PF elected to manually hold the throttles aft. Upon landing, it appears that his hand slipped off 
of one of the throttles and it proceeded to advance upon touchdown. This caused spoilers to deploy 
unevenly and created a lateral force on the aircraft. Ultimately, this resulted in the aircraft departing the 
runway.  
Event E1: Transition of A/T to THR at the End of Descent Point 
Time Impact94 – 00m 57s  
Actual State THR 
Situation Final approach descent 
Event Trigger Change in Actual State 
 
At the end of descent point on the approach, at approximately 500 feet MSL, the automation transitioned 
into a go around mode (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses, 1999). This transition was apparently triggered 
because the automation was not disconnected prior to the end of descent point, as the automation assumes 
that if disconnection hasn’t occurred, then a missed approach must be conducted.95 The feedback to the 
crew regarding this transition appeared to be salient. Engine thrust advanced, speed increased, and 
altitude increased essentially de-stabilizing the flight path. Considering there is a delay for engine 
spooling, the crew for a few seconds would only have the FMA and flight director cues as an indication.  
                                                      
94 In this accident, impact was considered the time of departure from the runway on landing roll.  
95 It is part of the design of the automatic flight system that if the End of Descent point is reached with the 
system still active, the automatic flight system concludes  that the visual approach has not occurred and, 
therefore, the missed approach procedure must be applied.  (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses, 1999). 
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An observation failure could have occurred if the crew missed the two definitive observables in those few 
seconds. There was likely an expectation failure considering the crew’s confusion later indicated they 
apparently did not expect the auto-throttle to transition to THR at this point. This combination of 
observation and expectation failure could have resulted in a brief period of unknown divergence.  
 
Figure D- 25. Human information processing model for Air France 72: Event E1 
Event E2: The PNF calls “Thrust Reference VNAV Speed” 
Time Impact – 00m 54s  
Actual State THR 
Situation Final approach descent 
Event Trigger Change in Observation 
 
At 3 seconds following the automation transition, the PNF calls “Thrust Reference VNAV Speed.” This 
specific verbiage indicates observation of the FMA. Considering this recovery of the observation process 
and the call out of the state of the actual system. It is possible that the crew transitioned through known 
divergence to re-convergence during this time, however the PNF stated in interviews following the 
accident that he “made the call-out (notably, Thrust Reference)… as prescribed by the instructions, but in 
a mechanical fashion, without analyzing the content of the message” (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses, 
1999). With this information, the evidence could suggest the lack of full re-convergence at this point in 
the timeline.  
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Figure D- 26. Human information processing model for Air France 72: Event E2 
Event E3: PF states “OK, Disconnect” –  
Time Impact – 00m 33s  
Actual State THR 
Situation Final approach descent 
Event Trigger Change in Human State Assumption 
 
Just prior to 33 seconds prior to impact, the states his confusion and says “I haven’t got 
(incomprehensible word)”. Then the PF added “What’s happening? Oh yeah, it’s because.” At 33 seconds 
prior to impact, he states “OK, disconnect” without further elaboration (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses, 
1999).. This conversation could have indicated that the PF attempted to disconnect the auto-pilot (which 
had been disconnected prior to initiation of the approach) or a command to disconnect the auto-throttle. It 
was not determined what the PF meant by this statement. The communication between the crew was 
noted in the report to be an issue. It mentioned the lack of several required call-outs throughout the 
approach that could have prevented the accident.96   
                                                      
96 The following are examples stated in the report regarding crew procedure compliance and 
communication (a) “At 21 h 04 min 17 s, when the PNF called out « Thrust reference VNAV Speed », the 
PF should have acknowledged and commented on this call-out. He did not. Here, they missed an 
opportunity to understand what was happening.  (b) The PF did not indicate that the throttle controls were 
tending to move forward, although this is information that is of fundamental importance. All he said was 
“I dunno what’s happening . . . oh yeah, because,” which, in reality, amounts to a meaningless message. 
What is more, this message failed to elicit a response from the captain, if indeed he heard it.  (c) 
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Following this statement the PF apparently retards the throttles manually and maintains them in IDLE 
position for the remainder of the approach. 
During this event, it was clear that while some observables may continue to have been missed, the crew 
was aware that the engines were advancing thrust. It appears that there could have been an associative 
understanding failure due to the inability of the crew to associate this behavior with a certain state. It 
could be that associative understanding was outputting no states that were consistent with the 
observations if the crew did not include this possibility in their repository for this situation. Since 
expectation could have been disregarded at this point due to the confusion, it wouldn’t have factored into 
the observation or the state selection process. If these indeed occurred, the failure in associative 
understanding likely continued the known divergence. In addition the incorrect choice of action could 
indicate a failure in the ambiguity resolution process as well.  
 
Figure D- 27. Human information processing model for Air France 72: Event E3 
Since the throttles were held in IDLE manually, apparently the PF’s hand slipped of the Engine number 1 
thrust lever when he was repositioning his hands to activate the thrust reversers immediately and the auto-
throttle proceeded to advance Engine 1 (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses, 1999). This occurred 
approximately 2 seconds prior to touchdown. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Similarly, the message « OK . . . disconnect . . . » is not explicit. He should have said specifically that it 
was the autothrottle control that needed to be disconnected (there are numerous such utterances on the 
CVR in which the copilot does not finish his sentences). Here again, the captain did not respond to the 
request.  (d) Following touchdown, the PNF did not make the required call-outs, and the PF did not 
comment on this matter.”  (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses, 1999). 
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Event E4: Following touchdown, auto-throttles automatically disconnect 
Time Impact – 00m 19s  
Actual State OFF 
Situation Final approach descent 
Event Trigger Change in Actual State 
 
The aircraft touched down on the runway 21 seconds before impact, and the auto-throttles disconnected, 
as designed, 2 seconds following touchdown. This event triggered a change in actual state, however the 
crew behavior in this case continued to show confusion. The report indicated that the crew did not 
recognize the high thrust level of Engine No 1 (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses, 1999).. The report 
suggested that both pilots were focused outside and this distraction contributed to the observation failure 
of the Engine No.1 thrust.  
Their verbalization also indicated confusion about why the aircraft was behaving the way it was. It is 
possible that this scenario was not accounted for in their associative understanding. If that were the case, 
there would be no states that were consistent with the observations they did perceive of the aircraft which 
appeared to be the asymmetric moment which they apparently attributed to a lack of thrust reverser 
deployment.97 While this was true, the reason the thrust reverser on Engine No. 1 didn’t deploy was 
because it was producing full thrust.  
Thus, the failure in observation and association may not have yielded enough information for the crew to 
determine a state of the auto-throttle if the result of the association process did not produce any possible 
states. 
                                                      
97 At 21 h 04 min 59 s, and 21 h 05 min 11 s, there were several utterances regarding the thrust reversers, 
ending with “great, one of the reversers isn’t kicking in” from the PF. (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses, 
1999). 
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Figure D- 28. Human information processing model for Air France 72: Event E4 
The aircraft eventually taxied off the side of the runway and ended in a bank of shallow water. Full re-
convergence was not apparent in this case.98 
Summary 
In the Air France 72 accident, there was evidence of observation, association, and expectation process 
failures. The observation failures included some aspects of distraction of controlling the asymmetric 
thrust of the aircraft on the ground in addition to possible fatigue. There could have been failures in 
associative understanding as it appeared that the crew had trouble identifying the state of the system with 
the cues they observed. Finally, expectation process failures were also apparent. Problems with system 
understanding was shown by the lack of anticipation of the transition to TOGA at the end of the descent 
point. In this case, because the crew reached known divergence almost immediately, the perpetuation of 
divergence through confirmation of expectation was not apparent here. It did not appear that the crew 
held a clear expectation after the initiating mode transition occurred.  
Table D - 6. Summary of information processing failures in Air France 72 accident 
       Failure 
 
 
Case 
Occurrence of 
Observation Process Failure 
Occurrence of 
Association Process 
Failure 
Occurrence of Expectation 
Process Failure 
Expect-
ation 
Bias 
Dist-
raction 
Work
-load Fatigue 
Design 
Influences 
Associative 
Under-
standing 
Ambiguity 
of 
Observables 
Abnormal 
Transition 
System 
Under-
standing 
Perpetuation 
of 
Divergence 
Air France 
072  x  x  x  x x  
 
                                                      
98 No data was available in the report regarding point of unrecoverability for this accident 
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D7: Accident: Indian Airlines Flight 605  
The accident of Indian Airlines Flight 605 occurred on February 14, 1990 in Bangalore, India (Ministry 
of Civil Aviation, 1990). During the localizer approach into Bangalore, the crew was using the auto-
throttle and auto-flight system to maintain control of the speed and flight path. Due to an input of a 700 ft. 
altitude into the MCP altitude, the autoflight system initiated an descent in the IDLE – Open Descent 
mode, which did not incorporate speed protection. The crew apparently recognized the IDLE approach 
and attempted to address it by turning off a flight director. However, both flight directors needed to be 
turned off in order for the auto-throttle system to take over in SPD mode. The airspeed decayed until 
Alpha Floor initiated just short of the runway. However, this was not enough time to recover and the 
aircraft impacted the ground.  
Event E1: Initiation of Divergence 
Time Impact – 00m 35s  
Actual State IDLE 
Situation Final Approach Descent 
Event Trigger 
Divergence Type 
Change in Actual State 
D-3: Both human state assumption and actual state transition 
 
The apparent initiation of divergence occurred when the PNF tuned in 700 feet into the MCP altitude box. 
The altitude of 700 feet was well below field elevation. The reason for this action was debated within the 
investigative community (Ministry of Civil Aviation, 1990).. The report suggested that “the most 
probable cause for the engagement of idle/open descent mode was that instead of selecting a vertical 
speed of 700 feet per minute, the PNF had inadvertently selected an altitude of 700 feet (the vertical speed 
and altitude selection knobs of the Flight Control Unit (FCU) are close to each other). The altitude of 700 
feet that got selected in this manner was lower than the aircraft altitude at that time and therefore the 
aircraft had gone into idle/open descent mode” (Ministry of Civil Aviation, 1990)99 If this was the cause 
                                                      
99 The other hypotheses for this action included:(a) “The PNF dialed the wrong (Altitude) knob (thinking 
that he dialed the Vertical Speed knob) resulting in the selection of a lower altitude. It was probable that 
he wanted to select go around altitude but the words just told to him by the PF regarding vertical speed, 
influenced his action and thus he selected the altitude of 700 feet without realizing that he selected the 
wrong altitude.” And (2) The PNF first selected a higher altitude towards missed approach alt. of 6000 
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of the engagement of the IDLE mode, it would have been the result of a slip, where the PNF apparently 
activated the wrong knob when intending to set the vertical speed mode. This slip however would have 
updated the expectation to update to the result of the intended action – which was that the auto-throttle 
remained in SPD mode however the actual state updated to reflect the actual action and transitioned to 
IDLE mode.  
Considering a descent was expected at this point, the IDLE on the FMA was the only definitive 
observable available to the crew at this point. Crew behavior indicated that they did not notice this 
indication immediately. It’s possible that an expectation of SPD prevailed and influenced the crew’s scan 
of new information. There was also the possibility that the crew was distracted with configuring the 
aircraft for a visual approach. While the report suggested that the crew was not affected by fatigue, crew 
verbalization indicated the possibility that the crew could have been overwhelmed in the situation and 
was having trouble interacting with the FCU. In this accident, the FMA, while missed during this event, 
was eventually observed.  
Ambiguity in the dynamic variables was also apparent until the speed dropped below Vapp suggesting 
evidence for an association failure. And as mentioned prior, an expectation of SPD mode could have 
prevailed when they initiated the descent.  
 
Figure D- 29. Human information processing model for Indian 605: Event E1 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
feet and then realizing that this would activate Open Climb, immediately reversed the alt knob to a lower 
altitude by a wrist flick which caused the aircraft to go to Idle Open descent" (Ministry of Civil Aviation, 
1990). 
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Event E2. Airspeed drops below Vapp of 132 knots.  
Time Impact – 00m 28s  
Actual State IDLE 
Situation Final Approach Descent 
Event Trigger Change in Observables 
 
Once the airspeed drops below Vapp, more definitive observables become available to the crew. These 
include the low airspeed, decreasing airspeed trend, and low engine thrust. In this Airbus A320, the thrust 
levers were non-moving thus the cue of the thrust lever movement was not available to this crew. The 
behavior of the crew however did not indicate that they observed this new information. Thus it appeared 
that the observation failure continued. The association failure of ambiguity of observables was likely 
alleviated by appearance of more definitive observables. However, the crew likely continued to hold a 
false expectation of SPD mode. Thus, with the observation and expectation failures, unknown divergence 
appeared to continue.  
 
Figure D- 30. Human information processing model for Indian 605: Event E2 
Event E3: PNF notices IDLE 
Time Impact – 00m 24s  
Actual State IDLE 
Situation Final Approach Descent 
Event Trigger Change in Observation 
 
At 24 seconds prior to impact, the PNF commented, “You are descending on idle open descent, ha, all 
this time” (Ministry of Civil Aviation, 1990). This comment suggests that the crew noticed the IDLE on 
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the FMA and updated their state assumption to reflect that. This re-convergence could have occurred 
through one event or multiple cycles through the process transitioning first to known divergence and then 
re-convergence. If the crew entered known divergence first, it suggests that the observation provided cues 
conflicting with the expectation and the failure was trapped in the state selection process. Likely, in the 
next cycle through, without an expectation- the crew likely deducted that the auto-throttle was in IDLE 
mode, reaching re-convergence.    
 
Figure D- 31. Human information processing model for Indian 605: Event E3 – Known Divergence 
 
Figure D- 32. Human information processing model for Indian 605: Event E3 – Re-convergence 
Event E4: PF Disconnects his Flight Director 
Time Impact – 00m 23s  
Actual State IDLE 
Situation Final Approach Descent 
Event Trigger Change in Human State Assumption 
 
In response to the throttles being in IDLE, the PF turns off his flight director 23 seconds prior to impact. 
This action showed some understanding of the system, however also highlights gaps in the pilots’ system 
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understanding. In reality, when the auto-pilot is off and BOTH flight directors are off, the autothrottle will 
transition to speed mode, however by only turning off one flight director the auto-throttle remained in 
IDLE mode.100 The PNF appeared to question the PF regarding this 2 seconds later. He states “You want 
the flight directors off now?"  The PF responds, "Yes.  OK, I already put it off." PNF comments "But you 
did not put off mine" (Ministry of Civil Aviation, 1990). No action to was taken by the PNF to turn off his 
flight director after this conversation.101  
In addition to the system understanding and expectation failure, it appears that the observables indicating 
IDLE Open Descent (same as Event E2) were missed due to the lack of response to the low energy state. 
The combination of the expectation failure and the observation failure apparently result in re-development 
of the unknown divergence.  
                                                      
100 “Turning off BOTH flight directors (with Auto-pilot disengaged) will cause the FMGS vertical and 
lateral modes to be removed from the Primary Flight Display guidance, the FMA vertical and lateral 
annunciations to blank out, and the auto-thrust mode will go to Speed Mode using the FMGS target speed 
(Vapp). Turning off only one of the Flight Directors will cause the flight director steering commands to 
be removed from that side display, however, since auto-flight guidance is still active (since one pilot still 
had an active Flight Director), the auto-thrust mode will remain in the current active mode (Idle Descent 
for Flight 605).” (Ministry of Civil Aviation, 1990). 
101 The Board of Inquiry provided an analysis of what might have occurred (a) "The (right seat pilot) was 
the PNF, it was his task to have switched off both FDs.  Further, in FCOM chapter 3.02.01 page 3 it has 
been stated that "procedures will be initiated on (PF) command.  PNF – Pilot-non-flying is responsible for 
execution of required action or request for execution by PF, if applicable."  …...  In this case (the PNF), 
instead of putting off both FDs merely asked (the PF)." (b) "It appears that even after saying that, (the 
PNF) still did not put off his own (right side) FD as revealed by the DFDR parameters."(c)"Since the 
auto-thrust did not change to speed mode, by inference, it is to be concluded that at least one FD remained 
ON.  Since it is known from CVR that PF switched off the FD1, therefore it has to be concluded that FD2 
remained on." (Ministry of Civil Aviation, 1990). 
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Figure D- 33. Human information processing model for Indian 605: Event E4 
Event E5: Initiation of Alpha Floor 
Time Impact – 00m 08s  
Actual State THR 
Situation Initiation of Alpha Floor 
Event Trigger Change in Actual State 
 
At 8 seconds prior to impact, the speed decayed to the point that Alpha Floor protection was activated. 
This caused the automation to advance thrust. It is likely that the observables tied to this transition were 
salient to the crew. These would include increase in engine noise and thrust values in addition to a change 
in the FMA. If the crew did observe these cues, this would have indicated a recovery of the observation 
process leaving only the expectation process failure. The discrepancy between these two would have 
likely caused known divergence. This is supported by the PF comment one second after Alpha Floor 
initiation, “Hey, we are going down” (Ministry of Civil Aviation, 1990). At this point, the PF advanced 
throttles forward. This action had no effect due to the activation of Alpha Floor, indicating that while he 
recognized there was something wrong, he may not have been converged.  It is possible that on his next 
cycle through human information processing, he may have recognized the auto-throttle state, however 
there is no evidence on this.  
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Figure D- 34. Human information processing model for Indian 605: Event E5 – Known Divergence 
 
Figure D- 35. Human information processing model for Indian 605: Event E5 – Re-convergence 
Despite these recovery actions, the aircraft impacted the ground short of the runway.102,103 
Summary 
Indian Airlines 605 showed evidence of observation, association, and expectation process failures. It is 
possible that an incorrect expectation of SPD affected the crew’s scan patterns exhibiting expectation 
bias. It was also possible that the crew was distracted by setting up the automation for their visual 
approach. For a small period of time, there were likely ambiguous observables due to excess airspeed. 
Finally, there was evidence of problems with crew understanding of the system, such as the effect of the 
                                                      
102 The report stated that “At that time of 316 or for that matter even up to 320 seconds, if the thrust levers 
had been moved up to TOGA this aircraft would have survived” (Ministry of Civil Aviation, 1990). 
Impact occurred at 328 seconds. 
103 It may have been possible that had the crew complied with stabilized approach criteria that they would 
have aborted the approach prior to it becoming unrecoverable.  
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operation of a single FD on the auto-throttle system. These combined failures likely contributed the case 
of unknown divergence seen in this accident.   
Table D - 7. Summary of information processing failures in Indian Airlines 605 accident 
       Failure 
 
 
Case 
Occurrence of 
Observation Process Failure 
Occurrence of 
Association Process 
Failure 
Occurrence of Expectation 
Process Failure 
Expect-
ation 
Bias 
Dist-
raction 
Work
-load Fatigue 
Design 
Influences 
Associative 
Under-
standing 
Ambiguity 
of 
Observables 
Abnormal 
Transition 
System 
Under-
standing 
Perpetuation 
of 
Divergence 
Indian Air 
605 x x     x x x x 
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D8: Accident: American Airlines Flight 965 
The accident of American Airlines Flight 965 occurred on December 20, 1995 near Cali, Colombia 
(Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Columbia, 1995). In this case, on approach into Cali, the crew 
accepted a runway change that significantly shortened their approach. While reconfiguring the FMS, the 
crew apparently inadvertently selected the incorrect waypoint into the FMS, which was considered the 
initiation of divergence. This resulted in the aircraft executing a left turn during the approach descent. 
About a minute later, the crew showed confusion regarding their location and made a turn back to the 
right. However, the aircraft had crossed a mountain range during the initial lateral deviation and the turn 
back to the right, combined with the descent had resulted in the aircraft impacting the mountain range. 
Using the waypoint set in FMS as the state of interest, divergence apparently occurred when the incorrect 
waypoint was set in the FMS. Known divergence was indicated by the confusion verbalized by the crew, 
but there was no evidence of re-convergence in this case.  
 
Figure D- 36. Depiction of  lateral profile for AA 965 
(http://code7700.com/mishap_american_airlines_965.html) 
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Event E1: Initiation of Divergence – Setting of ROMEO into FMS 
Time Impact – 03m 27s  
Actual State FMS – Waypoint ROMEO 
Situation On approach into Cali, Colombia  
Event Trigger Change in Actual State 
 
In this case, divergence likely occurred when the crew apparently inadvertently set ROMEO into their 
FMS when intending to set ROZO. In order to recognize the mistake, they would have needed to refer to 
the EHSI display or conduct considerable calculation. Romeo was located 132 miles east of their position, 
so the aircraft initiated a left turn following activation of this waypoint (Aeronautica Civil of the Republic 
of Columbia, 1995). This turn away from the airport and the EHSI display were reportedly the definitive 
observables at this point in the accident timeline that were available to the crew.104   
At this point in the accident timeline there was apparently an observation failure since the crew did not 
take action to return the aircraft to the approach path, nor verbalize the flight off course. This could have 
been due to expectation bias. Based on their action to enact the waypoint, they likely updated their 
expectation to ROZO since they intended to set that waypoint, but the actual change in the environment 
was ROMEO. This expectation failure however, could have influenced the crew to change their scan 
pattern for new information. When the crew accepted the runway change, the crew workload appeared to 
increase drastically as indicated by the confusion and discussion in the cockpit as the crew attempted to 
reconfigure the cockpit for the runway change. This likely contributed to the lack of scan of the waypoint 
after it was input into the FMS. Also, this change also apparently introduced distraction of both flight 
                                                      
104 According to the report, “The evidence indicates that either the captain or the first officer selected and 
executed a direct course to the identifier “R,” in the mistaken belief that R was Rozo as it was identified 
on the approach chart.” In addition, “the first automation-related error by the flight crew, the selection of 
Romeo instead of Rozo, was a simple one, based on the method used to generate a selection of navaids 
from the FMS data base, using the single letter identifier. All navaids having that identifier are displayed, 
in descending order of proximity to the airplane. The one closest to the airplane is presented first, the 
second is farther from their position and so on. Selecting R resulted in a display of 12 NDBs, each of 
which used the “R” as an identifier. Choosing the first beacon presented in this list resulted from a logical 
assumption by the pilot.  
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crew members as they attempted to use the FMS to determine their position immediately following 
activation of the waypoint.105   The report did not make a conclusion of whether fatigue was a factor in the 
accident, however it did cite problems with procedure compliance and CRM (Aeronautica Civil of the 
Republic of Columbia, 1995).106 
When assessing association failures, there was evidence some ambiguity of the observables given that 
both beacons “had the same radio frequency, 274 kilohertz, and had the same identifier “R” provided in 
Morse code on that frequency”. Thus, if the observation was made, it is possible that this ambiguity 
would have affected the association process. Also, the crew did not appear to recognize that the left turn 
toward Bogota was abnormal, if they had observed it. This could have resulted in a problem with 
associative understanding, which could have been built from their situation awareness of the environment. 
It appeared that they did not have a clear model of where the waypoints were in relation to their position, 
thus it’s possible that they could have considered the left turn appropriate for a direct to ROZO.  
As mentioned in the discussion of observation process failures, the crew likely held an expectation of 
ROZO based on their action to set it. There was apparently problems with their system understanding 
illustrated by their use of the FMS and lack of anticipation of the behavior there of. It was argued in the 
investigative report that, design logic for the FMS could have contributed to this poor understanding.107   
                                                      
105 According to the report, after they initiated the transition to ROMEO, “ both pilots also attempted to 
determine the airplane’s position in relation to ULQ, the initial approach fix Neither flight crew member 
was able to determine why the navaid was not where they believed it should be, and neither noted nor 
commented on the continued descent.” 
106 The report also stated, “Although the differences between the presentation of the same information 
could be confusing and the selection of Romeo instead of Rozo can be understood according to the logic 
of the FMS, the fact remains that one of the pilots of AA965 executed a direct heading to Romeo in 
violation of AA’s policy of requiring flight crew members of FMS-equipped aircraft to verify coordinates 
and to obtain approval of the other pilot before executing a change of course though the FMS.” 
107 “The investigation determined that because of rules governing the structure of the FMS data base, 
Rozo, despite its prominent display as “R” on the approach chart, was not available for selection as “R” 
from the FMS, but only by its full name. The evidence indicates that this information was not known by 
the flight crew of AA965.”  
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In this case, the possible failures in the observation, association, and expectation processes likely resulted 
in unknown divergence at the initiation of the waypoint transition.  
 
Figure D- 37. Human information processing model for American 965: Event E1 
Event E2: Verbalization of Confusion  
Time Impact – 02m 39s  
Actual State FMS – Waypoint ROMEO 
Situation Deviation from approach into Cali, Colombia  
Event Trigger Change in Observation 
 
At 2 minutes 39 seconds prior to impact, the crew apparently recognized the deviation from the approach 
course which was highlighted by verbalized confusion in the cockpit (Aeronautica Civil of the Republic 
of Columbia, 1995).108  This conversation indicated possible scanning of the instruments perhaps 
addressing the observation failures seen in the previous event. However, the factors of workload, 
distraction, and expectation bias could still have been a factor at this point. The associative understanding 
                                                      
108 “The CVR indicates that the flight crew became confused and attempted to determine their position 
through the FMS. For example, at 2138:49 the first officer asked, “Uh, where are we?” and again 9 
seconds later asked, “Where [are] we headed?” The captain responded, ”I don’t know ... what happened 
here?” The discussion continued as each attempted to determine the position and path of the airplane 
relative to the VOR DME 19 approach to Cali. At 2140:40, the captain indicated that he was having 
difficulty again apparently in locating Tulua VOR through the FMS.” (Aeronautica Civil of the Republic 
of Columbia, 1995). 
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failure could have alleviated as the crew gained more awareness of their position, while not complete, was 
sufficient to recognize their deviation.  
Thus, if the observation and associative understanding failures alleviated feeding definitive information 
into the association process, ambiguity could have recovered also. This indicates that only an expectation 
failure remained at this point. With the observation and association processes feeding contrary 
information to the state selection process compared to expectation, it’s likely this was trapped in state 
selection. 
 
Figure D- 38. Human information processing model for American 965: Event E2 
Event E3: Re-convergence: Change of lateral mode to heading select 
Time Impact – 01m 32s  
Actual State  Heading Select 
Situation Deviation from approach into Cali, Colombia  
Event Trigger Change in Actual State 
 
In response to the lateral deviation, the crew decided to turn right back towards Cali. In this case the crew 
apparently transitioned the automation to enact Heading Select mode.109 In this mode, the lateral target for 
the autopilot is no longer taken from FMS, but from the heading selected on the MCP. It is possible that 
the crew, not understanding the behavior of the automation decided to switch the lateral control, 
effectively contributing to re-convergence in the lateral mode of the auto-pilot.  
                                                      
109 The crew verbalization included the PM stating, “come to the right, right now, come to the right, right 
now.” The PF responded “yeah, we're, we're in a heading select to the right.” 
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Figure D- 39. Human information processing model for American 965: Event E3 
In this case however, re-convergence of the lateral mode of the auto-throttle, was not sufficient to prevent 
the accident as impact occurred approximately one minute later. This accident was complex and 
divergence appeared to occur in multiple channels such as vertical and lateral flight path, terrain 
awareness, in addition to the lateral flight mode of the automation. Thus, it’s likely that the continued 
divergence in vertical flight path or terrain awareness could have remained and further contributed to the 
accident.110 Seventeen seconds prior to the accident, the GPWS annunciated and prompted the crew to 
initiate a recovery to avoid terrain, however this recovery was not successful and ended with the aircraft 
impacting the mountain (Aeronautica Civil of the Republic of Columbia, 1995).. 
Summary  
The accident of American Flight 965 showed evidence of observation, association, and expectation 
process failures. Observation failures could have been attributed to many factors. Expectation of the 
waypoint selection could have influenced the crew’s lack of verification of the waypoint selection. 
Distraction and workload also appeared to play a large part in terms of the lack of observation. In 
addition, the report specified that there could have been improved feedback to the crew regarding this 
error so design also appeared to influence the crew’s performance in observation. In addition, there was 
also the possibility that as the crew’s situation awareness of the situation changed, their associative 
understanding of the situation also updated. A failure in associative understanding could have occurred if 
the crew had recognized the left turn, but didn’t consider it abnormal. In this case, it is possible that their 
insufficient understanding of where the waypoints were disabled them from associating the observations 
                                                      
110 No data was available in the report regarding point of unrecoverability for this accident. However it 
was stated that if the speed brakes had been stowed during recovery that the recovery would have been 
successful. 
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properly. In addition, the report also mentioned that the feedback differentiating ROZO from ROMEO 
was minimal and this ambiguity of observables also could have influenced the association process. 
Finally, in terms of expectation, there was indication of system understanding failures suggested by the 
crew confusion and lack of anticipation of automation behavior.  
Table D - 8. Summary of information processing failures in American 965 accident 
       Failure 
 
 
Case 
Occurrence of 
Observation Process Failure 
Occurrence of 
Association Process 
Failure 
Occurrence of Expectation 
Process Failure 
Expect-
ation 
Bias 
Dist-
raction 
Work
-load Fatigue 
Design 
Influences 
Associative 
Under-
standing 
Ambiguity 
of 
Observables 
Abnormal 
Transition 
System 
Under-
standing 
Perpetuation 
of 
Divergence 
American 
965 x x 
x 
(high) No data x x x x x x 
 
In the case of American 965, it was clear that while analyzing the lateral mode target of the auto-pilot for 
divergence, it was not the only channel of divergence. More comprehensive results could have been 
achieved if multiple channels were analyzed, such as the vertical flight path awareness for example. This 
illustrates a limitation in assessing a single state of interest and care should be taken in interpreting these 
results.  
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D9: Severity of Cases Analyzed 
Since it has been established that some cases of divergence are inconsequential while others can have 
major consequences, it may be more impactful if mitigations were implemented for transitions that are 
particularly prone to divergence, specifically cases of divergence that have potentially severe 
consequences. Mode transitions of concern for the purpose of this thesis are defined as transitions that 
have high potential for divergence and high potential for serious consequences of divergence.  
The cases discussed in the previous chapter provided examples of divergence with various levels of 
consequences. Figure D- 40 depicts the varying degree of severity of the cases analyzed. On the less 
severe side are incidents. These could be further differentiated by the minimum altitude achieved during 
the case. According to this differentiation, American 903 would have been the least severe of all cases 
analyzed due to the lack of injury and the fact that the minimum altitude reached during the case was at 
13,000 feet (Federal Aviation Administration, 2016). The other two incidents occurred on the final 
approach segment and correspondingly had much less altitude buffer, which could indicate higher 
severity than if the same divergence had occurred at a higher altitude. Accidents without fatality were 
considered as more severe than incidents but less severe than fatal accidents. The only case that fell into 
this category in our analysis was Air France 72 which where the divergence resulted in a runway 
excursion. Finally, fatal accidents were considered the most severe of the cases analyzed. Depending on 
the number of fatalities of these accidents, it may be possible to further rate these accidents, however for 
the purpose of this thesis, all fatal accidents are weighted equally.  
 
Figure D- 40. Severity of consequences of cases analyzed 
 
